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I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This document, Investigation of Transitional Management
Problems for the NSTS at NASA, is the final report
summarizing the research carried out in 1986 under a one year
contract between the National Space Transportation System
(NSTS) and the Department of Industrial Engineering at the
University of Houston - University Park (UHUP). The main
purpose of this research is to provide analysis and
recommendations to the NSTS on managing the transition from a
research and development (R/D) structure to an operational
structure. This contract represents a continuation of work
originally begun in 1985 and seeks to take a closer look at
specific transition management problems utilizing the
knowledge gained in preparing the 1985 report.
2.0 PERSONNEL
Two professors and two graduate students performed the
research for this grant. The principal investigator was Dr.
John L. Hunsucker, Associate Professor of Industrial
Engineering and Assistant Dean of the College of Engineering
at UHUP. In addition, Dr. Hunsucker also serves as the
Director of the Engineering Management Graduate Program. The
co-principal investigator was Dr. Japhet Law, Assistant
Professor of Industrial Engineering and Director of
Industrial Engineering Graduate Program at UHUP.
industrial engineering graduate students, Mr. Shaukat
and Mr. Randal Sitton,
from its inception.
the
Two
Brah
have been involved in this project
3.0 DEFINITIONS
O Operations or Operational
"operations" is normally
sense than is used NASA
program to be operational
scheduled test flights.
Era - At NASA, the term
used in a somewhat different
has considered the shuttle
once it completed its four
However, when we refer to
operations here, we mean an organizational structure
set up to insure routine, timely performance. In the
sense it is used here, operations is synonymous with
production.
o Research and Development (R/D) - The term R/D includes
research, development, design, testing, and evaluation
(DDTE). It is also synonymous with the term "design".
o Strategic Planning - Long-range planning.
o Tactical Planning - Short term planning.
o Goal - A desired future state, oftentimes stated in
philosophical terms.
o Objective - A specific action whose accomplishment
will help obtain a goal.
o POP - Program Operating Plan. A budgeting process
done every six months using a 5-year planning horizon.
o OPF - Orbiter Processing Facility. A building at the
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) where the orbiter is made
ready before launching back into space.
o VAB - Vehicle Assembly Building. A building at KSC
where the Orbiter is mated with the ET and the SRBs.
o ET - External Tank which contains the fuel and the
oxidizer for the liquid fuel orbiter engines.
o SRB - Solid Rocket Booster.
o PAD - Launch pad.
o Experience Envelope - The body of knowledge consisting
of the various shuttle component design parameters
such as minimum and maximum temperatures, or maximum
load, etc.
o Flight Rate - The number of flights per year.
o Workloading - The work load or amount of work required
to complete a job.
o Maquiladoras - "Twin plant industry". A concept
whereby a U.S. Company designs and fabricates a
portion of a product and then ships the unfinished
product to its plant in Mexico where the labor
intensive portion of the process is carried out.
o SR/QA - Safety, reliability, and quality assurance.
o Hanger Queen - Normally, an aircraft that spends an
inordinate amount of time in the hanger being
repaired. However, NASA uses the term to denote an
Orbiter incapable of flight, e.g. the Enterprise.
o NRC - National Research Council.
o Closet Management - Top level management making top
level decisions with little or no input from the lo_er
echelons, almost as if the decision is made in a
closet.
o FMEA/CIL HA - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis /
Critical Systems List Hazard Analysis.
o SPC - Shuttle Processing Contractor. The consolidated
contract at KSC, presently held by Lockheed.
4.0 WORK EFFORT
The work
parts:
effort for this project consisted of five
I. A literature search and analysis with particular
emphasis on applications of interest to NSTS, i.e. R/D
to operational transition management.
2. Interviews and analysis
undergone transitions.
of organizations which have
3. Based on literature searches and interviews,
identification of techniques which are applicable to the
transition of NSTS and the presentation of them to
management.
4. Adaptation of the results to the NSTS program.
5. Interaction of the contractor with NASA management to
advise them on transition management.
The results of the first four parts are contained in
this report. The last part involved day-to-day interaction
with various levels of NASA management, the results of which
are interspersed throughout the report.
5.0 STRUCTURE
This report is comprised of eight chapters, each of
which can stand alone with the exception of the last chapter
which relies on the previous chapters to support its recom-
mendations and conclusions. Chapter II
summaries of published literature on
applications of transition, or change
contains additional
the theory and
management. Chapter
III includes the results of interviews with additional
industry personnel whose organizations either have gone
through or are now going through change. The issues of
flight rates and the flight decision process are addressed
in Chapter IV. This chapter also discusses the use of a
computer simulation model to analyze the effect
different parameters on the flight rate.
Chapter V delves further into the issue
of varying
of NASA's
changing demographics and why this may be cause for concern.
The impact of the whole shuttle system structure on the
Challenger accident along with highlights of the Rogers
Commission Report are presented in Chapter VI. Chapter VII
deals with the proposed reorganization of the NSTS management
structure and how this transition from R/D to operations can
be brought about. Finally, Chapter VIII summarizes the year's
work and presents the conclusions of the study.
6.0 OVERVIEW
Parts of this report may seem to dwell excessively on
the theoretical. However, in order to fully appreciate the
magnitude of the task at hand, some understanding of the
theory is important. An in-depth reading of the complete
report is therefore advised.
The intent of this report is tostimulate the problem-
solving environment at NASA. The change from an R/D to an
operational era will be most effective if implemented by NASA
itself and not by an outside source.
7.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The principal investigator would like to express his
sincere appreciation for the diligence of the University of
Houston research team, without whose efforts this work would
not have been accomplished. In addition, thanks are also due
to the Flight Production Office of the NSTS, which not only
provided the funding for this
and support made possible
contained in this report.
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE SEARCH
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The work on a search and review of the literature was
intended to generate a comprehensive information base on the
subject of R/D to Operations Transition Management, which
forms the foundation of our research effort for NASA's NSTS.
Previous work by the authors has identified a void in the
literature specifically addressing transition from R/D to
Operations. In order to fill this void, it was necessary to
research two major areas, namely the characterization of R/D
and Operations Management, and the area of Transition
Management in general.
The work on the characterization of R/D and Operations
Management has resulted in a comprehensive comparison of the
two management environments. Thus, our attempts were
directed towards further search of the literature in the area
of Transition Management based on the major topics of
interest identified in our previous work. This includes an
updated computer search of the available material since our
last search effort, and a 'chaining process' through the
references of articles reviewed in the previous grant. The
results of this effort are seventy-four article summaries,
which are presented in Section 2 of this chapter, along with
a one to four star rating of the articles based on their
relevance to our work.
It is obvious that most of the articles reviewed this
year are somewhat less current than our previous work due to
the generation of the majority of the articles through the
'chaining process'. They did not reveal any new insight into
transition management or the issue of transition from R/D to
Operations; however, they did reinforce the findings from
last year's research. The
dealt with the issues of
resistance to change.
Corporate culture was cited
contend with during a transition.
difficult, time-consuming, and
areas of strongest concurrence
corporate culture and employee
as a powerful
Also, it is one
expensive to change.
force to
that is
Several
consulting firms have methods for attempting cultural change,
but they are exceptionally expensive,
success rates. Concerning change
repeating themes have been noted. One
necessity for employee participation in the change effort.
Another is the consideration of corporate culture during the
planning and implementation phases of the transition effort.
Also, two-way communication before, during, and after the
change effort has taken place is vitally necessary.
Resistance to change was another prominent topic of
discussion. The various types of resistance that may be
experienced during the transition process can be placed in
three categories, based on who makes the change, what kind of
change is involved, and how the change is conducted.
Similarly, the persistence or institutionalization of
slow, and have low
resistance, several
of these is the
change was discussed. It was found by several authors to be
related to the type of organizational reward systems,
unanticipated consequences Of change, discrepancies between
the actual and anticipa%ed future states, upper management
commitment for the program, group forces, and the nature of
the external environment.
Also, they did offer numerous axioms and other "rules-
of-thumb" for change agents and Organizational Development
(OD) practitioners. Other noteworthy subjects examined in
this set of papers were the use of change agents, the Lewin
three-phase model of transition (unfreeze, change, freeze),
the presence of a catalyst to initiate the transition
process, and the systems approach to organizational analysis
and problem diagnosis.
Several notable transition management programs were
presented and discussed. It was found that these programs
are mainly concerned with the aspects of planning, use of
power, types of interpersonal relationships, and rate of
change. Moreover, they may be focused either at individuals,
groups of individuals, or organizational structural variables
such as division of labor or reward systems. The change
programs most often discussed in this set of articles were OD
and Action Research (AR). Some of the OD methods discussed
included Confrontation, Team Building, Laboratory Training,
Encounter Groups, Behavior
Analysis. Action Research
technique in which the
Modification, and Transactional
was described as a change
scholarly researchers that are
studying an organization actively take part in the transition
process by enhancing the organization's own capacity for
problem diagnosis and correction. AR involves preliminary
diagnosis, datacollection, presentation of collected data to
the organization, data analysis by the organization, action
planning, and action.
Finally, in order to adequately summarize the results of
this literature search, a cross-correlation matrix that shows
relevant transition management concepts and the articles that
support them is presented.
2.0 SUMMARIES OF THE LITERATURE
PAPER USEFULNESS LEGEND:
* NO DIRECT RELEVANCE
** SEEMS TO HAVE SOME RELEVANCE
*** SEEMS TO HAVE A MODERATE AMOUNT OF RELEVANCE
**** SEEMS TO HAVE QUITE A BIT OF RELEVANCE
[ i] (**) Ackoff,
Wiley, 1974).
R. L., Redesigninq the Future (New York:
Ackoff acknowledges the importance of employee
participation in the organizational transition process.
Thus, he proposes a "circular" organizational structure
that gives workers at every level in an organization the
ability to participate in decisions that will directly
affect them. A typical organizational structure is
given in Figure 2.1, and an example of a circular
structure is given in Figure 2.2. In this structure, a
board is placed at each level in the organization, which
establishes policies and monitors performance of the
managers reporting to it. Each manager operating in the
circular organization is a member of the board to which
he reports, the board to which his superior reports, and
the chairman of the boards to which each of his
immediate subordinates reports. Thus, the author claims
that he makes every unit of the system - except the
lowest element - participate in the management of both
the larger system of which it is part and the smaller
systems that are part of it.
[2] (**) Alderfer, C. P., "Change Processes in
Organizations," in M. D. Dunnette (Ed.) Handbook of
Industrial and Organizational P___choloq_ (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 197-6_.
The author presents the following axioms for change
agents to follow when attempting organizational change:
(I) In deciding where to start and with whom to work, a
consultant should keep in mind the tendency for both
the openness and closedness of boundaries between
groups to be self-sustaining.
(2) An optimal structure for changing organizations
consists of establishing a team (or series of teams)
including insiders and outsiders.
(3) The team needs to have optimally open boundaries and
relationships of mutuality among team members and
between the team and the system.
(4) Permanent change in systems (or subsystems) is most
likely to be achieved and sustained if programmed
through a series of cycles including diagnosis,
action, and evaluation which are carried out by both
insiders and outsiders.
(5) Since knowledge depends on having access to
information and closed systems restrict the flow of
information, change agents can increase the
probability of a successful change program if they
move the system toward having more optimally open
boundaries with mutual relationships.
[ 3] (**) Armenakis, A. A., H. S. Feild, and W. H. Holley,
"Guidelines for Overcoming Empirically Identified
Evaluation Problems of Organizational Development Change
Agents," Human Relations, Vol. 29 (1976), 1147-1161.
One of the phases in an OD transition program is
the evaluation phase. This phase is important, because
data from the evaluation serve as feedback to the
organization, as well as a basis for justification of
the time and effort expended in the effort. However,
the process of evaluation is hindered due to three basic
categories of problems: (I) Methodological, (2)
Administrative, and (3) Miscellaneous. Methodological
problems include the selection and quantitative
measurement of "soft" criteria, controlling for
extraneous influences, overcoming criterion
deficiencies, and dealing with time lags between
transition efforts and results. Administrative problems
primarily deal with the difficulty in devoting time and
financial resources to evaluation of OD efforts.
Miscellaneous problems include communicating to managers
what OD can and cannot do, and managing conflict between
adequate research design and client assistance. These
problems are outlined in Table 2.1. In order to
overcome these problems, the authors cite various
studies and papers that have addressed these issues and
present possible courses of action.
[4] (**) Armenakis, A. A., and R. W. Zmud, "Interpreting the
Measurement of Change in Organizational Research,"
Personnel _, Vol. 32 (1979), 709-724.
The detection and measurement of Beta changes
(changes due to a recalibration of the measurement scale
over time by the subjects) is empirically demonstrated
in this article through an experiment conducted with
members of a U. S. Army training brigade,. The vehicle
used in accessing organizational change is the Survey of
Organizations Questionnaire, and the experiment was
administered at two points in time with no intervention
in between. Present ("how it is now") and ideal ("how
I'd like it to be") perceptions of various
organizational dimensions were used to establish two
........scales of measurement, actor analysis was used to
consolidate the twenty one perceptions into two
distinguishable factors for each measurement scale.
After elimination the possibility of the presence of
Gamma changes (change of subjects' perception of the
criterion being measured) through the use of congruence
coefficient tests on the distinguishable factors,
comparisons of the scores in the two scales over time
were made to establish the presence of Beta change. It
was observed that while the difference between ideal
versus present scores remained unchanged over time, the
actual scores themselves were found to have
significantly changed. Further analysis into the
sources of internal validity such as testing,
maturation, etc. was also presented.
[ 5] (****) Beer, M., and J. W. Driscoll, "Strategies for
Change," in J. R. Hackman and J. L. Suttle (Eds.)
Improving Life at Work (Santa Monica, CA: Goodyear
Publishing Co., Inc., 1977).
Five conditions required for successful change were
outlined: (i) People in the organization must feel
pressure in order to change, (2) Participation and
involvement of people in reexamining problems and
practices are needed to build commitment to change, and
to assure that behaviors and attitudes once changed
remain changed without surveillance and control, (3) New
ideas, models, and concepts must be brought in from the
outside to help people in the organization find new
approaches that will improve the quality of work life,
(4) To ensure successful transition and prevent massive
failures that can slow the momentum of change, early
innovations leading to improvements should be limited in
scope, and (5) A skilled leader or consultant is often
needed to bring in new ideas, catalyze the process of
reexamination, and support individuals in the process of
improving the quality of work life. Also, several
considerations for the selection of a proper
organization transition strategy were given. These
considerations include the amount of power shared
between management and subordinates, the appropriate
definition of a change-target boundary, the amount of
centralization in transition planning and strategy
formulation, and the rate of organizational change.
[6] (***) Bennis, W. G., Changing Organizations: Essays o__nn
the Development and Evolution of Human Organizations
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).
The author identified seven types of change
programs: exposition and propagation (use of knowledge
to change people and organization); elite-corps (putting
the right people in the right places); staff (use of
staff personnel to act as an intelligence-gathering
agency); scholarly consultations (use of scholarly and
[7]
academic procedures such as research and investigation
to develop change strategies); circulation of ideas to
the elite (getting change ideas to the people in power
or to those who influence people in power);
developmental research (taking theoretical transition
theories and developing implementation strategies); and
action research (the use of change agents to research
and solve client problems, except that the roles of the
change agent and the client may change and reverse). In
those programs that utilize change agents, a six phase
strategy was specified:
Phase I: Away from the client's plant location,
personnel are exposed to behavioral science
theory and participate in encounter-type
sessions.
Phase 2: Team training is conducted off-site.
Phase 3: Meetings stressing the achievement of better
integration between functional groups takes
place.
Phase 4: Groups of ten to twelve managers get together
and set goals for the total organization.
Afterwards, mechanisms for achieving the goals
are planned.
Phase 5: The change agent attempts to help the
organization realize the goals established in
Phase 4.
Phase 6: Stabilization of the changes brought about
during the prior phases.
(****) Bennis, W. G., "A Typology of Change Processes,"
in W. G. Bennis, K. D. Benne, and R. Chin, The Planning
of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.,
1961).
Based upon the persons formulating transition goals
and the distribution of power among the members of the
organization, eight types of organizational change are
presented in this article. These types, presented in
Table 2.2, are: (i) Planned change, (2) Interactional
change, (3) Technocratic change, (4) "Natural" change,
(5) Indoctrinational change, (6) Socialization change,
(7) Coercive change, and (8) Emulative change. Planned
change involves deliberate mutual goal setting by one or
both parties, and an equal power ratio. Indoctrination
incorporates mutual goal setting, but has an imbalanced
power ratio. Coercive change consists of one-sided
deliberate goal setting, and an imbalance in power.
Technocratic change relies solely on collecting,
interpreting, and disseminating data. Interactional
change is a non-deliberate (possibly unconscious) change
characterized by mutual goal setting and equal power
distribution. Socialized change is non-deliberate,
involving mutual goal setting and an imbalance in power.
Emulative change is non-deliberate change brought about
through a form of identification with and emulation of
the "power figures" by the subordinates. Natural change
is change with no deliberateness or goal setting on the
part of those involved; in other words, this is a
"catch-all" category for change occurring inadvertently
or by a "quirk of fate".
[8] (***) Cartwright, D., "Achieving Change in People: Some
Applications of Group Dynamics Theory," Human Relations,
Vol. 4, No. 4 (1951), 381-392.
This article describes the use of the forces
operating in groups, or group dynamics, to achieve
organizational change. For example, it is shown that
when a group as a whole made a decision to have its
members change their behavior, this was two to ten times
as effective in producing actual change as was a lecture
urging members to change. From the application of group
dynamics to organizational change, eight principles have
been identified by the authors. These are:
(i) Group members who are to be changed and those who
are to exert influence for change must have a strong
sense of belonging to the same group.
(2) The more attractive the group is to its members, the
greater is the influence that the group can exert on
its members.
(3) In attempts to change attitudes, values, or
behavior, the more relevant they are to the basis of
attraction to the group, the greater will be the
influence that the group can exert upon the members.
(4) The greater the prestige of a group member in the
eyes of the other members, the greater the influence
he can exert.
(5) Efforts to change individual or subparts of a group
which, if successful, would have the result of
making them deviate from the norms of the group will
encounter strong resistance.
(6) Strong pressure for changes in the group can be
established by creating a shared perception by
members of the need for change, thus making the
source of pressure for change lie within the group.
(7) Information relating to the need for change, plans
for change, and consequences of change must be
shared by all relevant people in the group.
(8) Change in one part of a group produces strain in
other related parts which can be "reduced only by
eliminating the change or by bringing about
readjustments in the related parts.
[ 9] (*) Clark, P., Action Research and Organizational Change
(London: Harper & Row Ltd., 197_-_.
The use of Action Research (AR) as a method of
transition management was examined. The author cites
[IO]
that AR aims to contribute both to the practical
concerns of people in a problematic situation and to the
goals of social science by joint collaboration within a
mutually acceptable ethical framework. It is a type of
applied social research differing from other varieties
in the immediacy of the researcher's involvement in the
action process. Thus, Action Research must possess an
aspect of direct involvement in organizational change,
and must simultaneously provide an increase in scholarly
knowledge. The book outlines strategies, tactics, and
qualifications for action researchers, as well as
providing case studies for analysis.
(*) Clark, P., and J. Ford, "Methodological and
Theoretical Problems in the Investigation of Planned
Organizational Change," Sociological Review, Vol. 18,
No. 1 (1970), 29-52.
In this article, the authors raised the issue of
questionable methodological and theoretical standings of
current research in the area of planned organizational
change (POC). After establishing the need for
sociological research in the area of POC, they outlined
various major models, and elaborated on the weakness of
these frameworks. These included the post facto nature
of the studies, thus creating a tendency for the
research to be dependent on data collected in the POC
process. The absence of failures reported also raised
the question of how representative these studies were of
the population of POC. Another major concern was the
issue of what is included and excluded from these
....studies, In particular, the lack of mentioning of
antecedents to POC, resolution of conflicts and
resistance, and the analytical frameworks used was
noted.
The authors proposed an alternative approach to the
study of POC, emphasizing on a tandem relationship
between the researcher and the consultants assigned to
the POC. They also described some concurrent research
they were conducting into POC, and the experience with
the simplification of their approach.
[ii] (***) Coch, L., and J. R. P. French, "Overcoming
" Human Relations, Vol 1 (1948),Resistance to Change,
512-532.
This paper describes an experiment to study the use
of group methods to overcome the resistance to change in
the work environment. Starting with general
observations of past data with respect to changed
groups, a preliminary theory was devised to account for
the resistance. It was believed that resistance to
change is a motivational problem, and that there are two
forces involved in the change process. There is a
driving force toward the achievement of production goals
which increases as one gets closer to the goal, and a
restraining force which increases with the level of
production. The conflict of these two forces produces
frustration, which then results in high turn-over and
absenteeism. The amount of 'we-feeling' was also
thought to be an important factor in the resistance to
change, that strong psychological subgroups with
negative attitudes display strong resistance, whereas
those with positive attitudes are the best learners in a
changed environment.
The experiment was set up with different groups of
workers, all of which have similar profiles in their
work efficiency rating, amount of 'we-feeling' within
the group, and were assigned to new tasks with similar
degrees of change. One group was set up so that worker
representation was involved in the design of the change,
while two other groups have total worker participation
in the design Of the change program. A control group
was included with no worker participation at all. The
result from the experiment indicated that the three
groups with worker participation were able to recover to
the former work efficiency in a short time, and actually
proceeded to exceed previous performance levels. The
control group have no improvement in their work
efficiency, and displayed marked aggression against
management and high turn-over in the work force.
Based on the data, it was concluded that the rate
of recovery is proportional to the amount of
participation, which in turn provided higher morale in
the work force during the change process. The use of
group techniques in the design of the change process
improved the communication for the need of change and
increased participation in planning the change. A
second experiment was conducted with the control group
going through the participative change process,
resulting in improvement in the work efficiency as in
the first three groups in the first experiment.
[12] (**) Conlon, E. J., "Feedback About Personal and
Organizational Outcomes and its Effect on Persistence of
Plannned Behavioral Changes," Academy of Management
Journal, Vol. 23 (!980), 267-286.
This article addresses the issue of the endurance
of change in an organization. Once the decision to
change is made, events may occur that cause an
individual to reevaluate the newly adopted behavior (see
Figure 2.3). Some types of feedback that initiate the
reevaluation process include contradictions, unexpected
outcomes, and new alternatives. Based upon a study done
by the author, three things may be stated concerning
feedback and the persistence of change:
(I) Confirming and disconfirming feedback about the
expected outcomes of a behavior affects the decision
to persist only when the outcomes are valued.(2) It is the content of feedback, and not its presence,
that affects behavior and beliefs.
(3) Feedback has an impact on the strength of beliefs to
which it is targeted and, when no other feedback is
available, may transfer beliefs about outcomes that
are indirectly related to the instrumental feedback.
[13] (**) "Corporate Culture: The Hard-to-Change Values That
Spell Success or Failure," Business Week, 27 October
1980, 148-160.
[14]
Due to the pervasiveness of corporate culture,
cultural change is one of the most difficult tasks that
management can undertake. One of the major problems
of cultural change is the relative immutability of
culture, along with the fact that that few executives
consciously recognize what their company's culture is
and how it manifests itself. If cultural change is
required, the company needs to examine its existing
culture in depth and to acknowledge the reasons for
revolutionary change. The change should be marked by a
changed structure, new role models, new incentive
systems, and new rewards and punishments. Some
successful cultural change methods and strategies
include the preparation of the organization's current
and desired mission, goals and targets, the use of
employee participation, and increased organizational
communication.
(*) Cronbach, L., and L. Furby, "How Should We Measure
Change - Or Should We?," Psychological Bulletin, Vol.
74 (1970), 68-80. .........
This paper argues that "raw change" or "raw gain"
scores, formed by subtracting pretest scores form
posttest scores, lead to fallacious conclusions
concerning the amount of change made. This is primarily
because such scores are systematically related to any
random error of measurement. Thus, gain scores are
rarely useful, no matter how they may be adjusted or
refined. Due to this conclusion, the authors present
superior ways of estimating true change and true
residual change scores. Also, it develops new and
better estimators for measures of change.
[15] (***) Dalton, G. W., "Influence and Organizational
Change," in J. B. Ritchie and P. Thompson (Eds%)
Organization and People: Readings, Cases, and Exercises
i__nnOrganizational Behavior (St. Paul: West Publishing
Co., 1976).
OD change agents will act more as an adviser and
facilitator of change rather than a Change initiator.
In order to give structure to the transition process, a
four-step sequential model for induced organizational
change is presented. In this model (see Table 2.3), the
four steps are: (i) Tension occurs in the system, (2)
Intervention of a prestigious influencing agent, (3)
Individuals attempt to implement the proposed changes,
and (4) New behaviors and attitudes are formed,
accompanied by decreasing dependence on the influencing
agent. This four-step model can be mapped into the
familiar Lewin three-step model (Unfreeze, Change,
Refreeze) model as shown in Table 2.4. Furthermore, the
authors have found four conditions which must occur
during the transition process in order for successful
transition to occur. First, the organization must move
away from generalized goals toward specific objectives.
Second, social ties built around previous behavior
patterns must be abandoned for new relationships which
support the intended changes in behavior and attitudes.
Third, self-doubt and a lowered sense of self-esteem
must be replaced with a heightened sense of self-esteem.
Fourth, an external motive for change must be changed to
an internal motive for change. These concepts are
presented in Table 2.5.
[16] (***) Davey, N., The External Consultant's Role in
Organizational Change (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State
University Press, 1971).
Based on the author's research into the external
consultant's role in organizational change, a framework
for the development of an organization - consultant
relationship which will result in a high level of
effectiveness was developed. Some of the identified
arrangements that should be observed in order to make
consultant assistance more effective were:
(i) In considering consultant help, an organization
should allow that some changes may be necessary and
should reflect this by its identification and
engagement of a consultant.
(2) An organization should regard a consultant as an
expert resource, and a collaborating equal, and
ensure his participation in the consideration of
any changes which should be made in the assignment
during its progress.
(3) An organization should not closely direct a
consultant's work, nor unreasonably constrain him
by restricting personal contacts or access to
organizational information.
(4) A consultant should work closely and directly with
members of the client organization and provide for
their participation in the consulting assignment
either by assignment to specific working roles,
discussion of findings, or an opportunity to
(5)
initiate proposals.
An organization should establish a specific point
of contact and liaison for a consultant - either
the assignment sponsor or other organization member
- who can initiate other organization contacts and
through whom the consultant can report.
[17] (**) Davis, Shel, "Thoughts on Planned Change and Change
Diffusion", Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol.
12 (1976), 230-238.
The author of this paper discussed his opinion on
various concepts in change projects :
a • Change projects should not be sheltered; extension
both upwards and downwards within the organization
should be practiced. Projects that are 'walled-off'
get started easier, but one should have long term
outlook for the results on change projects.
be Change projects can get started through productivity
issues, through suggestions of the line managers, or
through people in the personnel function who's
familiar with powerful, proven techniques in
changing the pay structure, training methods etc.
Co Involve enough units in the organization with
credible managers ('golden boys', with delegated
authority), and in a fairly short time (one to two
years) to get big payoff in the effort that is
visible in the organization. Selection of these
'golden boys' are intuitive and involves trial-and-
error. Limited resources in most change projects
necessitates careful selection of the target units.
do Need good, strong inside people with continuity and
understanding of the culture. Together with outside
consultants, develop and update the 'white paper'
(what are we up to, and how are we going to proceed
in the change project).
e. Inertia provides resistance to change.
implement plans in new units.
Easier to
[18] (***) Ernest, R. C., "Corporate Cultures and Effective
Planning," Personnel Administrator, March 1985, 49-60.
The author states that effective business planning
requires an understanding of not only the external
competitive environment, but also the internal corporate
culture (see Figure 2.4). Based on the author's
research, five orientations were found to be critical in
defining a company's culture: (I) Marketing orientation,
(2) employee orientation, (3) Problem-solving
orientation, (4) Innovation orientation, and (5) Service
/ quality orientation. The interrelationships of these
five orientations may be summarized by using an
"organizational culture grid" (see Figure 2.5). The two
dimensions on the grid that define culture are "action"
and "people". The amount of corporate "action" may be
classified as being "reactive" or "proactive", while the
amount of "people" orientation may be from
"participative" to "nonparticipative". Based on the
action and people dimensions, four culture types may be
identified: (I) Interactive, (2) Integrated, (3)
Systematized, and (4) Entrepreneurial. The Cultural
Grid is useful for strategic planning, organizational
development, human resource planning, employee
selection, orientation and training, compensation, and
performace appraisal and promotion systems.
[19] (***) Fierman, J., "The Corporate
Fortune, October 17, 1983, 66-72.
Culture Vultures,"
Due to the influence of corporate culture, it has
been suggested that corporate strategy alone, no matter
how well formulated, Cannot produce winning results. A
number of consulting firms have devised methods to
attempt cultural change. The Management Analysis Center
(MAC) has developed the CEO's Change Agenda for
instituting cultural change. The first three steps
focus on planning. Next, the chief executive is to
forge a vision of the new strategy and the shared values
needed to make it work, then communicate this to
employees via speeches, memos, and more informal
contacts. Monitoring of the progress of this strategy
is an on-going process. The last three MAC items
specify methods of creating change. One of these is for
the leader to use the budgeting process and internal
public relations as levers for change.
Other consultants treat culture less globally,
using questionnaires to measure organizational climate,
and then use conventional tools such as feedback
sessions and team-building techniques to initiate
change. Also, hiring, promoting, and terminating
systems can effectively be used to build culture and
"weed out" incompatibles. However, consultants also
state that cultural change is slow and costs too much,
and is justifiable only under five conditions: (I) The
company has strong values that don't fit a changing
environment, (2) The industry is very competitive and
moves with lightning speed, (3) The company is mediocre
or worse, (4) The company is about to join the ranks of
the very largest companies, or (5) The company is small
but growing rapidly.
[20] (***) Franklin, J. L., "Characteristics of Successful
and Unsuccessful Organization Development," Journal of
[21]
Applied Behavioral
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Science, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1976), 471-
It is often important to identify OD approaches
which are effective across a spectrum of change
situations. This paper, however, addresses the dual to
the above problem; namely the identification of
characteristics of the organization which are correlated
to the success of the change effort regardless of the OD
technique used. Twenty five organizations were studied.
Questionnaires were conducted both at the beginning and
the end of the =change effort, Which then provides an
input in classifying the change effort into 'successful'
and 'unsuccessful' categories. Continuous monitoring of
the change effort through interviews with key personnel
and review of meetings and reports.
Eight major categories of characteristics were
investigated, namely: organization's environment,
characteristics of the organization, initial contact
between the OD team and the members of the organization,
formal entry procedures and commitment, data gathering
activities, internal change agent characteristics,
external agent characteristics, and exit procedures.
Statis£ical tests were applied, and revealed that
organization's environment, organization's
characteristics, entry and commitment, and internal
change agent were significant factors in relation to the
success of the OD effort. In particular, successful
change efforts were related to organizations that are
open and involved in adjusting to the change, with
specific and great commitment to the OD efforts. It is
interesting to note also that careful selection of
internal change agents who possesses assessment-
prescriptive skills and has little related experience in
change efforts correlates with successful changes in the
organizations. Details of the differentiation ability
of the eight categories, together with the individual
dimensions within each category are provided in Table
2.6. Implications and limitations of these results are
also discussed in the paper.
(**) French, Wendell L., and Cecil H.
Organization Development (Second Edition)
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978).
Bell, Jr.,
(Englewood
This book describes OD as a long-range effort to
improve an organization's problem-solving and renewal
processes, particularly through a more effective and
collaborative management of organization culture - with
special emphasis on the culture of formal work teams -
with the assistance of a change agent, or catalyst, and
the use of the theory and technology of applied
behavioral science, including action research (AR).
Action research consists of (i) a preliminary diagnosis,
[22]
[23]
(2) data gathering from the client :group, (3) data
feedback to the client group, (4) data exploration by
the client group, (5) action planning, and (6) action.
The use of action research as a change strategy differs
from most other strategies in that the AR consultant
does not present formal conclusions and recommendations
to the client organization; rather, the AR consultant
gathers data and assists in the way the client solves
problems.
(**) Golembiewski, R. T., K. Billingsley, and S.
Yeager, "Measuring Change and Persistence in Human
Affairs: Types of Change Generated by OD Designs",
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Vol. 12 (1976),
133-157.
A discussion of the three types of change generated
by OD designs are provided, namely Alpha, Beta, and
Gamma changes. Alpha change pertains to a variation in
the level of some state within a relatively constant
measurement interval. Beta change involves a change due
to recalibration of the intervals used to measure the
state of interest within the conceptual domain. Gamma
change relates to a major shift in conceptualization of
the dimensions of reality, or a redefinition of the
relevant dimensions being measured. Brief discussions
are presented where similar distinction of changes
exists in the field of psychological counseling and
other sciences.
The authors then elaborated on factorial analysis
based methods to demonstrate the existence (or the
strong indication of existence) of Gamma changes in an
OD structural intervention experiment by Golembiewski,
Hilles, and Kagno (1973). Through the use of
congruential tests of the factorial structures, the
authors concluded that Alpha and Beta changes were
inadequate to explain the magnitude of changes present
in the data. They further stated that the existence of
Gamma changes is difficult to establish. However, the
statistical procedures given do provide a reasonable
approach to suggest its existence, and that it is very
important that attention be devoted to the three
different types of changes when dealing with
experimental design in behavioral research.
(**) Golembiewski, R. T., and A. Blumberg, "The
Laboratory Approach to Organizational Change:
Confrontation Design," Journal of the Academy of
Management, Vol. ii (1968), 199-21_ n
The authors propose that confrontation between
groups may be used as a method of organizational change.
There are several prerequisites for the use of
confrontation design as a transition method. First,
[24]
[25]
there must be participants that are hierarchically
and/or funcitonally involved in some common flow of
work. Second, confrontations involve two or more
organizational entities whose members have real and
unresolved issues with one another. Third,
confrontation designs involve the mutual development of
images as a basis for attempting to highlight unresolved
issues. These images are usually three-dimensional in
nature, along the lines of: (i) How do we see ourselves
in relation to the Relevant Other?, (2) How does the
Relevant Other see us?, and (3) How do we see the
Relevant Other?. Fourth, confrontation designs must
provide for the sharing of 3-D images created by the
groups in confrontation. Fifth, confrontation designs
assume that significant organizational problems often
are caused by blockages in communication. Sixth,
confrontations should be short-cycle affairs. Seventh,
confrontation designs typically are seen as springboards
for organizational action. The authors note that
confrontation design seems widely applicable, but some
potential host organizations are not culturally prepared
for it.
(*) Golembiewski, R., and S. Carrigan, "The Persis[ence
of Laboratory Induced Changes in Organization Styles,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 15 (September,
1970), 330-340.
The authors reported the results of a follow-up
study to an earlier experiment, in which a learning
design based on a laboratory approach induced changes in
interpersonal and intergroup styles in a small sales
organization. In this work, two more observations were
obtained subsequent to the earlier experiment using the
Likert profile of organizational characteristics to
gauge the changes. The major finding was that the
laboratory-induced changes in interpersonal and
intergroup styles had a sustaining effect over the
eighteen month time frame.
(**) Goodman, P. S., M. Bazerman, and E. Colon,
"Institutionalization of Planned Organizational Change,"
in B. M. Shaw and L. L. Cummings (Eds.) Research in
Organizational Behavior (Vol. 2) (Greenwich, Corm: JAI
Press, 1980).
This article outlines the factors that contribute
to the institutionalization or persistence of
organizational change. Some of these factors include
the type and nature of the organization's reward
allocation system, unanticipated consequences of change,
discrepancies between the actual and anticipated future
states, amount of sponsorship of the change program by
upper management, group forces, commitment, publicity of
[26]
[27]
the change program, internal
and the nature of the
environment.
intergrdup dependencies,
organization's external
(**) Greenwald, R., "Companies Need to Establish Climate
That Fosters Innovation," Industrial Engineering, April
1985.
The author notes that there are three major
barriers to innovation: (i) Too little or too much
structure, (2) An organizational culture that
discourages innovation, and (3) Lack of employee
responsibility for implementation of their ideas.
Today, it is recognized that innovation is not a luxury,
but a life-or-death issue for business. Innovation can
flourish in an organization that has enough structure to
impose order on chaos, but not so much that creativity
is stifled. Also, while structure allows a company to
function smoothly, a bureaucratic organization resists
change and is slow to accept new ideas due to the large
amount of inertia that exists in such organizations.
Furthermore, ideas may never be developed if inter-
departmental rivalry is very intense, since departmental
interests will be pursued at the expense of the company
as a whole.
(**) Greiner, L. E., "Patterns of
Change," Harvard Business Review, Vol.
1967), 119-130.
Organizational
45 (May/June
This article discusses various means to initiate
transition. The concepts the author introduces are
grouped into three categories: (i) Unilateral action,
(2) Power Sharing, and (3) Delegated Authority.
Transition methods involving unilateral action include
change by decree, employee replacement, or
organizational restructuring. Power sharing techniques
include group decision making and group problem solving.
Authority delegation methods include case discussion and
T-group sessions. T-group sessions, usually used by top
management', attempt to increase an individual's self-
awareness and sensitivity to group social processes. It
was found that most successful transitions occurred when
there was strong internal and external pressure toward
change. Also, use of shared power techniques or a
redistribution of power within the organization
contributed to successful transition. Less successful
transitions were noted by inconsistency in the change
steps and the use of unilateral or delegated authority
concepts. From the case studies, the author developed a
transition model composed of the following six phases:
(I) Pressure and Arousal, (2) Intervention and
Reorientation, (3) Diagnosis and Recognition, (4)
Invention and Commitment, (5) Experimentation and
[28]
Search, and (6) Reinforcement and Acceptance.
model is presented in Figure 2.6.
This
(**) Greiner, L. E., and L. B. Barnes, "Organization
Change and Development," in G. W. Dalton et. al. (Eds.)
Organizational Change & Development (Homewood, Ill.:
Irwin Dorsey,' 1970). --
[29]
The authors propose that all change programs have
four elements in common: planning (ranging from
structured to unstructured), use of power (ranging from
unilateral to delegated authority), type of
interpersonal relationships (from impersonal to
personal), and tempo (from revolutionary to
evolutionary). Also, a four-phase model for
organizational change was proposed. Phase 1 consists of
diagnosing organizational problems, Phase 2 involves
planning for change, Phase 3 entails the execution of
the change plan, and Phase 4 is a analysis of the
outcome of the change program.
(*) Hummon, Norman P., Patrick Doreian, and Klaus
Teuter, "A Structural Control Model of Organizational
Change," American Sociological Review, Vol. 40 (1975),
813-824.
A structural control model relating the size and
structure (levels of differentiation) of an organization
is proposed. The variables involved were: (i) The
number of employees primarily performing output tasks of
the organization, (2) The number of divisions
functionally differentiating the work force, (3) The
number of supervisory employees, and (4) The mean number
of hierarchical levels over all divisions. A system of
linear equations was formulated to show the structure of
the control variables. This was further developed into
a system of linear differential equations when the
change of state variables over time was considered.
The system was applied to data reported in the
literature and found to be interpretable with
empirically observed relationships, which provides an
alternate view of the organizational change process.
[30] (****) Huse, E., Organization Development and Change
(St. Paul, MN: West, 1975).
This book discusses the use of Organizational
Development (OD) techniques for change. Some of the
methods discussed include Action Research,
Confrontation, Management By Objectives, Team Building,
Laboratory Training, Encounter Groups, Behavior
Modification, Transactional Analysis, and Human Resource
Accounting. It also closely examines the types,
qualities, and roles of an organizational development
practitioner (i.e., change agent). Selected
and case studies concerning the role of
organizational change are also included.
readings
OD in
[31] (**) Jones, G., Planned Organizational Change (New York:
Praeger, 1969).
client
help c
establ
betwee
of cha
This book notes the importance of change agents and
their strategies in the transition process. They serve
to identify and clarify the goals of change for the
system, develop useful strategies and tactics to
lient systems solve their own problems, and
ish and maintain appropriate working relationships
n the parties engaged in the
nge agents were discussed:
agents, who can be a person, group,
that are employed by the client
achieving improved organizational
change catalysts, who may or may
change. Three types
(I) regular change
or an organization,
system to assist in
performance; (2)
not be professional
agents, that influences the speed of transition but does
not actively participate or undergo change during the
transition process; and (3) pacemakers, who are action-
oriented and are involved in aspects of stimulation,
control, coordination and regulation of organizational
behavior (they do not bring about change, but simply
guarantees the maintenance of change).
[32] (**) Jones, G., "Strategies and Tactics of
Organizational Change," Human Organization,
(1965), 192-200.
Planned
Vol. 23
Six major elements were identified in the change
process: (i) Change Agents, (2) Client system, (3)
Goals, (4) Strategies and tactics, (5) Structuring of
change, (6) Evaluation. This article primarily focuses
on the strategies and tactics of organizational change.
Strategy refers to the planning and directing of
operations, while tactic relates to the maneuvering of
forces into position(s) of advantage. Three classes of
strategy were discussed: (i) Coercive strategies, (2)
Normative strategies, and (3) Utilitarian strategies.
Coercive strategies are characterized by non-mutual
goal-setting and an imbalanced power relationship.
Normative strategies place emphasis on the use of
normative power as a major source of
techniques of control are usually the
symbolic rewards and symbols, employment
administration of rituals. Utilitarian
characterized by control over material
rewards through the allocation
contribution, benefits, and services.
Three useful
(i) The use of
actively becoming
control. The
manipulation of
of leaders, and
strategies are
resources and
of increased
tactics of organizational change are:
Action Research (research personnel
involved as a manipulator in the
change process), (2) Organizational structure
modification, and (3) Marginality (the use of
facilitators that share the same value systems of both
the new and old states).
[33] (**) Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, The Change Masters:
Innovation for Productivity in the American Corporation
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983)
This book deals with the topic of increasing
employee innovation and initiative through
organizational change. Kanter argues that American
management has been reluctant to abandon the managerial
methods that were successful in the 1950's and 1960's.
Thus, many of the organizations that continue to use
these outdated methods are currently experiencing low
productivity, decreased profits, or overwhelming losses.
However, Kanter notes that companies with "progressive"
human resource practices, such as IBM, General Electric,
and Xerox, have significantly higher long-term
profitability and financial growth than companies which
do not effectively utilize human resource management
techniques to adapt to environmental changes. From this
observation, the concept of "Change Masters" was
developed. Kanter defined Change Masters as being
"people and organizations that are adept at the art of
anticipating the need for, and of leading, productive
change". In order to more precisely define what
practices either stimulate or inhibit innovation and
initiative, she closely examined ten companies; some of
these included Hewlett-Packard, Wang Laboratories,
Polaroid, General Electric, and General Motors. Based
on her observations of these companies, she asserts that
an American corporate Renaissance is needed which would
restore American industry to its former place of
leadership and innovation.
[34] (**) Katz, D., and R. L.
in The Social Psychology
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
Kahn, "Organizational Change",
of Organizations (New York:
I_-_0), 390-451.
Transition programs may be focused either at
individuals, groups of individuals, or organizational
structural variables. Individual-oriented programs,
such as information dissemination, training, counseling,
psychotherapy, employee selection and placement,
termination (firing), and behavior modification, have a
history of failure due to a disregard on the part of the
change agent of the systemic properties of organizations
and from the confusion of individual changes with
modification in organizational variables. Group
approaches to organizational change include sensitivity
training, T-groups, surveys, and feedback processes.
However, it was noted that the direct manipulation of
[35]
[36]
organizational structural variables, such as the
authority structure, reward structure, and the division
of labor, is a more powerful approach to producing
enduring systemic change.
(*) Kimberly, J. R., and W. R. Nielson, "Organizational
Development and Change in Organizational Performance,"
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 20 (June 1975),
191-206.
This study examined the impact of an OD effort on
organizational performance using a model of causal
linkages in planned change (see Figure 2.7) which
appears to underlie the OD approach to organizational
intervention. The transition program consisted of six
phases: (i) Initial diagnosis, (2) Team skills training,
(3) Data collection, (4) Data confrontation, (5) Action
planning, (6) Team building, and (7) Intergroup
building. Significant positive changes in target group
attitudes and perceptions were found, as was significant
positive change in quality of output and in profit. No
change in the levels of productivity was found, and a
strong positive correlation between those levels and
levels for the industry as a whole was interpreted as
indicating that this particular index of performance was
outside the direct control of plant management and more
a function of corporate policy and market conditions.
(*) King, A. S., "Expectation Effects in Organizational
Change," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 19, No.
2 (1974), 221-235.
An experiment was conducted in four plants of a
clothing pattern manufacturing organization, where it
was decided to use job enrichment to improve
productivity. Two plants implemented job enlargement
while the remaining two implemented job rotation. One
plant from each of the above groups was told that
productivity was expected to increase as a result of the
implemented change, while the remaining plants were told
that improved industrial relations rather than increased
productivity was expected. Both absenteeism and average
daily output per machine crew were recorded in a twelve
month period.
While there were no significant differences in
absenteeism among the plants, it was observed that
productivity is significantly (in a statistical sense)
greater as a result of the expectation effect. A
follow-up questionnaire was conducted to distinguish
between the expectations, perceptions, and evaluations
of job enrichment with respect to the alleged effects.
The results indicated that the experimentally induced
high expectations on productivity affected managers to
communicate the expectations more effectively to the
employees, and that managerial expectations on
performance often serve as self-fulfilling prophecies.
[37] (***) Kotter, J. P., and L. A. Schlesinger, "Choosing
Strategies for Change," Harvard Business Review, (March-
April 1979), 106-114.
One step in the process of selecting an
organizational change strategy is to identify
resistances to change. Some of these resistances could
be parochial self-interest, employee misunderstanding
and lack of trust, and low organizational tolerance to
change. In order to overcome these resistances, the
authors recommend the use of education and
communication, employee participation and involvement,
managerial facilitation and support, negotiation and
agreement, manipulation and co-optation, and explicit
and implicit coercion. These methods are presented in
Table 2.7. The use of these techniques should be based
on the four following key situational variables shown in
Table 2.8: (I) The amount and type of resistance that is
anticipated, (2) The position of the change initiators
vis-a-vis the resistors (in terms of power, trust,
etc.), (3) The locus of relevant data for designing the
change, and of needed energy for implementing it, and
(4) The stakes involved (e.g., the presence or lack of
presence of a crisis, the consequences of resistance and
lack of change). A manager can improve his/her chance
of transition success by_ (i) Conducting an analysis
that identifies the possible causes of organizational
problems, (2) Conducting an analysis of factors relevant
to producing the needed changes, (3) Selecting a change
strategy, based on the previous analysis, that specifies
key transition variables, such as the speed of change,
and (4) Monitoring the implementation process.
[38] (**) Labovitz, S., and J. Miller, "Implications of
Power, Conflict, and Change in an Organizational
Setting," Pacific Sociological Review, Vol. 17 (1974),
214-239.
This study involved the fragmentation of a research
organization into two separate entities due to
organizational conflict. This conflict was caused by
organizational growth, increasing organizational
structuring and bureaucracy, and the widening power
differential between executive board members and the
research directors. It was found that after the
creation of the new company, job satisfaction increased
and job tension decreased following the division in the
organization. Also, it was determined that increasing
size, bureaucratization, differential power, free
expression of sentiments, and organizational division
led to a decrease in job satisfaction and an increase in
job tension.
[39] (*) Lawler, E. E., III, "Pay, Participation, and
Organizational Change," in E. L. Cass, and F. G. Zimmer
(Eds.) Man and Work in Society (New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhol_ Co., 197--_.--
The following points concerning pay systems were
indicated by the author:
(i) When employees perceive pay and performance are
related, they are motivated to perform well,
(2) Pay incentive plans do not always produce higher
motivation,
(3) When employees do not trust management, instead of
believing that good performance will lead to higher
pay they believe that it will lead to higher
standards, the abandonment of the incentive plan or
some other management "trick" to keep pay down even
though performance increases (see Figure 2.8),
(4) Perception of the relationship between pay and
performance influences motivation, and
(5) Feelings of satisfaction are important determinants
of absenteeism and turnover.
It is noted that pay system changes are highly visible
in organizations and as such can produce rapid change.
Also, it is usually necessary when structural changes
are made to change the pay system. The author notes
several disastrous cases that involved the
implementation of job enrichment or autonomous work
group programs without a change in the pay system to
compensate for increased responsibility or work load.
[4O] (**) Lawrence, P. R., "How to Deal with Resistance to
Change," in G. W. Dalton, P. R. Lawrence, and L. E.
Greiner (Eds.) Organizational ChanGe and Development
(Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., I_-O), 181-197.
Resistance to change may come in a variety of
forms, such as low work output, an increase in employee
hostility, resignations and requests for transfer,
chronic quarrels, or strikes. This resistance may be
lessened through the use of employee participation, an
understanding of the true nature of resistance, and the
use of concrete steps to deal constructively with
resistance caused by staff preoccupation with the
technical aspects of new ideas. One of the major points
addressed was that change agents often are too concerned
with the technical aspects of change to be aware of the
social changes they are inadvertently introducing. The
suggested method of change is to use a give-and-take,
compromise approach, instead of a unilateral, mandate-
oriented one. Also, the change agent should utilize
employees that have a first-hand knowledge and
experience of the organizational area under transition
as a source of ideas and feedback. Another idea is to
communicate transition plans and goals in clear,
understandable terms to the transition participants.
[41] (*) Leavitt, H. J., "Applied Organizational Change in
Industry," in J. G. March (Ed.) Handbook of
Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 1144-1170.
The author views organizations as complex systems
involving task, structural, technological, and human
variables. These variables may serve as focal points of
an organizational change program. However, the human
variables are stressed as being the key point that will
determine the success or failure of the transition. In
particular, the equalization of power between
individuals in the organization is very important to the
success of a change program.
[42] (*) Lee, J., "Leader Power for Managing Change," Academy
of Management Review, Vol. 2 (1977), 73-80.
This paper presents a transition model where the
main focus is on the direct assessment of the leader's
power, defined as the ability and opportunity to
influence others. The model is designed to assess a
leader's residual power after accounting for all
possible sources that reduce his or her power, such as
varieties of subordinate power, task and organizational
design power, and power sources extraneous to the
immediate system. This model has been used successfully
in cases involving a Central American Sugar Mill and a
U. S. Copper Mining company.
[43] (*) Linn, R. L., and J. A. Slinde, "The Determination of
the Significance of Change Between Pre and Posttesting
Periods," Review of Educational Research, Vol. 47
(1977), 121-150.
This article notes some of the problems with the
use of various numerical change indicators. For
example, difference scores can have negative correlation
with the pretest, low reliability, and lack of common
trait and scale. Residual scores, which have a zero
correlation with the pretest, also suffer from
unreliability. The authors conclude by stating that
there are numerous problems in measuring change, most
notably the main problem of change scores concealing
conceptual difficulties and giving misleading results.
[44] (**) Lippitt, G., "Managing Change: 6 Ways to Turn
Resistance Into Acceptance," Supervisor Management
Magazine, Vol. ii, No. 8, 21-24.
It is noted that the way a supervisor introduces
change, rather than the change itself, may cause
transition resistance. Nine supervisory actions may
cause resistance: (i) Failing to be specific about the
change, (2) Failing to show why a change is necessary,
(3) Failing to allow those affected by change to have a
say in the planning, (4) Using a personal appeal to gain
acceptance of a change, (5) Disregarding a work group's
habit patterns, (6) Failing to keep employees informed
about a change, (7) Failing to allay employee worries
about possible failure, (8) Creating excessive work
pressure during a change, and (9) Failing to deal with
anxiety over job security. Six ways _ to reduce
resistance are offered by the author: (I) Involve
employees in planning the change, (2) Provide accurate
and complete information, (3) Give employees a chance to
air their objections, (4) Always take group norms and
habits into account, (5) Make only essential changes,
and (6) Learn to use problem-solving techniques.
[45] (**) Lippitt, R., J. Watson, and B.
Dynamics of Planned Change (New York:
and Co., I-_58).
Westley, The
Harcourt, Brace
The authors present an expanded, change agent
oriented model of change that is based on the Lewin
three phase (unfreezing, change, freezing) change model.
This model consists of seven phases, which are
extensively discussed in the book:
Phase i: The client system discovers the need for help,
sometimes with stimulation by the change agent
("unfreezing").
Phase 2: The helping relationship between the client and
the change agent is established and defined.
Phase 3: The change problem is identified and clarified.
Phase 4: Alternative possibilities for change are
examined; change goals or intentions are
established.
Phase 5: Actual change efforts are attempted.
(Phases 3, 4, and 5 are analogous Lewin's change step.)
Phase 6: Generalization and stabilization of the change
program is sought ("freezing").
Phase 7: The helping relationship ends or a different
type of continuing relationship is defined.
[46] (*) Lovelady, L., "Planned Change: Problems at the Union
/ Management Interface," Industrial Relations Journal,
Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 1977), 43-58.
This article gives the theoretical background on
the process of planned change in organizations that have
employees represented by trade unions. As with other
organizations, employee involvement, commitment, and
participation is essential for a change program to be
successful. Other resistances to change noted by the
author include the traditional management - union
adversary relationship, inflexible union structure and
organization, and insufficient time allotment to the
change program. These resistances may be overcome by
using an extension of the present system of collective
bargaining, appointing workers' representatives to the
organization's Board of Directors, and involving
employees and their representatives in those matters
which most closely affect them at the workplace and to
which they can contribute.
[47] (*) Lynch, M., Planned Organizational Change: An
Analytical Model," Philippine Journal of Public
Administration, Vol. 14 (January 1970), 31-40-_.
The author of this paper proposes an alternative
analytical typology for the classification of strategies
and/or tactics previously proposed by Jones and Niaz
(see Figure 2.9). The typology proposed in Lynch's
paper consists of three strategy/tactic dimensions: (I)
Unit of analysis, (2) Role of unit members, and (3)
Position of the unit of analysis. This typology is
considered superior to previous strategy/tactic
classifications because: (i) This classification uses
variables that are relevant to other....... popular theories
such as administrative ecology, power structure
analysis, and decision-making, (2) Other classifications
are not readily transferable into graphic representation
(see Figure 2.10), (3) The o£her systems is more
subjective, and therefore more subjective and less
reliable, and (4) the other models do not contain the
prime requisite of a valid typology -mutually exclusive
categories.
[48] (**) Lynn, G., and J. B. Lynn, "Seven Keys to Successful
Change Management," Supervisory Management, Vol. 29, No.
ii (November 1984), 30-37.
Although no "cookbook" formulas for change
management have been identified by the authors, seven
common denominators in the approaches of adaptable
companies like Delta Airlines and Hewlett Packard are
introduced. These are:
(i) The managers of successful change organizations have
a clear picture of exactly where they want their
companies to go and what they want them to
accomplish,
(2) Successful change managers understand that people,
including themselves, naturally resist change,
(3) Management must commit itself in deed as well as
word to the accomplishment of the change,
(4) Those responsible for implementing the change in
their day-to-day operations should be involved in
the change planning process,
(5) Change implementation should be first tested on a
small-scale,
(6) The change effort must be evaluated, and
(7) The right time for full-scale implementation of the
change effort must be carefully determined.
Also, in order to assist managers in planning a change
program, a Change Planning Checklist is presented (see
Figure 2.11).
[49] (*) Mangham, I., __The Politics __°f Organizational Change
(London: Associated Business Press, 1979).
In this book, the political aspects of change were
examined. Five types of change processes were
described: unilateral decree, personnel changes,
structural rearrangement, group agreement with decisions
formulated elsewhere, and collective (participative)
decisionmaking. Also, change programs should attempt to
structure the organization such that there is team play,
sharing of responsibility, expression of feelings and
personal needs, collaboration, open and constructive
conflict, feedback on performance, flexible leadership,
involvement, trust, and adaptiveness.
[50] (***) Mann, F. C., "Studying and Creating Change: A
Means to Understanding Social Organizations," in C. M.
Arensburg (Ed.) Research in Industrial Human Relations
(New York: Harper, 1957).
Based on the author's research, seven psychological and
sociological facts must be taken into consideration in
attempting to change the attitudes and behavior of and
individual or a group of individuals in an
organizational setting. These seven facts are:
(i) Change processes need to be concerned with altering
both the forces within an individual and the forces
in the organizational situation surrounding the
individual.
(2) Existing organizational forces such as rights and
privileges, reciprocal expectations, and shared
frames of reference must first be made pliable, then
altered and shifted, and finally made stable again
to support the change.
(3) Expectations of the supervisor are more important
forces for creating change in an individual than the
expectations of the subordinates.
(4) Change processes designed to work with individual
supervisors off the job in temporarily created
training groups contain less force for initiating
and reinforcing change than those which work with an
individual in situ.
(5) Change processes organized around objective, new
social facts about one's own organizational
situation have more force for change than those
organized around general principles about human
behavior. The more meaningful and relevant the
material, the greater the likelihood of change.
(6) Involvement and participation in the planning,
collection, analysis, and interpretation of
information initiate powerful forces for change.
Own facts are better understood, more emotionally
acceptable, and more likely to be utilized than
those of some "outside expert". Participation in
analysis and interpretation helps by-pass those
resistances which arise from proceeding too rapidly
or too slowly.
(7) Change processes which furnish adequate knowledge on
progress and specify criteria against which to
measure improvement are apt to be more successful in
creating and maintaining change than those which do
not.
[51] (***) Mann, F. C., and F. W. Neff, Managing Major Change
i__qnOrganizations (Ann Arbor: The Foundation for Research
on Human Behavior, 1961).
A five-phase approach to change was proposed: (I)
Analysis of the old state, (2) Recognition of the need
for change, (3) Planning for change, (4) Taking the
action steps to make the change, and (5) Stabilizing the
change. Then, case studies of several organizations
using this model were presented to validate the authors'
claim. Throughout the article, numerous conclusions
drawn from the case studies were introduced. Also, a
model for understanding an individual's response to
change was given (see Figure 2.12).
[52] (***) Margulies, N., and J. Wallace,
Change: Techniques and Applications
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973).
Organizational
(Glenview, IL:
This book presents and examines a range of
transition management techniques drawn from applied
behavioral science that are considered useful in planned
organizational change programs. These techniques
include Action Research, Laboratory Training, Role
Theory, and the use of Internal Consulting Teams. It
also looks at the factors that determine the choice
of a transition technique such as context, cost, and
appropriateness for given organizational problems.
Furthermore, it offers six major propositions for
change:
(i) Regardless of initial focus, any change effort in
which changes in individual behavior are required
must include means for ensuring that such changes
occur.
(2) Organizational change is more likely to be met with
success when key management people initiate and
[53]
[54]
support the change process.
(3) Organizational change is best accomplished when
persons likely to be affected by the change are
brought into the process as soon as possible.
(4) Successful change is not likely to occur following
the single application of any technique.(5) Successful change programs must rely upon informed
and motivated persons within the organization if the
results are to be maintained.
(6) No single technique is optimal for all
organizational problems, contexts, and objectives.
(**) Margulies, M., P. L. Wright, and
"Organization Development Techniques:
Change," Grou_ _ Organization Studies,
428-448.
R. W. Scholl,
Their Impact on
Vol. 2 (1977),
Organizations are composed of technical,
management, and human subsystems (see Figure 2.13). It
is proposed that each of these subsystems may be changed
through the direct application of appropriate OD
transition methods. Specifically, it was found that for
changes in the human system, organizational sensitivity
training, team building, and survey feedback methods
should be used. Likewise, job redesign and
sociotechnical interventions promote changes in the
technical subsystem. Also, management subsystem change
may be accomplished by altering the formal structure of
the firm and/or by modifying the organizational control
method.
(****) McFeely, W. M., "Organization Change Perceptions
and Realities," (New York Conference Board, 1972).
Organizations do not seem to initiate major
strategic changes until the pain of not making a change
is perceived by those in a position to take action as
being greater than their perception of the pain of
change. Once the decision is made to undergo change,
seven highly interdependent organizational elements
should be considered: (i) Linkage or networking; (2)
Long versus short term emphasis; (3) Paths of decision-
making; (4) Reward system; (5) Administrative
constraints; (6) Cultural constraints; and (7) Self-
correcting mechanisms. Additionally, seven guidelines
for change were given:
(i) There can be no major organizational change without
a change in management style.
(2) A change in management style requires a change in
people.
(3) The time frame of change tends to be much longer if
it is to be implemented by the incumbent management
group as contrasted with putting new persons in
various key positions within the components affected
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by the change.
(4) If there is to be a major change with little time
for implementation, the odds are against the
incumbent team being able to do it.
(5) If a minor change is contemplated with much time in
which to carry it out, the probabilities are that
the incumbent team can do it.
(6) If the planned change is minor in nature, but there
is little time for implementation, the odds still
favor the incumbent team, but the flexibility of of
that team must be examined more critically and be
given substantial weight in the decision.
(7) If the change is of major magnitude with much
available time for implementation, the likely
situation will be that of a holding action by the
incumbent team with the significant "breakthrough"
coming at such time as a new chief executive can be
moved in graciously.
(***) Micheal, Stephen R.,
Odiorne, W. Warner Burke,
Techniques of Organizational
Hill, 1981).
Fred Luthans, George S.
and Spencer Hayden,
Change (New York: McGraw-
This book presents six techniques of organizational
change: Qrganizational Behavioral Modification (OBM),
Management By Objectives (MB0), Management Development
(MD), Organization Development (OD), Management Auditing
(MA), and Control Cycle (CC). These techniques are
compared in Table 2.9. OBM involves changes employee
behavior through a five-step process: (i) Identification
of critical behaviors; (2) Measurement of the behaviors;
(3) Functional analysis of the behaviors; (4)
Development and implementation of an intervention
strategy; and (5) Evaluation to assure performance
improvement. MBO is a management and transition method
whereby the superior and the subordinate managers in an
organization identify major areas of responsibility in
which the employee will work, set some standards for
good - or bad - performance, and plan for the
measurement of results against those standards. MD
shapes managerial behavior through the use of internal
and external training programs, coaching, and
counseling. OD is a planned, organization-wide, and
top-level managed program to increase organization
effectiveness through planned interventions in the
organization's process using behavioral science
knowledge. MA consists of a comprehensive audit of an
organization's management personnel and procedures. CC,
comprised of the managerial processes of planning,
implementing, and evaluating projects, is essentially a
control mechanism for bringing about organizational
change.
[56]
[57]
[58]
(**) Miller, Danny and Peter Friesen, "Structural Change
and Performance: Quantum Versus Piecemeal-Incremental
Approaches," Academy of Manggement Journal, Vol. 25, No.
4, 867-892)
Quantum change is said to occur when the
anticipated organizational change happens in a concerted
and dramatic way (this is also known as dissipative
change); otherwise, a slow and gradual change process is
said to be incremental in nature. Based on the research
of the authors into structural change of organizations,
it was found that successful firms generally had a
significantly higher percentage of extreme changes along
structural variables than unsuccessful firms_ It was
also found that incremental structural change was less
likely to be undertaken by high performing firms.
(**) Moore, M., and P. Gergen, "Risk Taking and
Organizational Change," Training and Development
Journal, Vol. 39, No. 6 (June 1985), 72-76.
This paper addresses the risk-taking involved in
transition management. Four key structural/cultural
factors were found to influence risk-taking: (I)
Organization expectations, (2) Reward systems, (3)
Support systems, and (4) Available resources.
Interacting with the structural factors, personal
tendencies such as propensity to taking risks, previous
experiences, and decision-making skill affect the
process (see Figure 2.14). The authors note that
organizations can reduce risk through clear
organizational expectations, equitable reward systems,
effective support systems, and adequate resources.
(**) Morse, N. C., and E. Reimer, "The Experimental
Change of a Major Organizational Variable," Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psycholoqy, Vol. 52 (1956), 120-129-?.
A field experiment in an industrial setting was
conducted in order to test hypotheses concerning the
relationship between the means by which organizational
decisions are made and (a) individual satisfaction, and
(b) productivity. The experiment involved the
measurement of satisfaction and productivity in two
separate work environments - one with a high degree of
worker participation and autonomy in the decision-making
process, the other with low amount of worker
participation. The results of this experiment showed
that the individual satisfactions of the work group
members increased significantly in an autonomous work
environment (with increased role in the decision-making
process) and decreased significantly in an
hierarchically controlled environment (with a decreased
role in the decision-making process). Also, contrary to
expectation, both decision-making systems had increased
productivity, with the hierarchically-controlled program
having a greater increase. The authors partially
attribute this finding to the Hawthorne effect (i.e.,
greater attention to the system by the experimenters
caused the increase).
[59]
[60]
(*) Pettigrew, A. M., "On Studying Organizational
Cultures," Administrative Science Quarterly, December
1979.
This paper looks at some of the concepts and
process associated with the creation of culture within
organizations. The subject under investigation was a
private British boarding school from the years 1934 -
1975. The author notes that culture is instilled in
organizational members through statements of mission,
activities, selective recruitment, and socialization.
Furthermore, he notes that culture is manifested through
symbols, language, ideologies, beliefs, rituals, and
myths. One issue that is highly stressed is that
commitment is a key factor for cultural change.
(****) Pfeiffer, J. William, and John E. Jones, The 1980
Annual Handbook For Group Facilitators (San Diego:
University Associates, Inc, 1980).
This publication presents a variety of tools and
knowledge in the field of Organizational O4velopment
(OD). Discussions on an Organizational Diagnosis
Questionnaire, a nine-step problem solving model (see
Table 2.10), accelerating the stages of group
development, a strategy for cultural transitions, OD
intervention assessment techniques, and a glossary of
frequently used terms in OD and planned change were
presented.
[61] (*) Schein, V., "Political Strategies for Implementing
Organizational Change," Group and Organization Studies,
Vol. 2 (1977), 42-47.
The author notes that little is written about the
power and political strategies that are used to
implement OD interventions. If a change agent cannot
contend with these political forces, he is likely to be
overpowered by those who perceive his change approaches
as endangering their own power. Thus, supervisors,
middle managers, the personnel department, and other
staff groups, perceiving the change program as a threat
to their power, employ a variety of overt and covert
tactics to resist the change. In order to overcome
these resistances, Schein suggests that change agents
align with powerful allies such as top management, have
good credentials to increase their referent power, and
maintain a non-threatening, neutral appearance.
[62] (**) Sears, L. N. Jr., "Organization and Human Resource
Professionals in Transition," Human Resource Management,
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Winter 1984), 409-421.
This article discussed the marginal impact of the
OD field on strategic business performance. Three
reasons for this were noted: (i) OD has had trouble
finding a strategic position in most organizations.
Usually being a staff position buried several levels
down in the human resource or personnel funciton, it has
serious political access and legitimacy problems as
compared with high level business decision making; (2)
OD professionals often are not well versed in the
business issues facing their client; (3) The concepts
and skills of OD are generally not possessed by the
senior human resource managers who are formally closer
to the senior line; thus, OD is not used or strongly
advocated. Also, the author advocated a systems
approach to organizational analysis (see Figure 2.15).
[63] (*) Seashore, S., and D. Bowers, Changing The Structure
and Functioning of an Organization (Ann Arbo--_: Institute
fo{ Social Research, University of Michigan, 1968).
This book concerns a change effort in a prominent
firm to increase: (i) The emphasis of the company toward
the work group as a functioning unit of organization;
(2) The amount of supportive behavior on the part of
supervisors; (3) Employee participation in decision-
making processes within their area of responsibility;
and (4) The amount of interaction and influence among
work group members. The foci of the change effort
included policy change and clarification, change in
organizational structure, and interpersonal skills
development. While the results of the program were
deemed inconclusive, it was found that stresses upon the
organization from internal and external sources caused a
significant amount of resistance to change.
[64] (*) Seashore, S. and D. Bowers, "Durability of
Organizational Change," American Psychologist, Vol. 25
(1970), 227-233.
This article notes the transition of the Weldon
Company after it has been purchased by the Harwood
Company. Weldon was losing money, experiencing high
cost, generating many errors in strategy and work
performance, and suffering from high absenteeism and
high turnover. The aim of the transition program was to
make Weldon a viable and profitable economic unit as
quickly as possible. Due to the change strategy used,
the change process was very effective and durable. The
change strategy included the concepts of job security
based on improved corporate performance, use of employee
participation in the planning and decision-making
process, and the linking of guidelines to concrete
events and to the rational requirements of the work to
be done and the problems to be solved.
[65] (**) Skipton, M. D., "Helping Managers to Develop
Strategies," Lo___ Range Planning, Vol. 18, No.2 (1985),
p. 56-68.
The strategic management process is seen to have
four sequential operations, these being analysis,
planning, implementation, and control. The analysis
process results in a SWOT report, which outlines
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats.
Planning outlines the various methods and means for
obtaining the objectives. These objectives and means
should be specified in all steps of strategic planning.
One consideration in planning is the policy/aims and
mission/purpose of the organization. Policy/aims define
what the organization wants to be, and mission/purpose
defines what the organization wants to do. Based on the
organization's overall SWOT analysis, corporate strategy
should contain objectives and means that the strategic
management group identifies and wishes to pursue in the
future. A business strategy matrix that incorporates
the concepts of mission/purpose and policy/aims is shown
in Table 2.11.
[66] (***) Taylor, J. C., Technology and
Organizational Change (Ann Arbor: Institute for
Research, University of Michigan, 1971)
Planned
Social
Based on the research of the
conclusions concerning technology
organizational change were found:
(I) A measure of production technology
author, five
and planned
sophistication
could be developed which had a reasonably high
inter-rater reliability and factorial and convergent
validity.
(2) The measure of technological sophistication
distinguished between groups with different pre-
change levels of subordinate perceptions of
supervisory and work group behaviors.
(3) Technological sophistication does facilitate or
enhance change forces in the direction of
participative management or autonomous group
functioning.
(4) Technological sophistication seems to operate as a
conditioning variable in social change efforts both
directly through situational constraint on worker
behavior, and indirectly through affecting
interconnectedness of social subsystems.
(5) Technological sophistication acts to increase
permanence of change efforts by providing a
situation where changes in attitudes are strong
subsequent effects of changed behaviors. These
changed attitudes appear to be reinforcing factors
in the continuance of the changed behaviors.
[67] (**) Tichy, N. M., "How Different Types of Change Agents
Diagnose Organizations," Human Relations, Vol. 28, No.
12 (1975), 771-800.
In this article, the author discusses four types of
change agents: (I) Outside Pressure (OP), (2)
Organization Development (OD), (3) Analysis for the Top
(AFT), and (4) People Change Technology (PCT). OP's
focus primarily on changing the way systems relate to
their external environment. OD's focus on internal
processes instead of individual functioning. Also, OD's
work collaboratively with the client system to help them
solve their problems and to improve their system's
problem-solving ability. AFT's focus primarily on the
system's external relationships with its environment and
whose leverage for change is from inside at the top of
the organization. AFT's essentially work with business
and government units and are interested in improving
'efficiency' and 'output' of the systems they work with.
PCT's concentrate their change efforts on individual
functioning within organizations. Using behavioral
science techniques, they attempt to improve efficiency
and output, system problem-solving, and power
equalization and responsiveness to the general public
interest. The percentage of OP's, AFT's, OD's, and
PCT's that employ different types of organizational
diagnostic techniques is displayed in Table 2.12.
[68] (**) Toronto, R., "A General Systems Model for the
Analysis of Organizational Change," Behavioral Science,
Vol. 20, No. 3 (1975), 145-157.
It is proposed that organizations are systems
comprised of several elements (see Figure 2.16). Of
these elements, there are three key ones: (i) The
authority figure, who has the legitimate organizational
authority to make decisions which effect the
organization below him; (2) The system structure, which
is the totality of relations among the components of the
system; and (3) The suprasystem structure, which is the
structure of relations among different systems that
impinge upon the activity, productivity, and the
effectiveness of the system being studied. This model
of organizations leads to four major propositions
concerning organizational change that were supported by
the author's research: (I) Changes in the suprasystem
induce changes in the system, but not vice-versa; (2)
Changes in structure induce changes in program, but not
vice-versa; (3) Permanent change in system activity data
requires a change in and the subsequent equilibration of
both the system and its suprasystem; and (4) The
hierarchy of constraining influence on a system's
activity in order decreasing constraint is: suprasystem
structure, suprasystem program, system structure, system
program.
[69] (**) Tosi, H., J. Hunter, R. Chesser, J. Tarter, and S.
Carroll, "How Real are Changes Induced by Management by
Objectives," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21,
No. 2 (1976), 276-306.
In order to test how effective Management by
Objectives is in facilitating organizational change, the
authors used a questionnaire to gather transition data
from two organizations. This questionnaire assessed
goal, feedback, superior-subordinate characteristics,
and end-result variables. After using correlational
techniques to draw causal inferences from the various
parameters of the transition model, it was shown that
no-change had occurred. However, due to some
contradictions in the data, the authors recommend that
further studies be done to verify this conclusion.
[70] (***) Warmington, A., "Stress in the Management of
Change," in D. Gowler and K. Legge (Eds.) Managerial
Stress (New York: Halsted, 1975)
This article analyzes the the sources of stress
which are inherent in organizational change programs.
The most likely kind of stress to be encountered comes
from difficulties between members of the change program
and the people in the rest of the organization. These
difficulties may be in communications, of the perceived
legitimacy and acceptability of the program, or from
employees who feel that they are under pressure to
change their behavior. Also, there may be uncertainties
and anxieties among members of the change unit about the
nature of their task and the criteria for Success. unit
members individually and collectively will suffer
personal anxieties about their position in the company,
the way they as individuals are being appraised in
conditions of unusual vagueness and ambiguity, how they
now fit, and will fit in future, into the status and
power structure of the organization, and how appointment
to the team has affected their chances of advancement.
Finally, individuals are likely to experience internal
stress and dissonance as their own value systems and
perceptions of the wider organization and its behavior
patterns change and as they try to resolve some of the
external causes of tension. The - author offers several
methods for reducing stress. One method is for the unit
i
undergoing change to try to gain the attention of key
people in very senior positions in the company, and to
organize themselves to play a useful role as staff
advisers and assistants to board members on a variety of
policy and planning matters in which their newly
acquired expertise can manifest itself.
[71] (*) Warmington, Allan, Tom Lupton, and Cecily Gribbin,
Organizational Behavior and Performance: An Open Systems
Approach to Change (Lond_." Macmillan, 197_/).
The authors contend that organizations should be
viewed as socio-technical systems comprised of nine
elements: product market variables, resource market
variables, labor market variables, designed technical
variables, designed mediating mechanisms, attitudinal
variables, unofficial manipulatory devices, behavioral
variables directly influencing performance, and
dependent cost and technical performance variables.
These elements and their interactions may considered as
change levers (see Figure 2.17 and Table 2.13).
[72] (***) Watson, G., "Resistance to Change," in W. G.
Bennis, K. F. Benne, and R. Chin (Eds.) The Planning of
Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969).
Twelve recommendations for the prevention and
minimization of resistance to change are offered. These
suggestions are grouped into three categories, based on
who initiates the change, what kind of change is being
proposed, and specific procedures for instituting
change.
Group I: Who initiates the change
i. Resistance to change will be less if administrators
and other key personnel
their own - not one
outsiders.
2. Resistance will be less if
wholehearted support from
system.
Group 2: What kind of change
3. Resistance will be less
change as reducing rather
present burdens.
feel that the project is
devised and operated by
the project clearly has
top officials of the
if participants see the
than increasing their
4. Resistance will be less if the project accords with
values and ideals which have long been acknowledged
by participants.
5. Resistance will be less if the program offers the
kind of new experience which interests participants.
6. Resistance will be less if participants feel that
their autonomy and their security is not threatened.
Group 3: Procedures for instituting change
7. Resistance will be less if participants have joined
in diagnostic efforts leading them to agree on what
the basic problem is and to feel its importance.
8. Resistance will be less if the project is adopted by
consensual group decision.
9. Resistance will be reduced if proponents are able to
empathize with opponents; to recognize valid
objections; and to take steps to relieve unnecessary
fears.
i0. Resistance will be reduced if it is recognized that
innovations are likely to be misunderstood and
misinterpreted, and if provision is make for
feedback of perceptions of the project and for
further clarification as needed.
ii. Resistance will be reduced if participants
experience acceptance, support, trust, and
confidence in their relations with one another.
12. Resistance will be reduced if the project is kept
open to revision and reconsideration if experience
indicates that changes would be desirable.
[73] (****) Zaltman, G., and R. Duncan, Strategies
Planned Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977).
for
organization members,
[74]
Numerous transition management principles that
would be useful to change agents @re offered in this
book. Facilltative, re-educative, persuaslve, and power
strategies f0r change were presented. Cultural, social,
organizational, and psychological barriers were
discussed. Also, the characteristics of change agents,
and the organizations themselves
are extensively examined.
(**) Zander, A., "Resistance to Change - Analysis and
Prevention," Advanced Management, Vol. 15-16 (Jan.
1962), 9-11.
The author cites six causes of transition
resistance. Resistance can be expected if:
(i) The nature of the change is not made clear to the
people who are going to be influenced by the change,
(2) Management does not account for the fact that
different people will see different meanings in the
proposed change,
(3) Those influenced by the change are caught between
strong forces pushing them to make the change (i.e.,
management) and strong forces deterring them against
making the change (i.e., peer pressure),
(4) The change is make on personal grounds rather than
impersonal requirements or sanctions, and
(5) The change ignores the already established
institutions in the group.
It is proposed that resistance can be prevented to the
degree that the changer helps the changees to develop
their own understanding of the need for the change, and
an explicit awareness of how they feel about it, and
what can be done about those feelings. This rule has
the following implications:
(I) Two-way communications must be maintained, or
negative attitudes will persist and increase in
intensity,
(2) Resistance may be less likely if the group
participates in making the decisions about how the
change should be implemented, what the change should
be like, how people might perform in the changed
situation, or any other problems that are within
their area of freedom to decide, and
(3) Resistance will be less likely if facts which point
to the need to change are gathered by the persons
who must make bhe change.
Table I. M-_ior Prnbiem* Lnco_insvT_:d in l:v:duatm_
OD Eltort_ a.', Idenhlwd by ('hnn_e A ecnh_
Problem I rcqucnc)' Percent
Mel hodolo_ical
Selection a,d qua,lil.',livc
mc:]suremenl t)r ._nlt crilcria 24 22
Diflicullies oi employing
comparison gro,ps 22 21
Controlling for extraneous
influences 2 1 20
Criterion deficiency 4 4
Problems will= lime lags 3 3
Administralive
Dil'l"iculty in tlevotin,, lime
3nd financial rcs.urces In
evalualion of O1) elfurls 20 19
Misccllaneou._ (such a_) 13 12
Communicating to munat:crs
what OO can ;_nd _nno[ do
Con[lict between adequ'_lc
rese'_rch design and helping
a clicnl
Total 107 I l) 15; h
aN= 101.
hpcrccntages dn not sum to IO0 pcrccnl due to ruund-
ing.
Table 2.I [3]
Power
ratio
.5/.5
_/o
PARADIGM FOP. CIIANCE PROCESSF...S
Mutual goal setting
Deliberate on
the part o/
one or both
sides of the re-
lationship
Nondetiberate on
the part o/ both
sides
Nonmutuat goat setting
(or goals set by one side)
Deliberate on Nondeliberate on
the part o] the part o/ both
one side o I sides
the relation-
ship
Planned
change
Interactional
change
Technocratic
change
"Natural" change
Indoctrina- Socia]ization Coercive Emulative
tional change change change change
Table 2.2 [7]
A modeJ of induced change
Tension expe-
rienced within
the system
Intervention of a
prestigious
influencing agent
IndividuaLs at-
tempt to imple-
ment the proposed
changes
New behavior and
attitudes rein-
forced by achieve-
ment. social ties.
and internalized
va]ues--accom-
pained by
decreasing de-
pendence on
influencing agent
Generalized objec-
tives established
Growing specific- Achievement and
ity of objectives resetting of
> --establishment _ specific objec-_
of subgoals tives
Tension within
existing social
ties
Prior social ties
interrupted or
attentuated
->
Formation of new New social ties
a]JJances and reinforce altered
relationships behavior and
centering attitudes
:> around new > --_
activities
Lowered sense of
seE-esteem
Esteem-building
begun on basis
of agent's atten-
tion and
assurance
Esteem-buildinR Heightened sense
based on task of sehr-esteem
accomplishment
> >
External motive
for change
[New schema
--_" provided)
Improvisation and Internalized
reality-testing motive for
change
> --->
Table 2.3 [15]
Unfreezing Change Refreezing
Tension and the Change was Individuals with- New behavior
need for change advocated in the organiza- and attitudes
was experienced by the new tion tested out were either
within the director, the proposed reinforced and
organization, changes, interna]ized,
or rejected
and abandoned.
Table 2.4 [15]
Away from:
Generalized goals
Former social ties
built around previous
behavior patterns
Self-doubt and a
lowered sense of
self-esteem
An external motive
for change
and Toward:
> Specific obiectives
New relationships which
> support the intended
changes in behavior
and attitudes
A heightened sense of
> seLf-esteem
An internalized motive
> for change
Table 2.5 [15]
I
Characlertsficsof Successful and Unsuccessful Change in Organizations,
including Nondiflerentialing Characleris|ics
C.allgot_
ORGANIZATION's
ENVIRONMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
INITIAL CONTACT
ENTRY AND
COMMIIMENT
DATA
GATHERING
NondlMer enfia lin 9 characteristics
Geographical Ioca hOrl
Slale O| the Industry a
Scope ol Ine market b
Siz • b
Changes an size
Position of conlact person
Negotialion pet,dO b
Des,re to be seen as innovalive
Commitment for a resurvey b
Commitmenl [o¢ a restructur;ng of the
organlZshonb
Commmmenl to Survey Feedback plus
PI oces$ Coflsulfahon
Total population data collections
Sample data collecf,ons
Time between waves ol data collection
Reasons lot second wave of data
collecfions a
Credibility of Ine survey instrument b
Successful
E xE]ano+ng maw Ke!
Labor 0fawn horn subu{barl areas
H_gner pay rate
More levels OI hi(_rarchy
Heavy inouslty o/_;anIzahons
lnnovalive reputahon
Inleresl based on prior Conlact with
researchtoeve_0pmenf slaff
Commilmenl Ic Survey Feedback
Strategy
Greater support horn top managemenl
Research developmenT stall inlroduced
as _art ol generaJ plesenlalton
Express,on o! a specific brobtem
More recent initial,on of Oevelopmenl/
researcn effort
Unsuccessluf
SleaOy marke!
Labor drawn from towns
Lower pay" tale
Fewer levels of h0efarcrly
Olhce an(: Safes or Gamzahons
Nonlnnovahve reputation
Nonunlorl
Ins,Jrance inouSlry
Inleresl noI based on prior confacl w,th re-
seafch/developmenl stall
No commltmenl to Survey Feedback
Strategy
Lesser support Iromtop managemen_
SeI|-inlfoouchons by lesearcntoevelop-
menl s!afl
Expression of a general problem
NOI mot;rated by a des,re to experlmen!
with new ideas
INTERNAL
- CHANGE AGENTS
EXTERNAL
CHANGE AGENTS
TERMINATION
PROCEDURES
ICA seleclion
Knowledgeability of organizahonal
luncl,omng and change agenlP/b "
Skill levels
Value or iefltaliorls b
Non-change-agent experience b
Prewous change-.gem experience
Research posture
Change-agent style
ECA select,on a
Care of ECA selection a
Knowledge base b
Value or,enlahon b
Skdl levels
Types ol skillsb .
Non-change-agent exper,ence
Previous change-agent experience
Change-agent slyle
Research posture
Pace and planning ol rerm;nauon
Reasons lot terrrl,nallon (;ncludes
several d_mensions) a.b
Art,lude toward elforl at term,nation
ICAs possesse0 assessment-prescrlp-
live skills
More care taken in ICA selection
Did not possess assessmem-prescrlpllve
skills
Less care faken _n ICA seleC.lion
Prey,bus ICA training
More previous work experience m a per-
sonnel departmenl
|IrIOICiI('S ['B1/le_ v4rlahc! among w_ni][;i|lOflS ,i'_Iu_.leO in Ibis $lu(ly
I_IM_c;IIe$ the e=u$1ehcff or ife.n_$ Irlo, $ialiSllc..lliy Signihc.,,3nll $u_geShr_ diflevences belween succf:.__=|ui _nd Ul_,uc:cesslu; ot gan,2al_Or[Ll_
Table 2.6 [20]
I_.elhods for dealing with resistance
,,%Opto,ach
Eoucahon -,_ communlcahon
Pa,"hCIDallon _ involvement
to change
Commonlyuse_,n;_al,0"ns
Wnere'lhere IS a'lacK-ot ,nformahon
or inaccurate mlormalJon and
analysis
Where the imtlalors Oo not have all
the inlormahon they need IO des,g n
Ihe change, and wnefe Others have
considerable power Io resist
I
Facd_tal_on _. suppon
_"egot_al_on -, agreement
l,(an:pulahon + cO-oplalJon
Wne_e people are resisting because
of adjustment problems.
where someone or some group will
clearty lose oul in a change, and
wnere thai group has considerable
power I0 lesJSt.
Where olnef tactics wili not work, Or
ate tOO exoensive
E,_pii_! + implicJl coercion VVnme speed Is essenllal, and the
change in_t;ators possess
conslderabie power.
................... 53,:,Da=ksAdvantages
Once persuaded, peooie will olten
help v.,dn lne implementahon Of lhe
change •
PedDle wn0 parltc:pate will be
COmmllteO to _mpJemenhng change.
an(3 any relevant mlormahon Ihey
nave will De inteoraled inlo Ihe
change plan
No Olher approach works as well
wain adjustmenl problems
Somehmes II iS a relat,vely easy
way Io avoid malor resistance.
Can be very hme-consummg d lOIS
OI people ate mvolvecl
Can De very llme-consummg tt
pamclpators oes,gn an
inappropriate
change•
Can be bme-consum*ng, expensive.
and sI_ll Jait
Can be Ioo expenswe in many
cases if it aie_s olhers to negotiate
Ior compliance.
It can be a relatively quick and
mexpensJve solution to _es_stance
problems
It IS speedy, and can overcome any
kind of ressstance
Can lead 1o lulure problems i|
people 1,eel manipulaled.
• Can be riskyif itleaves pecple mad
al the inlllalor$.
Table 2.7 [37]
Fasl Slower
Clearly planned. NOt clearly p_anned at the
begmmng.
Little involvement of others. Lols ol involvement of others.
Allempt to overcome any Attempl tO minimize any res=stance.
resistance.
Key silualional variables
The amounl and type of resislance lhal is anlicipaled.
The posilion of the initiators vis-a-vis the resistors (in terms of power, trust,
and so Iorth)
The locus of relevanl data Ior designing the change, and ot needed energy lor
implementing it.
The slakes involved (e.g., the presence or lack o1, presence of a crisis, Ihe
consequences ot resistance and lack ol change).
Table 2.8 [37]
ORIGINS,,. _ _,
OF POOR QU,_L_
POOR _...,.,,.,, _y
Comparison of the Techniques of Organizational Change
T?pe_ o[ irchn;q.e_
" OrFantl_lt;rmal Mana_t'mcnl b_, Mana_,rmt'nl OrFani_zllon Manajzrrntnt
_hara_e'r_,tK Beha,no_ _4ndihration Objrn;_-s Dt--_rlopmem Drvrtnpmem Audhing Cont_ C},_-_
Focal po,nt lndi,-iduals Individuals |ndi_:luals Fnt|re or[[aniul_on or F.nfirr nr_niz.li,rm or
_y_p,nrm o1" prob- Undesirable I_haviors Different exp_'lafiom DrEe;rnc_ in perl'or-
_ms rt_qulnn_ al- o[ workcn rt.'suhtn[[ in and inlcrprMal_ons by man¢(" nf ta,ks rrquiT.
left!ira suh,Llandard pcrfof sup_riors and suE, re'- in_ mental n,r_e'Kial
tartar dinates oF subord;- sb.ills m do prr'_¢nt j_b
nalr_" performance and/or lack oF sE;]ls to
do,future .j_b
pars p_rt
[X-struc_i_,e rnnfl;c_ and F.si_in_ I_r amiclp_t-d
[are or rnoI_rratmn problems nr oppm-
amnn_ ind;_,'iduals and Iunil;t"$: pr,_uo dr-
group mand and _uppi).
_l r_l f"l UT_. J'U n('l inns.
pn'x rs,_
_;;nds of Chang_ Improved El be_,_ten Improved F;_ be_,-rc'n
_(_ught or ach;_,_] individual and job "t ind;,.;dua! and ._b mt
nonmana_rrial levels managr_al and pro-
primarily frssional les_r|s .
rhror_:_! East's Behavioral Ih_o_/ Brhavionl and man-.
agemen[ th _on_'s
r)l:_ oi" coati Fred_c:_ark to rc-s_v¢ Fet.'dfor_arCV[¢cdl_ck
-. problems [o Fores[all problem's
or exploi_ oppo_'-
[unities
an[inuity ]nvermi.em Cominuotn
.'han]_¢ a_lem( Suprrlo'_ and/or ;nslde Sul_rior_: in_icl¢ and
a.d outside consul- outside consu'k_s can
lanu assail
Imprnvement in mental #mprov¢-d interpersonal lrnprn_rmrn_ in prcid-
and _c,c_al sk_ls all and imcrR'rnup b_hav- ur_ demand and sup
managerial and pro-. ioT ply. s[runurc, runc-
fes,donal le,.x'ls ti,ms. prorrss_
Behavioral throe T Brha_,;_rat th_'ot_' _,{anal_cmen[ lh_sor)-
Fr_rdror_larc[/rrrdb_cL Trcclbar_. to ,r-_olv¢ Fc'_dro,'_arcUrredbacl
In i'orr_all prnb;ems problems [o forrslall problems
or exploi! nppof or exploit oppor-
(unhics. or" feedback !o tuni_ics, or feedback m
resolve problems r_,,,oh,.c prol_ems
lnle_mitl_?ll or erJ_ntino- lnte_illtnt lnl_rmilllL'flt
ou_
Sul_rio_,. with P¢1"_1,n- OuLsld¢ and/oK insid_ Ou_sK"Ic and/or inside
nel or Training '_c- eonsolt_no'_x'wilh 'ba_T_- consuhanLs with back-
p,,lrsmenl In coo_ir_lme in_ o1" high_ man- in F or higher man-
agern_nt aRemenl
pan
lnabilhv ,n adap_ _rra-
n;;.at_on In chan_'_n_
rnGrnnmrn! usln_
/'re.dba_rk ronsrn, I on
produ¢'1 Hrrn_nd ar_.d
supply, s_rununr,
runo_ns, prnc ess_
ImprnsrmenLs in prvid-
uC_ drrnar_d and sup-
pl). slronure, ru,_-
Mana_rmcnl [hro_'
T_-dro,-- • rd trrrdbacL
10 [nrrszall prnbirms
and ezploil oppor.
[uni_ia
CAi nl in uol.n
All managr_. _i[h as,is-
lance of saatff group
and/or nu_side fnnsul-
lanu
Table 2.9 [55]
Counterproduc-tivr" Steps: • Deny the problem
• Ignore the problem
• Blame something for the probiem
• Blame oneselt for the probtem
• Decide to anempt a solution
L Define the Prob]em !_ '
1
If the problem is a confiicL ask these questions for diagnosis: I I
Whose problem is it? W'n0 is doino what to whom? I
What are the dislonions of pe_rception? t |
Whal are the d}storlions ol communication? _ /
Wh,,at is at stake? What are the decision-making pc'ssibilities? JJ
A_er the conflid has NONCONFI ICT
be_en diagr_osed.., h there is no conflict..._
define the problem define the problemJ
I1. Decide on a Method of Attack for the Problem
- * Form a commit'lee ,, Form an ad hoc group
• Call in a consullant • Solve h without outside advice
• Call a conference with • Delegate to another person
key persons or group
it a.group is to be used in the problem soMng,the probiem Jsho"uld be redefined in col_ab_ra.Uon with the group. I
IIL Generate Alternatives
IV. Test Alternatives for Reality
V. Choose an Alternative
._, Implement the Plan
VIIL Evaluate
-e Evaluate the plan based -
on the goals of the plan;
if plan did not meet goals..
IX. Next Steps
If the problem still exists, or if new problems have surfaced - • -
• Evaluate the effectiveness
of the plan for solving the
problem.
The Nine-Step Problem-Solving Model
Table 2.10 [60]
_5 i_,lO r_ 'Put DOS."-
ORLGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
Pol=cy//.._lm$-Whal no _,_/e 1,*,'ant To be Relalwe Io _ur _nv=fO,_mer_!?
%%nal B u sines$
do V_e P.ant 7'
Existing
Monhor/Nave
K n_;eclge of
Environment
N_w
Do Not Through
Decision
Monitor/'
Have
KnowfeOge
of
Environment By
.Default
Take lnlllai1ve I 30 /_"Ot Take Inll,alfv_-
Same D,r eel,on(s)
{1)
Po$11we
ConsuilOaZ ion
(Company
Stl en@lhen$ Its
Hold)
(4}
Reluctant
NC'w _JreCrJon($J
(2_
Explorat,ve
(3)
[nltlaIive
(g)
Negative
Consolidation
(Comoany Digs a
Hoie for Itself)
{15) -.
Complacent
(B)
Overconfident
(14}
Foolhardy
_"nt OU _._ DeCts=o= i
(Sa) Wa,ling Game" J
or
(Sb) Relc'_t,on ""
_v D E':=_url
(I0)
Fru;%rated
(6al Wail,no Game"
or
{6b) No Go'*
Ill)
Incapable
(7)
Inddlerent
(131
DeTached
{12)
Defeated
(16)
Lo_
* "Wai1_ng Game" Implies Tha_ Ssraz_gic Managemenl Retains the Capacity to Take an Initiative When il Chooses 1o do so
"" "Reje_ion' and "No Go' Imply That -Ktrateg,c Management Does Not Rezaln Any Ca0aeity to Take an Initiative
NOteS: 1. This Matrix Assumes That Knowledge msCorrelated With Best Assessment o! the Risks Involved
2. With Respect to Mission/Purpose it isAssumed That i( the 0r_anizatlon Does Nol Monitor. Then it Does Not
Monitor New or Existing Environment and Capabilities
3. Wilh Respect zo Policy/Aims it is Assumed Thai if No Initialive is Taken the Organization Continues in the
Same Direction(s) Through inertia
4. Each of the Business STrateg,es in Th_s MaTrix Represents a Continuum
A business strategy matrix for corporate strategy
Table 2.11 [65]
]'he percentage of OPt. A F"J"z, OD's and PCT's employing different diagnostic categories
• Category name
Organization Outside Analysis for People change
development pressure the top technology
type. _ type. _, type, _ type. 0 verall
1. Formal structure 85%
2. Goals of the system 33%
3. Informal structure 42%
4. External relationships 45%
5. Performance 39%
6. Individual/psychological variables 4"2_%
7. Change problem area/change problem
relation 39%
8. Culture 63%
9. Resources 18%
10. Reward system 18%
11. Leadership 24%
12. Work process 44%
59% 69% 71%
50% 47% 55%
42% 49% 44%
42% 30% 39%
44% 49% 39%
31% 31% 55%
69%
45%
44%
39%
43%
38%
25% 16% 50% 30%
17% 21% 28% 33%
47% 54% _'Fw'_,,, 39%
14% 21;'_ I 1% 19%
47% 2 I% 8% 28%
17% 57,% 39_ 40%
N (33) (36) (37) (18) (124)
Table 2.12 [67]
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A De_.'ision Making Model of lndividual'Adoplion and Persislence
]nformalional
Inpms
Information
Generated as
a Pan of a
Program of
Planned Chan_c
Including a
Pr escription
and Ralionale
for a New
Behavior
Cuin_ Factors
Cent radimions
Unexpecled Oulcomes _'-
New Aherna_ives ]
Individual
Does Not
Adopt the
New
Behavior
Forrnulale or
Reformulal¢
Cognitions
About the New
Behavior
Reassess
New
Behavior
Informalional Inputs
Personal.
Social. and
Organizaliona)
Responses to the
Performance of the
New Behavior
No
Individual
Slops
Behavior
Figure 2.3 [12]
: External
Environment +
Internal
Environment
I
m
'Effective
Planning
• Market
• Technological
• Natural Resources
• Demc_rikohlc
• Emnomic
' Political
1
Company'= I
Culture I
• Strengths
• WeaJ_nesaes
• Beliefs
• Values
• Strategic Planning
• OrgAntza,lionsl Development
• HumanF_source Planning
Figure 2.4 [IB]
Reactive
Corporate Culture Grid
(People)
Particij _ative
1. Interactive
3. Systematized
2. Integrated
4. Entrepreneurial
Proactive (Action)
NomParticipative
Figure 2.5 [18]
PHASE] P_SE2 PHASE3 PHASE4 PHASE5 P_SE6
Pressureon
TopMana9_nent
V
ArousalTo
TakeAction
-> Intervention
At The Top
V
Reorientation
To Internal
Problems
-)
Dia9nosis
of Problem
Areas
V
Recognition
Of Specific
Problems
Invention
-) Of New
Solutions
V
Commitment
To New Courses
Of Action
Figure 2.6 [27]
-> Experimentation
NithNew
Solutions
V
SearchFor
Results
-). Reinforcement
FromPositive
Results
V
AcceptanceOf
New Practices
t
_realmen; Cor_i u_n
OD :nlen_enltOnS
, l
I
I
• i
I I
Fifsl-oeOer (Z_hange I _ Second-o_def C._ange
Chac_leS i_ allll_,tOes. _ C/_r_es _ arlIJt uCles. _t-
_tCeOl_OnS. and beaver ceDl4_s anti _r_ol m
In Iargel S_SySlffm Oll'_e_SuOSyslerl_S
Aggt c"ga_ed Change
Changes _'iSySlem-
wlo_' Derl o; rr_r, ce
_'tD-- Assumed causal seouenc_
.... _ ReciProcal kn_ges
I
I
I
!
Causal finkages in planned change
Figure 2.7 [35]
Par_iciDazion
in
Design
I Feei,ngs of
Con:rol and
Commilment
\ " Infor maliGn
about Syslem
\
Nigh OualilyDecision
r
The eftec_ of participation on perceptions of pay.
Favorable
PerceDl_ons
of Pay Plan
Figure 2.8 [39]
5. Strategies and Tactics
5.1 Coercive Strategies
5.11 Strategy of Pressure
5.12 Strategy of Hierarchy
5.]3 Strategy of Stress
Induction
5.2 Normative Strategies
5.21 Strategy of Participation
5.22 StrateKy of Involvement-
Commitment
5.23 Strategy of Feedback
Evaluation and Follow-up
5.24 Strategy of Displacement
of Values
5.25 Rtratcgy of External Re-
]ations
•Garth Jones and Aslam Niaz. "Strat-
egies and Tactics of Planned Organiza-
Uonal Change: A Scheme of Working
Concepts," Ph{llppine Jourmal o/ Public
Admil_istratlon, Vol. VII,No. 4 (Oct-
ober 1963), p. 276.
5.26 Strategy of Social
A waren ess
5.27 Strategy of Education
and Training
5.3 Utilitarian Strategies
5.31 Strategy of Placement
5.32 Stratcgy of Em_piricism
5.33 Strategy of Condition
Assistance
5.34 Strategy of Goal Setting
5.4 Tactics
5.41 Tactic of Action Research
5.42 Tactic of Training -
Counselling Syndrome
5.43 Tactic of Timing
5.44 Tactic of Technical
Modification
5.45 Tactic of ]_tanipulation
of Charisma
5.46 Tactic of Communication
5.47 Tactic of Marginality
5.45 Tactic of Voluntary
Association
Figure 2.9 [47]
"TYPCW.(_V Or" P.RIP,_RYU_!ITS: IN'TIRe!aLLY _!ml___T_ .
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I'1. Tralnir_ - Counseling Syndrome*
• 2. Involvepe_t- Co_[timent
3. Ear, in.lily _
4. Voluntary Associaiion*
5. Parllcipalion in Decisions
I['1. Displacement o£ Values
2. Social Awareness
3. Edbca_ion and Trainir4j
" _ 4. Empiricism
"5. _anJpula_Jon O? Charisma*
III.
I. Feedback_ Evaiuaiion and
Follow-Up
2. Condilional Assistance
IV. 1. Stress Induction
2.Pressure
3. Hierarchy
4. Placement
5. _oal SettinE
G. Action Research*
7. Technical Mod_ficaiion=
B. Timir_,*
Figure 2.10 [47]
C]_ange Planning Checklisl
USe this checklist to assess your orgamza_aon S change ID;ar,nmg
readiness.
1. Are your obiectives clear? Can you see the results you oesJre "]
--What will you be doing differently?
--How will things look changed?
--How will your customers be responding after the change '_
--How will your OUtpUt change (percemage over a basehne)?
2. Have you explored your own resistance |o the change?
--Who on the team feels uncomf0P, able with the change? What is
the objection? How might tnis objection help .you to rethink
your approach?
wWhat new trarning or knowledge requirement(s) 0oes the
change put on you?
3. Are you committed, as a management group, to bringing about
the change?
--Are team members enthusiastic about the change? How {s this
feeling expressed?
--Are team members informally getting together to look at ways
to implement the change? --
-Are you making decisions by consensus or by voting "_ Leader-
ship decision?
--Does the organization's "rumor mill" s0pporl the change?
4. Are you involving people at aft levels in planning the change?
--Who is being involved? Why involve these people?
--What do you want from them?
--How are you organizing their involvemenl?
5. Are you field-testing the chan_L_.on a smafl scale?
--Have you selected a work unit thal is supportive of the change?
mHave you made your objectives clear to this pilot organizalion?
Do lhey have a clear'picture of results desired?
--Have you let the pilot organization know that il's O.K. to make
mistakes and that you are accessible to work through problems?
6. How are you evaluating your change pilot proiect2
-- Have you made it a habit to regularly review your learnings from
lhe pilot implementation?
--Are you seeking out negative as well as positive feedback?
--How are you gathering information and what is the information
gathering telling you?
7. When will conditions be right to implement the change organiza-
tion wide ?
--Do you have a firm understanding of how this change will
impact other parts of the organization?
--Do you have supporlers of the change throughout the organiza-
tion with the clout to keep the change on track?
Is the lime right for change in lerms of market conditions and/or
olher conditions in your environment?
Figure 2.11 [48]
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, ---_ ---m m ____-_ _-- __ ,,_
Organziational Risk Taking: Contributing Factors
I ml iN
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURAL/CULTURAL FACTORS
• REWARD SYSTEMS SUPPORT SYSTEMS
, Formal: money, awards.
, Informal: praise.
What" are my payoffs for
taking this risk?
• ORGANIZATIONAL
; EXPECTATIONS
! Organizaiiori_ needs thai " ;
" require taking risks•
_- Management attitudes Ioward
. .risk taking..: ----_-,
i'TW}lat does the organization
_. expect from me in terms of
' risk taking behaviors?
INDIVIDUA
T"
 ph o p ...
• .... _,: • .:_ ,
_:-;....._.-...__. .
I_ Inclination to take or avoid
[. risks. . ". :.__ ..
: How do I feel about H'sk
taking?
Formal: informahon control
sys:ems, training.
Inlormal: encouragement of
managemem anO peers.
How will 1 be supported if
I take this risk?
AVAILABLE RESOURCES
Money, maleHals, equipment,
information.
o.
Do I have what I need to
make taking this risk pro-
ductive?
_ RISK TAKER
EXPERIENCES WITH
RISK TAKING IN
: THE ORGANIZATION
... .:- -- .
:" Success or failure in past ""
, risk taking. Rewards or .-
punishment for pas( risk
taking.
_. ° -
How do my past experiences
with risk taking relate to
taking risks now?
"- DECISION MAKING SKILL
.Skill in using high quality
: decision making process.
: Does my decision making
; skill help me choose to take .
appropriate risks?
INDIVIDUAL TENDENCY FACTORS
Figure 2.14 [57]
S_otegy
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iEx_oino _
EnvironmentO|
Busine_ r-oc1o_
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III. VERIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF KNOWLEDGE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The objectives stated in the title of this chapter were
accomplished by two separate methods. Our knowledge was
expanded by moving our industrial visitation process to an
industry with a relatively new culture and one which has
undergone a large amount of change in a short period of time.
The interview process is discussed in
chapter. The verification part of
accomplished by numerous presentations
our work to both the professional and
section 2 of this
this process was
and publications of
the academic forum.
The specifics are covered in section 3 of this chapter.
2.0 ANALYSIS OF THE EXPANSION OF
INDUSTRIAL VISITATION
KNOWLEDGE THROUGH
During this year, eight companies were visited, all in
Juarez Mexico and all part of the Maquiladoras or twin plant
industry. The plants visited included two Packard Electric
plants, BRK, Westinghouse, Electro Circuits, Honeywell, RCA,
and GE. In addition, several of the
associations and Maquila associations were
industry is unique and has a large amount
intervention. In addition the industry has
considerable growth stage in the last several
industrial park
visited. This
of government
gone through a
years with the
work force being around 75 thousand currently. This
work force had a major cultural change imposed on it when it
went from an agrarian basis to a manufacturing one. All of
these points along with the fact that a large amount of
companies were located in close proximity were factors in
choosing this industry for visitation.
2.1 IMPRESSIONS DRAWNFROMTHE INTERVIEWS
One of the first impressions drawn from working with
this industry is that it is very low on the Maslow Hierarchy
of Needs list. A significant portion of the cultural change
is no doubt due to the need for the basic substance of life
supported by the minimum wage. The work force remains
transient with employees working for a while and then moving
on, either back to their original homes or to another plant.
This seems to show that the satisfaction of lower level needs
does not guarantee retention.
Another problem
industry is that of
production and design.
plants are requiring
that surfaces in almost all of this
obtaining the proper balance between
To deal with this issue, many of the
cross-training between the two areas.
This industry seems to produce a very high quality
product. One of the reasons is no doubt that the low labor
cost allows a large number of quality inspectors to be hired.
Perhaps a more important reason is that the work force has
been trained in quality from its inception into the
industrial world.
As a final impression it was difficult to identify
transition strategies in this work force. Things are
changing very quickly. In addition, many of the strategic
decisions are made at the home plants, located in other
countries.
2.2 CONCLUSIONS
A great deal of useful information was
visitation process. Much of this information
its application to the
gained from the
is valuable in
transition of NSTS to an operational
environment. The following concepts
conclusions drawn from last year's
process.
re-enforce
industrial
the listof
interview
o For
production.
o Cross-training is essential to smooth the design
operations interface.
o Quality must be built into a new program or product from
its beginning.
o In order to impact retention, higher order needs than
just the basics of life or salary must be addressed.
Ego and self-fulfillment seem to be important here.
smooth operations, a product must be designed for
3.0 VERIFICATION
In the highly technical world of today, any work, no
matter how elaborate, cannot be taken for granted to be
unquestionably complete. There are numerous highly qualified
researchers in the wide world of academia and industry, who
are sometimes working in closely similar areas. The
intellectual input of such colleagues and professionals is
very important for the growth and development of the research
activity. Therefore, it is very
researchers exchange their work in
substantiate their research efforts.
important that the
order to simplify and
Conferences are one of the principal meeting places for
the exchange of ideas and thoughts by researchers. This year,
three papers were presented at the National and International
levels in order to publicize the research work and gain
valuable response from different areas of the academic and
professional comunities. As a consequence, it was noted that
the research activity is for
direction. It was also noted
research work in the area of
substantially ahead of others.
valuable comments about the
the
that
transition
However,
validation
most part, in the right
in most situations, our
management is
there were some
of some of our
theoretical research work.
are well taken. Furthermore, they
aspiration and commitment to
companies in order to give
theoretical investigation.
Another channel of verification of
practical ideas and thoughts is by means
Those commentsand suggestions
have solidified our
survey more individuals and
us a more reliable basis for
theoretical and
of publication in
reputable journals. This mode of presentation usually covers
a wider segment of researchers and professionals involved in
similar activities. Moreover, most prestigious journals have
elaborate refereeing process. When the paper goes through
the refereeing process in such journals, it is scrutinized by
several people at the edge of technology in that research
area, before it is cleared for publication. Such extensive
exploration by the referees improves the quality of the
paper, and usually provides good direction for the future
research. Two of our papers have already been through that
rigorous refereeing process. One of them has already
appeared in a journal and the other is due for publication.
Besides, two other papers have appeared in the proceedings of
the conferences in which they were presented. Moreover, four
other papers are, at present, passing through the time
consuming process of scrutiny and hopefully will be published
soon. Three other papers are in the final stages of the
preparation for our submission.
A summary of the presentations and publications of the
research is contained in Appendix IIIA of this chapter.
APPENDIX IIIA
PUBLICATION/PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH
i. TRANSITION LIFE CYCLE - AN R&D TO OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVE
- Submitted for publication to the IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management.
2. R&D TO OPERATIONS TRANSITION MANAGEMENT
- Presented At The National Decision Science Institute
Annual Meeting In Honolulu, Hawaii, Nov. 23-25, 1986.
- Submitted for publication to The Academy of Management
Review.
3. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT - A STRUCTURED PERSPECTIVE
- Published In The Proceedings of The International
Conference on Engineering Management: Theory and
Application, Swansea, England, (September 15-19, 1986).
- Submitted for publication to the IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management.
4. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT - A PERSPECTIVE
- Published In The Proceedings Of The 24th Annual
Southern Management Association Meeting at Atlanta,
Georgia, November 12-15, 1986.
5. TRANSITION MANAGEMENT OF AN ORGANIZATION
- Working Paper, UH-UP, Houston, Texas, 1987.
6. AN INDUSTRIAL INSIGHT INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE
- Working Paper, UH-UP, Houston, Texas, 1987.
7. DISASTER ON FLIGHT 51-L: AN IE PERSPECTIVE ON THE
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
- Published in Industrial Management, Vol. 28, No. 5,
1986. (See Appendix VI C)
8. OPERATIONAL ARM FOR THE SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM :
A PERSPECTIVE DIRECTION
- Working Paper, UH-UP, Houston, Texas, 1987.
(See Appendix VII G) !
9. AN ANALYSIS
PROGRAM
OF THE FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY OF NASA's NSTS
- To Appear in the Logistics Spectrum.(See Appendix IV E)
10. OPTIMAL SCHEDULING IN AN M-STAGE FLOW SHOP WITH MULTIPLE
PROCESSORS
- Submitted to TIMS/ORSA for Presentation in May, 1987.
- Submitted for Publication in the International Journal
of Production Research. (See Appendix IV A)

CHAPTERIV
SPACE SHUTTLE SCHEDULINGAND FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY
1.0
2.0
3.0
INTRODUCTION
SCHEDULING OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE
FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY
APPENDICES
IV A : SCHEDULING IN A FLOWSHOP WITH MULTIPLE PROCESSORS
IV B : FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY : PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
IV C : USES OF FLIGHT RATES
IV D : THE FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS
IV E : AN ANALYSIS OF THE FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY OF NASA's
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM

IV. SPACE SHUTTLE SCHEDULING AND FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The primary
tools necessary for
planning. To this
management have been
focus of this chapter
effective operations
end, several areas
studied in extensive
is on methods and
and managerial
of production
detail in this
control the system.
be very effective
system.
chapter. The scheduling of the Space Shuttle and the flight
rate capability analysis, for better planning and
predictability, are the examples of such operational
instruments studied here for effective planning. The use of
mathematical models to solve scheduling problems, and
simulation models to estimate the flight rate capability will
enhance the potential of the management to predict and
Furthermore, such tools are expected to
in reducing the operational cost of the
In the following sections, brief descriptions of the
scheduling and flight rate simulation analysis are presented.
A rather detailed description of the research work has been
included in the appendices of this chapter.
2.0 SCHEDULING OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE
The Space Shuttle goes through three specific facilities
namely the OPF, VAB, and PAD, in the same order before being
launched into space from the PAD at Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). The Orbiter Processing Facility, OPF, is where basic
processing is done on the Orbiter. The Vertical Assembly
Building, VAB, is where the Orbiter is mounted with its Solid
Rockets and External Tank. The Launch PAD, is where most
payloads are mounted, and it is the launch site. There are
multiple processing resources of each facility and the
problem under consideration is that of scheduling the space
shuttle through them such that a specified regular measure of
performance such as mean flow time or makespan is optimized.
Although a similar sequence is followed for processing by the
space shuttle for all types of missions, making it a flow
shop scheduling problem,
and limited number of
situation.
In order to address the subject matter of
scheduling, the problem of a flow shop
the presence of multiple facilities
space shuttles complicates the
space shuttle
with multiple
processors is formulated as a mixed integer programming (MIP)
problem in Appendix IV A. The special case of flow shop
problem formulation developed there can be applied in the use
of the Space Shuttle processing. The direct utilization of
the method developed is in solving the sub-problem of finding
the sequence for a small group of jobs equalling the number
of space shuttles available. The missions available in the
scheduling bracket, or window are the candidates for the
sequencing positions. In case the number of available
missions in the scheduling window under consideration is
greater than the
analysis can be
Furthermore, the restrictions on
space shuttle can be easily
subsequent scheduling windows. The objective function
this formulation could be the optimization of any one,
more regular measures
NASA administration.
number of space shuttles, then sensitivity
performed to find the best sequence.
the availability of the
modeled as well for the
in
or
of performance as established by the
3.0 FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY
There are several factors which may be instrumental in
causing any management to present somewhat higher or lower
production, and/or flight rates. However, using unrealistic
figures as production targets can be extremely dangerous for
the smooth flow of the work in a production or operations
environment. Furthermore, the selection of target production
figures may also have a detrimental effect on the long range
planning and objectives of the organization. Therefore, it
is imperative that management studies and uses the right
production (or flight) rates before making any organizational
commitment. An analysis of the flight rate capability of
NASA's Space Shuttle program through the use of simulation is
presented in appendix IV E of this chapter.
simulation model will provide an example
investigation process. However, before
analyses of the simulation modeling ,
The study of the
of the managerial
presenting the
some thoughts about
flight rates, uses of flight rates, and the flight decision
process are necessary. They are presented in appendices IV
B, IV C, and IV D respectively. In addition, a brief outline
of the three topics is presented in the following sections.
3.1 FLIGHT RATES
Two broadsides in the appendix, "Flight Rate Capability"
and "Uses of Flight Rates" address the general issue of
determining and using flight rates. One of the major
messages is that in order to determine the flight rate at
which the system can perform the first step is to determine
the amount of control in the system presently. It is very
difficult to determine a realistic flight rate based on only
24 flights, particularly with the amount of variability that
seems to be in the system. Once the amount of control is
determined then confidence or reliability factors can be
assigned to flight rates. The main message here is that
different usages may generate different flight rates.
3.2 FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS
The underlying issue here is the method to be used to
both control and insure safety while gaining experience with
a developmental product. One method is to define the
experience_ envelope of a product as the collection of data,
both analytical and historic, under which it is felt that the
performance of the product is predictable. When performing
within this envelope, the burden of proof to an objector to
performance is to show that the product is unsafe in this
environment. When performing outside this envelope the
burden of proof is to prove that it is safe to move outside.
As experience is gained and analysis is done then the
envelope changes in a corresponding manner. A level of
confidence is also associated with this envelope. When costs
are small then a large level of confidence is not necessary.
However when costs are large then the opposite is true.

APPENDIX IV A
SCHEDULING IN A FLOW SHOP WITH MULTIPLE PROCESSORS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
A flow shop sequencing problem is characterized as
processing of n jobs on m machines. The machines are laid
out in unidirectional flow pattern and each job is processed
identically in the fixed ordering of the machines. The
objective of job scheduling can be that of minimizing the
maximum completion time to complete processing all jobs on
all of the machines average time to complete all jobs, or any
other regular measure of performance. More detailed work
could involve the optimization of multiple objectives, or
goals. The sequencing of a flow shop with multiple
facilities at each stage is a special case of the flow shop
problem. It involves sequencing of n jobs in a flow shop,
where for at least one stage, the processor has one or more
identical machine(s). Stated another way, the problem is a
special case of the job shop problem in which all jobs to be
scheduled follow the same machine sequence. The problem was
first identified by Salvador (1973). He suggested a branch
and bound approach to solvethe problem for the permutation
flow shop with multiple processors. However, no work has
been reported to formulate it mathematically and possibly
solve it for real life applications.
The purpose of this paper is to formulate the flow shop
with multiple processors scheduling problem as mixed integer
programming (MIP) problem and give some real life examples to
demonstrate the usefulness of the model. A special case of
this formulation, when the number of machines at each stage
of processing is one, represents a pure flow shop; a MIP
representation of which is also presented. Many real life
examples are also introduced which demonstrates the presence
of numerous such problems in production scheduling.
An important aspect when dealing with the scheduling
problems is that even the simplistic case of static flow shop
minimizing the makespan belongs to the family of
combinatorial problems. The complexity of the problem is
further increased by the fact that unlike the single machine
case, the inserted idle time may be advantageous. The number
of possible schedules for such problems are to the extent of
(n!)m(Baker, 1974). The excessive number of possible
combinations make the scheduling of flow shop even more
complex, and the solutions have only been obtained for some
elementary problems. One of the simplified class of the flow
shop problems is which considers only permutation schedules,
and even in this case the number of possible alternatives are
n! (Gupta, 1972). Furthermore, it has been shown that the
three and more machine permutation flow shop problems are NP-
complete problems (Lenstra et al., 1977). Therefore the
complexity of the problem strongly suggest that polynomial-
bounded method for solution is highly unlikely.
The number of possible schedules for total enumeration
even for permutation schedule is excessively large and
perhaps the only course available is a partial enumeration,
commonly referred as branch and bound technique. The work
done on flow shop has primarily focused around development of
various branch and bound algorithms. Ignall and Schrage
(1965), Lamnicki (1965), McNohan and Burton (1967), Ashour
(1970), Gupta (1970), Szwarc (1977), Lageweg et al. (1978),
and Bansal (1979) have applied branch and bound techniques to
solve such problems. A comparison of some of them is
contained in Baker (1975). Most of the other work has been
developed through heuristic procedures. Palmer (1965),
Campbell et al. (1970), Gupta (1971; 1972), Gupta and Maykut
(1973), Dannenbring (1977), Gelders et al. (1978), King and
Spachis (1980), Stinson and Smith (1982), Nawaz et al.
(1983), Park et al. (1984), and others have developed some
heuristics to solve flow shop problems.
with multiple processors scheduling is
Salvador (1973) suggested a branch and
As far as flow shop
concerned, although
bound approach, and
gave an equation for the lower bound, but no work has been
reported to the knowledge of the authors on the development
of such an algorithm.
2.0 PROBLEMDESCRIPTION
The problem of flow shop with multiple processors
scheduling can be presented graphically as in Figure I.
ST ART
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FIG. I. FLOW SHOP WITH PARALLEL PROCESSORS
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FIG. 2. QUEUING REPRESENTATION OF FLOW SHOP
WITH PARALLEL PROCESSORS
There is a main queue of incoming jobs, and each job can go
to any one of the M I machines at stage 1. As can be seen in
Figure 2, there is a queue at each stage of the flow shop
processing, and theoretically all of the jobs can be routed
to any one of the Mj machines (I _ j _ m) at stage j. When
the job has been processed through the last stage m, using
one of the Mm machines, it is complete and at that point can
leave the system. In theory, the jobs can take '_-_n " l)fn-_1__J "j -j-,-- .
possible sequence combinations, some of which may not have to
be explored.
There are two decision activities which occur at each
stage of the problem. The first decision is the assignment
of the job to a specific machine k from _ _arallel machines,
at stage j, and the second is the scheduling of jobs on each
one of the machines at that stage. The two decisions are
closely linked and both of them effects .the quality of the
scheduling results.
There are numerous solution techniques that can be
applied to the stated problem. The choice can range from an
integer programming, mixed integer programming, linear
programming, branch and bound algorithm, simulation
experimentation to heuristic procedures for single or
multiple objectives. The optimal seeking techniques
obviously have the advantage of coming up with optimal
solution, but the major drawback is in the computation time
and being intractable for large problems.
3.0 APPLICATIONS 0P THE PROBLEM
The application of this type of problem occurs more
often than one would imagine. Many high volume production
facilities have several independent flow shops. The process
in such facilities is such that they are interchangeable at
each stage and are therefore practically similar. Salvador
_1973) first recognized the problem in the polymer, chemical,
process and petro-chemical industries where there are several
parallel plants which can be considered as flow shops, and
the jobs can practically be processed at any one of the
plants at each stage of the processing. Assembly lines in
which more than one products are manufactured, and each work
station has multiple machines is also an obvious application
of this problem. Similarly, the situation where parallel
machine(s) is (are) added at one or more stages of the flow
shop to ease the pressure on the bottle neck facilities, and/
or to increase the production capacities can be viewed as an
application of the suggested problem.
The flow shop problems have a close relationship with
the group technology applications. It is rarely the case
when manufacturing group in such situations have pure flow
shop formulation. In most of the situations, the requirement
is that of multiple processors for some stages of processing.
Such situations present themselves for
flow shop with multiple processors
Likewise, another utilization of the
the application of
scheduling problem.
problem could be in a
Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS). In a special case of
FMS where there are parallel machine installations which are
capable of processing any one of the jobs, on one or more of
the parallel facilities, is a likely example. The
restriction, or simplification on this problem is that once a
job enters an FMS, it can no longer use any of the other
parallel facilities. In other words, the sequencing choice
is made only at the first stage.
Yet another modification to the capacitated flow shop
problem can be skillfully applied in the use of the Space
Shuttle processing at Kennedy Space Center (KSC). In this
example, the space shuttle goes through a similar processing
sequence each time it is getting ready to fly a mission in
space. There are multiple processing facilities at each
stage and the orbiter can practically use any one of them for
the processing. The restriction in this case is on the
number of machine operators (or space shuttles) in the
system. The objective function in all of these cases could
be the optimization of any one or more regular measures of
performance.
4.0 MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
The purpose of production scheduling in any situation is
to determine an optimal schedule which will optimize a pre-
determined criteria. Parallel to the need of seeking an
optimal solution is the requirement of being practical and
efficient for the
of these requirements are at
compromise solution in the
reached. But, in order to
practical value, many times it may be
real life applications.
odds with each other
form of a heuristic is
evaluate heuristic for
Quite often, both
and a
often
their
necessary to compare
their performance with respect to the optimal seeking
mathematical or analytical formulation. Moreover, such
formulation most often provides insight into the intricacies
of the problem and eventually help in the development of the
heuristics. Wagner (1959) first introduced the integer
programming formulation for the machine scheduling problems
and also developed one for the the permutation flow shop.
The MIP formulation for the optimal scheduling of M-Stage
flow shop with multiple processors is generalization of the
formulation to include non-permutation schedules, as well as,
the multiple processors at each stage of the flow shop. As a
special case, non-permutation representation of a pure flow
shop is also presented.
Makespan, or the maximum completion time is the most
commonly used criteria to evaluate the flow shop algorithms /
heuristics in the literature. It is therefore natural to
first develop such a model which optimizes the makespan for
the flow shop with multiple processors scheduling problem. A
mixed integer programming formulation is developed to
minimize the makespan of the stated problem. As will be seen
latter, a slight variation will make it possible to formulate
the problem for other criteria such as minimize the mean flow
time, or the minimize lateness or mean lateness.
Before starting the mathematical formulation, it may be
logical to make some assumptions in order to make the problem
somewhat tractable. The following are some of the basic
assumptions:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii )
All jobs are available for processing at time zero.
The processing time of jobs is known and constant.
All jobs follow the same machine sequence.
The flow shop consists of m > 2 stages or levels.
Each level or stage has Mj _ I machines; j = I, ... ,m;
with inequality holding for at least one _ .
Set-up time is considered a part of processing time.
Set-up time is independent of the job sequence.
viii) No machine failure or downtime is allowed.
ix) No job may be split or pre-empted.
The objective function in this formulation is the
minimization of makespan, or the time to complete the last
operation. Mathematically,
Minimize Z
Where F.
im
machine(s) M
m"
Subject to Z >
-- Im
is the flow time of
for all i (la)
job i on the last set of
For the
modelled as
mean flow time criteria, the constraint can be
Z _>_Fim/ n (Ib)
i
Similarly for minimizing the lateness, the restriction
can be modelled as Z _> F.,m - d i for all i (lc)
Where di is the due date for job i.
Finally, for
restriction will be
minimizing the mean lateness,
Z >_ (Fire - d ) / n
- i |
the
(Id)
If the restriction of the simultaneous availability of
the jobs has to be relaxed, then the system can be modelled
with additional set of restrictions such that the processing
does not start before the release time. This modification to
la and Ib will provide optimal solution to two other criteria
(i.e. minimize the maximum, and mean completion time).
The Mixed Integer Programming
presented in Table I assigns the jobs
machines at each stage of the flow shop.
(MIP) formulation
to the individual
Two binary, or 0,1,
variables are used in the formulation. First, Xirjk is used
to take account of the precedence relationship among the jobs
for each machine k (I _ k _ Mj) at each stage j (I _ j _ m).
Second, Yijk to assign jobs to only one machine k at each
stage, or in other words to provide safeguard against the
multiple machine assignment at each stage of the processing.
Equation 2 of the Table I guarantee that the job is assigned
to only one of the machine k at each stage j. Equation 3
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION:
SUBJECT TO:
MINIMIZE Z
Z _> F_
or Z _>%: F_In
or. Z_> I F_-d i
or Z >E::i(Fir n- di)/n
v,j.: Ik=-I
M_÷ I
F .j+r _>
Q(2 - Yijk-Yrjk+ X_.j_)+ Fij
Q(3 - Yijk- Yrjl_-Xir:iI_)+ Frj
-Frj>
-Fij _>
0.!
0,1
0
YI_ =
Xirjk =
F_j
+ tij
for all i
for all i
for all i and j
for all i and j
for all i,r,jand k
for all i,j and k
for all i,r,jand k
forall i and j
(la)
(Ib)
(_c)
(Id)
(2)
(3)
(4)
WHERE:
n --
m -
I =
] =
Mj =
k =
tij =
Fij =
Q =
Xrj_
Total number of jobs.
Total number of machine stages in the flow shop.
Number of job; i= I, .........,n.
Number of machine stage; j = I, ............, m
Total number of parallel machines at stage j.
Number of machine at stage j; k = I, ........., Mj.
Processing time forjob i,at stage j, on machine k.
Travel time of job i,from stage j to j+1.
Flow time of job i at stage J.
M.
A large number >. 7. 7_ _ Pi:_-i j k
I If job i preceeds job r, on stage J, at machine k.0 Otherwise.
I If job i,on stage j, is assigned to machine k.0 Otherwise.
TABLE I. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE
FLOW SHOP WITH MULTIPLE PROCESSORS.
makes sure that
not start before it is completed at stage j, and it
reached stage j+1 for the processing. The fourth set
constraint in Table I are non-interference constraint.
job i" and job r are not assigned to the same machine k at
stage j, then both constraints will be inactive by
construction. In case they are assigned to the same machine
k at stage j, then one of them will guarantee non-
interference, meaning both of the jobs can not be worked on
simultaneously, and the other will become inactive by design.
For example, if either job i or job r, or both are not
assigned to the machine k, then a large number, Q or 2Q, is
added to the first of the set of equation 4, and 2Q or 3Q is
added to the second equation of the set, thereby making both
of them inactive. On the other hand, if both jobs are
the processing of the job at stage j+1 does
has
of
If
equation, making it inactive. The second equation in the set
will now guarantee non-interference. These equations of the
set will switch roles if the job r precedes job i.
Table 2 presents an example of the formulation of the
three stage flow shop problem with two parallel machines at
each stage of processing. The problem has 172 constraints
and 156 variables for a four jobs case which shows the size
and complexity of the problem. Table 3 presents the number
of variables and constraints for a general MIP formulation of
the flow shop with multiple processor(s) scheduling problem.
r
assigned to the same machine k, _ then Y|jk = _jk = I, and if
job i precedes job r and Q will be added to the first
AN EXAMPLEi
n=4; m=3; .MI=M2=M 3=2.
e I 2 3 4
PIU P211k=1I
k=2
2
k=2
k=1
3
k'=2
P112
P121
P122
P212
P221
P222
P321
P322
P411
]°412
P421
P422
P431
P432
SOLUTION:
SUBJECT TO:
MINIMIZE Z
Z2F_
Ylll + Yl12 = 1
Y121 + V122 = i
Y131 + Y132 = I
F11 -> YIIIP111 + YII2PII2 + t11
F_2-F_1.->_21P121+ Y_22P_+ t_2
F_3- F_2->_3_93_+ Y_32P_32+ t_3
Q(2- Yl11- Y211 + Xlzll ) + FlI - FZl 2 PllI
Q(2-YlII-Y311 +Xlzt! ) +Flt - _1 -> PllI
Q(2 - Ytlt- Y411 + X1411 ) + Fil - F41 2 Pllt
Q(3- Yl11- Y211- Xl211 ) + F21 - Fit > P211
Q(3-Y111-Y311 -XlzI1) + F31 - Fit -> P311
Q(3 - YllI- Y411 - X1411 ) " F41 - F11 Z P411
Q(2 - Y112- Y212 + X1212 ) + Fll - F21 2 P!12
Q(2 - Yl12- Y312 + Xlz,12) + FII - F31 2 Pl12
Q(2 - Y112- Y412 + X1412 ) + F11 - F41 2 P112
Q(3 - Yll2- Y212 -X1212 ) + F21 - Fll 2 P212
Q(3 - Yll2- Y3_2- X1312) + F31 - F_ -> P_12
Q(3 - Yl_,- Y,._, -X_412 ) + F41- F_ 2 P_
TABLE 2. AN EXAMPLE OF THE FLOW SHOP WITH
MULTIPLE PROCESSORS SCHEDULING.
0(2 - _/121- Y221 . lZz _ _ r _ _ F-_ -> P121
Q(5 - Y122- Y222- X1222 ) + F22 - F12 _ P222
Q(3 V_zz- V3zz- X_zzz ) * F_z- Flz "_ P3zz
Q(3 - V122- V422- X1422 ) * F42" F12 ->' P422
Q(2-V131-V2_I + Xlz31 ))+ Ft_ - Fz3 -> P131
Q(2 - V_3_" Yssl + Xls_1 + Ft_ - F_z > P_I
Q(2 - YI_I- Y431 ÷ X1431 ) + FI_ - F43 > P131
Q(3-Y_3_-33_- + F33-F_3 > P3_
Q(3 - Y131- Y431" X1431 ) + F43 - F13 > P431
Q(2 - Y_3z- "/z32 + XI23Z )
O(2 - Yi3z- Vssz + X_33z )
+ Xi43ZQ(2 - V_32- "/432
Q(3 - V13Z- VZ3Z" X_Z3Z )
Q(3 - V_z2"%32- X_3_2)
O(3-v_32-%z2
- F23 -> P_3_• F_3
• _3- F3_Z P_32
+ F13 - F43 -> P132
• G:_-F_ 2 PSzZ
_X1432) + F43 - F13 2 P432
AbOVe are forty three constraints for job I. similarly,
there are forty three constraints each for job 2, 3, and 4.
please note that P_jk 'ti] 'and Q are known constants.
TABLE 2 (Continued)-
NUMBER OF VARIABLES:
Fij = n*m
ffl
Yijk = n * m (j_iMj).:
Xirjk: n (n - 1) (j_1.=Mj )
NUMBER OF CONSTRAINTS:
I) = n
2) = n*m
3) = n*m
n_
4) = 2 * n (n- I) (_-:.Mj)
j-1
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF VARIABLES & CONSTRAINTS.
As may be obvious from the table that the number of variables
and constraints increase rapidly, thereby making it difficult
to solve the larger problems.
The non-permutation pure flow
the above formulation of the problem,
before. It is the situation in which there
processor at each stage of the flow shop
shop is special case of
as has been discussed
is a single
processing, or
simply stated M! = ... = Mm= I, the representation becomes
that of the pure flow shop. Table 4 presents the
mathematical formulation of such problem. As is obvious from
Table I and 4, the model can be easily modified for
optimizing multiple criteria.
5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The flow shop with multiple processors scheduling
problem is in an area of direct application for some of the
real life problems of production scheduling. There are many
manufacturing and other situations
formulation can be usefully employed.
of this formulation is of direct
Shuttle scheduling problem.
been identified before, no
mathematical formulation or for
problem. This paper presents a
where this problem
A slight modification
interest to NASA's Space
Although the stated problem has
work has been reported on the
solving any real life
Mixed Integer Programming
formulation of the stated problem which provides insight into
the intricacies of the problem. The problem formulation is
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION:
SUBJECT TO:
MINIMIZE Z
Z >. F_
or Z >__. F_/n
1
or Z _> F_- d i
or Z _>_.(F_- di) ln
1
for all i
for all i
_>
Q(X_.j) + F_j -Frj>_ Pij
Q(1 - X_rj ) + Frj - F_j >_ Prj
+ tU for all i and j
for all i,r and j
for all i,r and j
for all i and j
(la)
(Ib)
(Ic)
(Id)
(2)
(3)
WHERE:
n
m -
i =
j =
tij =
Q =
Xirj =
Total number of jobs.
Total number of machine stages in the flow shop.
Number of job; i= I, .........,n
Number of machine stage; j = I, ............, m
Processing time for job i, at stage j.
Travel time of job i, from stage j to j+1.
Flow tlme of job I at stage J.
A large number .> _- ._Pij-I j
I If Job i preceeds job r, on stage J.0 Otherwise.
TABLE 4. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF A
PURE FLOW SHOP.
combinatorial in nature, and is useful when applied to the
smaller problems. However, the formulation is useful in
understanding the structure of the problem and can serve as a
benchmark in the development of heuristics.
Further research is recommended in the development of
useful heuristics which should substantially help in finding
the solution methodologies for the large scale problems. The
problem also lends itself for careful simulation studies of
the dynamic formulation.
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APPENDIX IV B
FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY : PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The process of determining the flight rate is similar to
determining the amount of production that an industrial
system can deliver. This industrial similarity holds even
though the Shuttle processing is more complex, difficult and
expensive than most industrial applications. The management
process of the Shuttle is complicated by the fact that the
Shuttle is relatively new having been processed only 24-25
times and by the fact that
routine processing.
There are several methods
NASA is new to the business of
used in industry to determine
process rates. One is to look at a comparable process and
develop rates based on similarities. Since there is nothing
similar to the Shuttle, this approach does not seem to lead
anywhere. Another method is to look at historic data within
the organization. Unfortunately, 24 flights does not provide
sufficient information to generate reliability.
The Shuttle program has
optimistic view through stages
pessimistic view of 9-12/year.
evolved from an extremely
from 60/year to 24/year to a
In truth, a lot of the
processing information appears to be random data. The as-run
information from KSC reads, flight by flight, like different
books. If much of the processing data is random, then
predicting flight rates from the mean of a random process is
going to lead to difficulty and certainly will not generate
reliable numbers.
The first step in determining a realistic flight rate is
to determine the amount of control or confidence that
management has in the process and its related data. Can
process steps be repeated on a new flight during the same
time interval and with the same amount of resource? Once the
amount of control in the process is determined then the
reliability of generated predictions (read this as flight
rate) falls out. Regardless of its usage in generated
schedules, determining what is controlled and what is random
is essential in order to accelerate the process rate. In
short, in order to have routine processing you must have
controlled processing. In order to have controlled
processing you must know what is controlled and what is not.
Then the uncontrolled issues can be addressed. But control
is the key concept.
To address an issue of this sort, assumptions must be
made. Typically one assigns enough constraints, through
assumptions, to develop a model for which an answer can be
determined. Then, where possible, the constraints are
relaxed one at a time to make the model more useful.
end the following initial assumptions are made.
There are at least two uses for determining
rates.
To that
One is for satisfying the real pressure
flight
generated by
having to respond to budget questions•
in long range planning.
Another is for usage
2.0 ASSUMPTIONS
i I
2.
•
JSC can support anything that KSC can fly.
Sufficient resource will be applied to find at least
a partial answer to the flight rate problem.
The attempt to answer the flight rate problem is in
relationship to long range planning as opposed to
its usage in the near term.
3.0 SUGGESTIONS
o The
traditional industrial engineering
processing: operations, inspections,
storage, and delay for each flight.
o These categories then need to be further sub-divided
into planned versus unplanned work.
o This task, which is non trivial and will require a large
amount of effort, needs to be done by a combined JSC-KSC
o
as run data from KSC needs to be broken up into the
categories of
transportation,
versus planned need to be
what is and what is not
team.
Coefficients of unplanned
generated to demonstrate
controlled.
o Then
confidence in that flight rate can be assigned.
o Statistical studies seeking correlations
processing parameters need to be continued as
step in the reduction and usage of the data.
a flight rate can be determined and a level of
between
a next
APPENDIX IV C
USES OF FLIGHT RATES
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Before one begins to develop a large amount of
information and analysis on flight rates the question of
intended usage must be addressed. Depending on the intended
usage, it may be necessary to develop different rates and to
use different methods to develop them. The choice of method
and the amount of time spent will also have some correlation
to the amount of confidence
justifies.
A concept that would seem
that a particular schedule
to be essential is that when
flight rates are discussed that there be some agreement as to
which flight rate is being discussed and what the intended
usage of the information really is. Certainly, ambiguity
among decision makers has the potential of creating serious
problems.
2.0 USES OF FLIGHT RATE
2.1 To Determine Manifests and to Meet Customer Commitments
In this sense there is some pressure being placed on the
system by the desired users of the Shuttle. One major usage
of flight rate is to determine how well the system can
respond to this pressure
payload can be flown when.
in the sense of determining what
2.2
A reasonable assumption is that
will be obtained is related
To Respond to POP's and Budgets
There is always a need for money to support the program.
the amount of money which
to the flight rate that is
planned.
2.3 For Use in Long Range Planning
Future concerns of NASA can have a large impact both on
the number of flights needed and on the capability of the
system to produce flights. As an example, the space station
both generates a need to support more flights and syphons off
resources, both money and people, which will be needed to
support a higher flight rate. ELV's enter into this picture
somewhere also.
2.4 To Determine Ways and Means of Increasing Production
Any schedule developed to apply 5 years in the future
based on 24 flights is going to have a large amount of error.
However, the simple attempt to determine a realistic schedule
should assist in the problem of increasing the flight rate.
3.0 CONCLUSION
Perhaps, all flight rates should be the same. Perhaps
being effective.
the same flight
should result as
these differences are only perceived. However two underlying
truths seem to apply. One is that it is difficult to imagine
the same information being used in many different ways as
The other is that if the policy is to use
rate for all applications then this policy
the product of careful and logical thinking
with a large amount of input from all concerned and should be
well communicated and understood throughout the organization.
The policy should not be the result of ommission but rather
the result of commission.

APPENDIX IV D
THE FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Roger's report mentioned several times the question
of determining when the burden of proof should lie on proving
safe and when it should lie on proving unsafe. The intent of
this short paper is to address this issue and perhaps to
provide some codification of the question.
2.0 EXPERIENCE ENVELOPE
When a design is being developed and moved into an
operational era an experience envelope is generated at
successive steps in the process. This envelope is based not
just on experience but also on analysis. The intent of this
envelope is to provide a description of expected performance
based on factors such as the environment, the conditions
under which the design is expected to perform, loads, and in
general, all known or analyzed factors which might affect the
performance of the design. As the design is used, the
envelope grows and performance can be predicted with greater
certainty for a larger number of conditions due to history
and the opportunity to do more analysis.
3.0 THE BURDEN OF PROOF
When a
envelope, the burden of proof lies
unsafe to use the design within
After all, this is the primary
experience envelope: to indicate
performance can be predicted.
system is going to perform within its experience
on showing that it is
its experience envelope.
reason for developing an
parameters under which
When a system is going to perform outside its experience
envelope, the burden of proof lies on showing that it is safe
to use this design in the new environment. This is new
territory and must be explored cautiously. Moving outside
the envelope requires, in the absence of history, a careful
analysis to be done on expected performance.
4.0 LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE
When costs, in the sense of any of money, people, or
equipment, are small, then the level of confidence in the
envelope need not be so great. However, when costs are high,
then a large level of confidence in the predictions of the
envelope is necessary. The intent here is to reduce risk.
With high costs and a cautious approach, the envelope can
grow and produce expanded performance.
APPENDIX IV E
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY OF NASA's
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle Program of NASA is an
research and development endeavor with aspirations
to an operational era. The
size and complexity, and the
structure is also increasing
extensive
of moving
program continues to grow, in
need to find an operational
progressively in the same
improve the entire
Commission on Space
that, although the
direction. The Space Shuttle Challenger's disaster has made
this system even more complex and critical, and has, at least
on the surface, made the move to operations more difficult.
A potential complicating factor is that of removing undue
pressure from the system and channeling resources in order to
system. The findings of the Presidential
Shuttle Challenger's
disaster occurred
engineering failure, it
problems in management,
control, etc. (i); most
operational nature. One
indicates a contributing
disaster suggests
because of an
a long strings of
safety, quality
difference between R&D and Operational management.
program was declared to be operational after
was rooted in
communications,
of these problems were of an
of the findings of the commission
factor being rooted in the
When the
the test
flights, the report points out, NASA started flying more
frequent missions with the same resources, which resulted in
a diversion of attention to the
problem of meeting the schedule.
pressure on the entire system (2).
more pressing immediate
The consequence was undue
As this program moves to a steady operational status, it
is important that appropriate planning/analysis models of the
system be developed to support the program. An example of
such a model is Flight Rate Capability Simulation Model, the
use of which will help the management to analyze the effects
of a planned flight rate before making a commitment. The
determination of the flight rate is a difficult problem and
one about which much controversy exists. The Rogers'
Commission (2) and the National Research Council (3) have
both studied flight rate as a result of Challenger incident,
which further point out the difficulty of the problem.
The flight rate simulation analysis will help to
ascertain the ways and means to achieve a target rate and
impact subsequent allocation of resources. An aspirant
example for the application of a flight rate capability model
may be to find bottleneck facilities and to determine the
necessary resources to rectify the
achieve the desired capability. Another
simulation model may be to observe how
situation in order to
use of such a
much increase in
flight rate can be achieved by adding one more Orbiter or by
increasing any other resource of the production process.
This paper presents a Flight Rate Capability Model for
the Space Shuttle. The simulation language, GPSS, has been
used for the modeling. The purpose of presenting this model
is to provide a direction for the planning of flight rate
capability. The simulation model presented here is meant to
provide an analysis tool for the resource allocation and
capital investment planning.
2.0 FLIGHT RATE CAPABILITY MODEL
The Space Shuttle goes through
facilities, Orbiter Processing Facility
Assembly Building (VAB), and Launch Pad
three specific
(OPF), Vertical
(LP), in the same
order before being launched into space from the LP at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC). The OPF is where basic processing is
done on the Orbiter. The VAB is where the Orbiter is mounted
with its Solid Rocket Boosters and External Tank. The LP is
the launch site where most payloads are mounted, and the
propellant is loaded. Before the Orbiter goes into the LP,
it requires the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP). At the VAB,
the Orbiter is mounted on the MLP, which stays with the
Shuttle until it is launched into space. At that time the
MLP is brought back and is processed before it can be made
available for the next mission. In the future, the Orbiter
will also be launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. In
that case, the Space Shuttle is processed in the OPF at KSC,
and is then loaded on the Shuttle Carrier Aircraft (SCA) with
the Tail Cone and sent over to Vandenberg where it is
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FIGURE I. SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF SPACE SHUTTLE
PROCESSING.
processed further and
Shuttle can either
California, or KSC
landing and abort
launched. In both cases, the Space
land at Edwards Air Force Base in
in Florida. There are other alternate
sites in Europe and Africa, but they are
not currently considered in the
lands at Edwards,
Tail Cone and is
the next mission.
model. If the Space Shuttle
then it is loaded onto the SCA with the
brought back to KSC for the processing of
Beside the time the SCA/Tail Cone spends
with the ferry operation of the Space Shuttle, additional
time is required for processing before it is can be made
available for the next trip. All of this has been considered
in the model and is schematically presented in Figure i.
Most of the elements of the Space Shuttle processing are
stochastic in nature, consequently the system has been
stochastically modeled. This means that the probability
distributions have been used in calculating various times.
As the simulation proceeds, samples are taken from the
appropriate probability distributions so as to model the
stochastic behavior. The model is designed to run for one
thousand times the number of working days in a year, and
various flight rate tables are tabulated after every ten
cycles. This is done to reduce the variance for flight rate
projection figures. Also, different queue tables are printed
to study the queuing behavior. The flow diagram of the model
is presented in Figure 2.
The flight Rate Capability Simulation Model is a
discrete change model in which most of the changes are occur
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FIGURE 2. FLOW DIAGRAM OF SIMULATION STUDY.
NOTE" IN CASE OF A SINGLE EXIT DECISION BLOCK, THE TRANSACTION STAYS TILL IT CAN LEAVE.
due to some statistical distributions. The processing times
in OPF, VAB and LP facilities have high variances. Even when
the data points of the test flights flown early in the
history of the Shuttle are removed, the variances are high
enough to justify the use of the exponential distribution.
One of the explanations for the high variances might be the
fact that the data from all of the flights was considered
together. Although some of the variance can be attributed to
the difference in the flight types, we do not have enough
data points to statistically reach a conclusion. The
comparison of simulation runs with equal probability of past
occurrence, and the ones using exponential distribution with
a mean of historical data did not produce any statistically
different results. Moreover, the plot of data also presents
a similar situation and it was therefore decided to use
exponential distribution in calculating the processing time
of these facilities. The flight time was also modeled to
follow the same distribution. Similarly, the processing time
for the Orbiter at Vandenberg, and MLP processing time after
it is brought back from the LP were also modeled to follow
the exponential distribution, although data was not available
to support or justify the assumption since the shuttle has
not yet flown from Vandenberg. SCA/Tail Cone ferrying and
thereafter processing time was considered to be quite
standard and are therefore thought to be following a normal
distribution with small variance. Again, no data is
available to justify the claim. Some of the other times,
mostly travel times, were considered known constants and were
modeled that way. An Orbiter down time of 21 days per year
is also included in the model and is treated as a constant.
Another variable included in the analysis is the flight rate
mixture. This variable is based upon a fixed number of
Vandenberg (VLS) flights and a percentage mixture of other
flight types launching out of KSC. Similarly, a ratio of
Edwards and KSC landing is supplied in the model and can be
changed for a different landing mix. Furthermore, a mixture
of different payloads is supplied as a percentage. The
choices of payload are Standard (STD), Department of Defense
(DOD), Space Lab (S/L), and Mixed (MIX) type. The selection
of choices is based on an analysis of both flown and
projected payloads.
The system is modeled with a number of different types
of facilities, the specifications of which can be changed by
the user, if so desired. These include:
o Number of Orbiters;
o Number of OPF Facilities;
o Number of VAB Facilities;
o Number of LP Facilities;
o Number of MLPs' Available;
o Number of SCA/ Tail" Cones;
o Number of Space Shuttles allowed in space at one time.
There are some restrictions
accordingly _ incorporated as:
on the model which are
o When there is a DOD job in the VAB or on the LP, then
the next DOD job cannot enter the VAB unless the first
has been launched in space;
o If the Space Shuttle flies from two different facilities
on consecutive missions, then a fourteen day change over
time is needed before the next mission can be flown.
Some of the processing times data which remained
unchanged during the entire simulation study are as follows:
o Processing time at OPF for VLS missions : Exponentially
distributed with" a mean of 42 days;
o Mission processing time at VLS: Exponentially
distributed with a mean of 63 days;
o MLP processing time: Exponentially distributed with a
mean of 22 days;
o Time for SCA/Tail Cone flight: Normally distributed with
a mean of 6 days and Standard Deviation of I;
o Time to process reuse of Tail Cone: Normally distributed
with a mean of 3 days and Standard Deviation of I;
o Time between flying of two mission§: One day;
o Time for MLP to go back for processing:7 days;
o In flight time of the Space Shuttle: 7 days.
CONSERVATIVE DATA
ITY
STANDARD
D0D
OPF
51
51
VAB
5
5
LP
23
28
SPACE LAB. 61 5 22
r i
MIX 55 5 23
REALISTIC DATA
4.
ITY OPF
MIX
VAB LP
17STANDARD 40 5
DOD 40 5 22
SPACE LAB. 50 5 16
44 5 17
OPTIM,ISTIC DATA
ITY OPF VAB
4
LP
16STANDARD 30
DOD 30 4 21
SPACE LAB. 40 4 15
MIX 34 4 .16
TABLE 1. MISSION PROCESSING TIMES DATA
(IN DAYS) FOR THREE DATA TYPES.
3.0 RESULTS
The simulation runs based upon the three data types have
been studied in reasonable details. Table 1 presents
Conservative, Realistic and Optimistic estimates of the
processing times, in the number of days, spent in each
facility, for the STD, DOD, S/L, and MIX flight types. At
this point, it may be noted that the three data sets are not
based upon any statistical prediction equations, but are
actually the result of management judgment at NASA. However,
they have been used in this illustration to exhibit the
working of the model and provide some useful guidelines for
comparing the options.
The simulation runs for
landing and/or down time mix,
each set of the data, and
as presented on the vertical
axis of Table 2, are based upon the six categories of
facilities grouping, as displayed on the horizontal axis of
the same table. The flight mix in all of these runs is as
follows:
STD.=26.7%; DOD=33.3% ; S/L=20%; MIX=20%.
Table 2 presents the summary of the flight rates of the
84 simulation runs. Before any conclusions are drawn on the
findings of the simulation, an obvious observation is in
order. The simulation results presented here are very useful
to perform what-if analysis for the planning of the flight
ALTERNATIVES _ 1 2
,.,-,__ OPF=Z OPF=5
LP =2 LP =2
FLIGHT MIX _ _o I"ILP=5 I"ILP=3
CONSERV AT IVE D AT A
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ORBITER DOWNTIME= 211
EDV ARDS LAND ING--100 9,
KSC LANDING = 0 9,
REALISTIC DATA
NUMBER OF VLS FLTS- O.
!ORBITER DOWNTIME= 21
iEDWARDS LANDING --'100%.
IKSC LANDING = 0 %.
RE AL IST IC D AT A
NUMBER OF VLS FLTS= O.
ORBITER DOWNTIME= 21
EDWARDS LANDING = 0%.
KSC L ANDING--100 %.
OPTIMISTIC DATA
NUMBER OF VLS FLTS= O.
ORBITER DOWNTIME= 21
EDWARDS LAND ING --100 %.
KSC LANDING = 0 %
OPTIMISTIC DATA
NUMBER OF'VLS F'LTS= 0
ORBITERDOWNTIME= 21
EDWARDS LANDING = 50%
KSC LANDING = 50 %.
OPTIMISTIC DATA
NUMBER OF VLS FLTS= O,
ORBITER DOWNTIME= O,
EDWARDS L ANDING = 0 %.
KSC LANDING ---'100¢_,
3 9.239 9.977
4 10.776!12.290
3 4
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VAB=5 VAB=_
LP =Z LP =5
MLP=5 MLP=3
5
OPF=2
VAB=2
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6
OPF=5
VAB=_
LP =Z
MLP=4
12.056
9.203 9.355
110.736 10.861
11.35111.362
113.10313.254
12.820 11.87111.903
15.31C 13.57113.638
13.25213.358
15.30915.442
13.72013.734
15;56015.775
114.60014.730
16.307 16.353
13.656
9.287 10.047
10.979
3 11.352
4 13.146 14.62
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3 13.73514.363
4 15.705 6.924
3 14.592115.52
4-:16.31917.655
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11.459
13.392
12.168
_14.014
13.491
16.021
14.036
16.562
15.138
17.369
13.888
12.515
12.21_
15.280
13.071
16.177
14.169
!17.550
14.805
18.146
16.342
19.468
14.756
15.42117.455
TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF THE SIMULATION RUNS
FOR THE FLIGHT RATE PER YEAR.
rate capability. Meaning, if the management can achieve the
processing time capabilities which they furnished with this
set of facilities mix, then these results are very likely to
occur. However, they d__o not, by any
assurance of the flight rate capability
shown that the data represents the
means, provide an
unless it can be
actual statistical
projections. Even then there is an element of statistical
uncertainty associated with the results and it may only be
interpreted that way. The validity of the model, however, is
established by the fact that when the actual processing time
and flight mix is used, the results are very similar to the
observed flight rates.
4.0 STATISTICAL PITFALLS OF SIMULATION MODELING
Simulation models are very meaningful in representing
the present system and that is where they can be verified as
well. Once the model passes the verification tests, it can
be used to study the changes in the
input variables. Here, the choice
variables is something which needs
the flight rate capability example,
system by changing some
of changes in input
some clarification. In
if the study is that of
incrementing a major resource such as an orbiter by one unit,
then the study will yield meaningful information as long as
the processing time for the different facilities is not a
function of time. Usually there is a learning curve pattern
in the processing time, as well as the factor that as the
facilities grow older, they require more maintenance and
safety inspections. Both of these imply that processing time
is a function of time and experience. Under such
circumstances and realizing that the lead time of adding any
facility in this example is several years, the need is that
of statistically projecting the processing time data to the
point when the facilities are planned to be made available.
If the projection equation is either statistically unsound or
projected beyond the experience base, then the output result
of a simulation experimentation can at best be as good as the
projections themselves. This leads us to a very serious
pitfall in simulation and cautions us that the model results
are only meaningful in the proper working range.
5.0 MODEL USEFULNESS FOR NASA
Computer simulation
engineering and management situations.
simulation models often involves a "trial and
demonstrate the likely
results are usually
decision is usually
preference under the
has found its use in almost all
various
economic
reached in terms of
budgetary restrictions.
effect of
interpreted in
The computer
error" way to
policies. The
terms and a
the economic
The user has
control over the source information,
is not properly supplied, then the
meaningful for the desired application.
A simulation
which means that if it
results may not be
model usually represents some statistical
experiment and it is important
that relationship. Another point
frame involved. For example, if
that the input data reflect
of consequence is the time
NASA is considering the
addition of a Space Shuttle or another OPF facility, then it
is important to consider the lead time required in acquiring
either one of them. Assuming it takes four years to build an
Orbiter or an OPF facility, then the appropriate way to model
will be to project the processing time of the facilities four
years into the future and study the effect of each
alternative on the model. If the processing time on the
facilities are on a downward trend, then although an
additional OPF facility may be economical today, it may not
be the same in four years when having another Orbiter may
become a more viable alternative.
flight rate has to be achieved,
facilities and Orbiters can be
Similarly, if a target
the right combination of
found with the help of a
Flight Rate Capability Simulation Model.
To answer such questions, it is important that NASA has
a simulation model available.
represents the most significant
processing, and has helped NASA
The model developed here
aspects of Space Shuttle
management to make judicious
estimates of the flight rate capabilities. However, in order
to gain realistic insight, NASA needs to incorporate other
pertinent considerations into the model. Items like Flight
Crew Simulator time, spare parts availability and others, if
added, could present a more realistic view of the situation.
With the aid of a complete simulation model, the NASA
management will be in a position to compare alternatives.
They will be able to see the effect of planned changes on the
overall system before actually
scientific judgment, as the
experimentation, will be much
making a commitment. The
result of simulation
more profound than with
intuitive feelings or an isolated economic analysis.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The prime function of running a smooth operational
organizations such as NASA's space shuttle program is that of
planning the future requirements of the system. The
performance evaluation of such an organization is generally
based upon the quantity and quality of the work produced, and
the economic considerations of how effectively the resources
were utilized to gain the overall objectives of the
organization. The economic considerations, in turn, includes
timing and location of the production, along with the
equipment, material, energy and labor utilization. All of
these considerations must be converted to a common economic
base when evaluating the contribution of the resources toward
the overall objectives of the organization.
In capital intensive engagements, such as NASA's shuttle
program, the managerial planning decisions are very crucial.
They are deciding the monetary commitment and future
direction of the organization over a long period of time.
The decisions made in such conditions are generally
irreversible and have serious implications. Therefore, it is
imperative that such decisions must be made after complete
deliberation and thorough scrutiny of the available choices.
The Flight Rate Capability Simulation Model presented in this
paper provides a planning tool and a probable direction for
such a methodical investigation process.
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CHAPTERV. DEMOGRAPHICSURVEY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to characterize as far as
possible the makeup of the AE, AM, C, D, E, F, G, S, T, and V
offices regarding the age, grade, experience, starting age,
and education of their professional employees. This process,
which was conducted in the summers of 1984, 1985, and 1986,
was done on the composition of the work force at JSC that had
a strong probability of being involved in the management and
technical support of the shuttle program. This base also has
a high possibility of providing future needs in these areas.
As the shuttle proceeds from an environment which is
primarily R/D to one which is more operational in nature,
human resource and manpower planning is an essential
ingredient to smoothing the transition. Also, since changing
demographics is a long lead time issue, a careful analysis of
the demographic state and its trending seems to be necessary.
Appendix V A shows the demographic state of NSTS as of
the summer of 1986. Appendix V B is a comparison of the
1984, 1985, and 1986 demographic studies. One difficulty
encountered in the preparation of a comparison was that the
means of collecting the data changed from 1984 to
familiarity was gained with the problem. This
comparisons weak and made some others impossible.
instances of this problem will be mentioned as the
1986 as
made some
Specific
data is
discussed. In addition some of the data in the 1986 survey
does not have a meaning when analyzed for change.
Specifically there does not seem to be any value in looking
at the way that degree migration has changed over the three
year period.
2.0 CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions made from this study are, of course,
very tentative since there are only three years of data, and
the method of drawing the sample changed during the period.
There are a few trends worthy of comment. One is the general
overall loss in the total work force. The major question is
whether this was planned or accidental• A related question
is: If it "was planned, was it planned by the right level in
the organization and did the plan work? Another trend worth
comment is the reduction of personnel in the GS 13 level.
The same questions on planning are applicable here. Another
trend that was found deals with the loss of technical talent.
Why are these people leaving and is this good are bad for the
organization?
3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
i • The loss of technical talent has
implications. This loss needs to be
examined and explained.
serious
further
2. The GS 13 spike needs
control.
3. During both the stand
transition period to
•
careful monitoring and
down caused by 51L and the
a more operational nature,
great care and attention must be paid to the morale
of the employees involved.
This study needs to be repeated in 1987.

APPENDIX V A
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
AE, ,AM, C, D, E, F, G, S, T, AND V ORGANIZATIONS
SUMMER 1986
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
This report is the first half of a two part report. The
purpose of this half is to characterize as far as possible
the makeup of the above offices regarding the age, grade,
experience, starting age, and education of their professional
employees. These offices were chosen to reflect the base
which composes the current management and technical support.
This base also has a high probability of providing future
needs in these areas. As the shuttle proceeds from an
environment which is primarily R/D to one which is more
operational in nature, human resource and manpower planning
is an essential ingredient to smoothing the transition. The
intent of this document then, in simple terms, is to show the
demographic state of NSTS and its support elements as of the
summer of 1986.
The size of
1689 employees.
This survey
1985. The second
the sample in the demographic
was also done
half of this
survey was
in the summers of 1984 and
report, which follows in
Appendix V B, is a comparison
Since changing demographics is a long lead
careful analysis of the demographic state and
seems to be necessary.
of these different surveys.
time issue, a
its trending
2.0 DEMOGRAPHICS
The rest of this
the charts presented.
report is devoted to a discussion of
2.1 AGE-CHART i, CHART 2
Chart one shows a bimodal distribution of age. The
cohort in the 46-50 year bracket is by far the largest with a
sub-maximal point in the 26-30 year bracket. Normally, one
would expect to see a chart which was loaded heavy on the
front end with younger brackets having more members. This
wave of older employees is indicative of down the road
problems as these employees age and early retirement becomes
more attractive.
Chart two shows the age by grade. An interesting point
here is that grades 13 through SES are almost flat. This
seems to indicate that promotion from 13 on is relatively
slow. As an aside, as more people opt for early retirement,
perhaps more slots will open up for early retirement.
2.2 GRADE-CHART 3
Chart three shows that the GS-13 slot is the largest
with around 37% of the
the GS-14 grade with 21%.
are graded 13 or above.
developmental environment but
operational problems.
sample.
So the
This
may
The next largest cohort is
majority of the employees
may be healthy for a
lead to down the road
This chart, along with the two
previous seems to indicate that there is little if any feeder
pipeline supplying new and younger talent to the program.
2.3 SERVICE-CHART 4
This chart is almost flat for 13 through SES at around
20 years. The average service for the sample was 16.4 years.
2.4 START AGE-CHART 5, CHART 6
Chart 5 shows the number of employees starting with NASA
at a particular age. Most employees started with NASA
between 23 to 24 years of age. The next largest cohort
started at 21 to 22 years of age. What this chart shows is
that for most of the sample, NASA was their first real job
after school.
Chart 6 shows start age as function of grade. Since the
chart is mostly flat, the start age does not vary much by
grade. The average start age is 27 years.
2.5 COMBINED DEMOGRAPHICS-CHART 7
This chart shows age, service,
function of grade.
and start age as a
2.6 HIGHEST DEGREE-CHART 8, CHART 9, CHART i0
Chart 8 shows the level of the highest degree of the
sample. Here, 27% of the sample has a masters degree or
better. This again is healthy for R/D but spells trouble for
operations.
Chart 9 shows that almost everyone is an engineer with
science and math coming in second and third. Chart 10 is the
same information by percentage.
2.7 BS DEGREE-CHART ii. CHART 12
The first degree that an individual holds goes a long
way towards shaping their thought process. These charts show
a majority of the bachelors degree sample holding an
engineering degree with science and math coming in second and
third as before.
2.8 MASTERS DEGREE-CHART 13, CHART 14
These charts show similar results for the masters degree
as the previous 4.
2.9 DOCTORS DEGREE-CHART 15, CHART 16
These charts show a small surprise with the field of
science having a strong majority of the doctors degrees.
Engineering is second.
2.10 FIELD AND LEVEL OF DEGREES-CHART 17
This chart shows the field and level of the degrees of
the sample. Two unusual points occur. One is that there are
more doctors of science than masters. Another is that there
are most masters of business than bachelors.
2.11 DEGREEMIGRATION-CHART 18
This chart shows the path from the second highest
degree, provided there was at least a masters, to the highest
degree. Most people followed a traditional path of second
highest to highest in the same field.
is the business masters which attracted
from outside of business.
An exception to this
a large percentage
AGE DISTRIBUTION
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APPENDIX V B
F
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON
1984-1986
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In the summers of 1984,85,and 86 studies were done on
the composition of the work force at JSC that had a strong
probability of being involved in the management of the
shuttle program. The following tables shows the specific
offices by year.
1984-85 1986
AM space operations
AE research and engineering
CA flight crew operations
DA mission operations
EA engineering
FA mission support
SA space and life sci.
LA NSTS program office
MA space shuttle projects off.
AM space operations
AE research and engr.
CA flight crew operations
DA mission operations
EA engineering
FA mission support
SA space and life sci.
GA NSTS system office
VA orbiter projects off.
TA STS integrations and op
While the names changed somewhat in 1986 due to a
survey does not have a meaning
Specifically there does not seem
at the way that degree migration has changed
year period.
reorganization of the NSTS program and project offices the
people and the actual working positions surveyed stayed the
same.
This report is the second half of a report finished
earlier which showed an in-depth look at the 1986 offices and
as such serves as a continuation of that report. One
difficulty encountered in the preparation of a comparison was
that the means of collecting the data changed from 1984 to
1986 as familiarity was gained with the problem. This made
some comparisons weak and made some others impossible.
Specific instances of this problem will be mentioned as the
data is discussed. In addition some of the data in the 86
when analyzed for change.
to be any value in looking
over the three
2.0 RESULTS
2.1 NUMBER
Year: 1984 1985 1986
Sample size: 1732 1764 1689
The change in the sample from 84 to 85 may be due to the
reorganizations that occurred during that time period. Table
3 shows the percent change as about a 2% gain from 84 to 85
and a 4% loss from 85 to 86. The key to the significance of
this change is whether it was planned and controlled or
whether it was uncontrolled and occurred against the best
wishes of management. One would suppose that as the shuttle
moves to an era which is more operational in nature and one
in which jobs become more routine that some loss of the work
force will occur.
2.2 AGE
Table one gives the ages by 5 year cohorts. Chart one
shows the same information graphically. This information is
not too reliable since the ages were drawn in 85 by GS grade
within an office while in 86 age was drawn as a pure
variable. The 85 method has the effect of smoothing out the
extremes. Perhaps the most significant information in this
section is that the average age stayed the same.
which increased are
grades of 13, 12,
the same.
2.3 NUMBER BY GRADE
In Tables 2 and 3 and in Charts 2 through 7 the number
of employees by grade is presented for 84, 85, and 86.
Charts 5 and 6 perhaps present this information best. The
spike at 13 has been reduced by what would appear to be
upward movement to 14 with perhaps some attrition. The ones
the grades of 15, 14, II, and 9. The
and 7 reduced while the SES grade stayed
If the GS 13 level is thought of as the Journeyman level
with the earlier grades thought of as a lengthy
apprenticeship or training program then the GS curves are no
so disturbing. One point of consideration
reduction in new hires at the GS 7 level.
was the lowest in the 3 year history with only 36 in 1986.
however is the
This level in 86
2.4 NUMBERBY FIELD OF HIGHEST DEGREE
Tables 4 and 5 along with Chart 8 show the number by
field of highest degree. All fields lost people over the 3
years with the exception of business which showed a net gain
of 28. This attrition is of course related to the general
attrition of the work force over these 3 years.
2.5 NUMBERBY DEGREELEVEL
Tables 6 and 7 along with Chart 9 show the number by
degree level. All fields showed a loss over the 3 year
history. There was a net loss of 75 from 85 to 86 with 5 of
these being at the doctors level and 7 at the masters level.
2.6
Tables 8 and 9
information in D and
degree for 85 and 86.
6 were lost from
arts/education/law.
NUMBERBY FIELD AND LEVEL
along with
E and
Of the 5
engineering
I0 masters
while 3 were gained in business.
doctorates was slightly over 20% of the 85 level.
Chart I0 combine the
show the number by field and
doctors lost mentioned in E,
and 1 was gained in
were lost in technical areas
This loss of engineering
This loss
of top level
next year.
talent is worth noting and tracking through the
d:
3.0 CONCLUSIONS
Only three years of data with the method of drawing the
sample changing during the period of course makes the drawing
of conclusions very tentative. There are a few trends worthy
of comment. One is the general overall loss in the total
work force. The major question is whether this was planned
or accidental• A related question is if it was planned was
it planned by the right level in the organization and did the
plan work. Another trend worth comment is the reduction in
the GS 13 level. The same questions on planning are
applicable here. The last trend to be discussed deals with
the loss of technical talent• This trend is brought out by
the loss of higher level technical degrees. Why are these
people leaving and is this good are bad for the organization?
4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
i • The loss of
implications• This loss
examined and explained.
2. The GS 13 spike needs careful
control.
3. During both the stand down caused
technical talent has serious
needs to be further
monitoring and
by 51L and the
transition period to a more operational nature,
great care and attention must be paid to the morale
of the employees involved.
4. This study needs to be repeated in 1987.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
4"
AGE COMPARISON. 85 AND 86
SUMMER 86
NOTE: During the summer of 85 the age data was gathered on
an average age for GS grade within an offi(ze. For tlne summer
of 8,6 the age was gathered as a pure var-iable. This accounts
for the large delta difference within several of the ac_e
cohorts. The gathering method of 85 had the effect of
smoothinQ out the e,,'tremes. For these reasons _Ireat care
must be used in interpreting the age data presented here ancl
in the histogram. The most significant fact contained in
this chart is the fact that the average a_e stayed the same
from one year to the next at 43,,6 years.
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE ACCIDENT
1.0 INTRODUCTION
After the Challenger accident, a presidential
commission, better known as the Rogers Commission, was
established to investigate the events leading up to the
disaster, to determine the cause of the accident itself, and
to make recommendations to NASA to prevent a future
reoccurence of this tragedy. In addition, the National
Research Council (NRC) was charged with performing what might
be described as a "watchdog" role and with doing its own
investigation. Also, the Science and Technology Committee
of the House of Representatives conducted its own
investigations. This chapter deals primarily with the Rogers
Commission Report [2], but also covers some aspects of the
other organizations.
Upon issuance of the Commission's report (hereafter
called the Report), the UH research team generated a detailed
outline of the Report's findings and opinions. The findings
indicated that all of the major problem areas, except that of
the SRB joint design itself, were in areas traditionally
associated with industrial engineering including management
structure and communication, SR/QA, transition management,
logistics, and documentation control.
This outline of the Report provided input for most of
the work done in this chapter and provided further
confirmation that the existing NSTS organizational structure
was in need of change. This chapter consists of five reports
which are briefly described as follows.
2.0 ROGERS COMMISSION REPORT - OUTLINE AND MILESTONES
The detailed outline of the Rogers Commission Report can
be found in Appendix VIA. This work was prepared in support
of the Crippen Committee which was charged with the task of
both investigating and responding to Recommendations II and V
along with any
process itself.
for change in
questions relating
Recommendation II
the STS management
to the flight decision
deals with (I) the need
structure, (2) the
importance of astronauts in the management positions at NASA,
and (3) the establishment of an STS Safety Advisory Panel.
Recommendation V involves problems in (I) communication,
especially involving the Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC),
(2) inconsistent policies towards the removal of launch
constraints and the signing off of waivers without ever
finding a proper solution to the problem, (3) ambiguity in
the way in which two different people understood the same
conversation, and finally, (4) a lack of astronaut input into
the launch decision and their not being informed of
mechanical problems from previous flights.
Each factor, or milestone, which had a bearing on each
particular item listed under Recommendations II and V, was
cited from the Report and grouped under that item. Although
not explicitly called out in the Report as a recommendation,
a third set of milestones was tabulated under the heading of
Flight Decision Process. This table dealt with the failure
of the system to communicate critical safety-related issues
to NASA management responsible
Ultimately, since all problems
communications can impact these
for launch decisions.
in management and
decisions, all of the
previously listed milestones can be placed under this heading
as well, especially those regarding communication. However,
these milestones were not listed twice in the tables. The
eight milestone tables can be found in Appendix VI B.
3.0 AN INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE ON THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
Based on the Rogers Commission Report, a paper was
written and published in Industrial Management [I], a journal
of the Institute of
engineering managers.
problem areas cited
Industrial Engineers for industrial
The paper illustrated that many of the
in the Report such as processing
problems, SR/QA, trend analysis, logistics, and communication
and management problems are all areas in which the
introduction Df industrial engineering methods would help to
rectify the situation. While the application of these IE
principles may not have prevented the shuttle accident, they
certainly would have improved the reliability of the shuttle,
both in terms of safety and on-time performance.
can be found in Appendix VI C.
This paper
4.0 CROSSREFERENCE
As mentioned above, a number of committee's were formed
in the aftermath of the Challenger accident to determine the
cause of the accident and to propose changes in the shuttle
program to avoid future mishaps. At the request of JSC, the
UH team reviewed the conclusions and recommendations of each
committee report and from them derived a Challenger Report
Cross-Reference Matrix (Appendix VI D). The purpose of this
matrix was to compare and contrast the findings of each
committee as well as to ensure that NASA addressed each point
raised in the various reports so that none of them were
inadvertently overlooked.
The four reports used were those of the Rogers
Commission [2], the U.S. House Committee on Science and
Technology [3], the NRC Flight Rate Working Group [4], and a
NASA internal investigation known here as the "Lessons
Learned" Report [5]. The findings of each report were placed
into three main categories: program management, the
processing of the shuttle, and the design of the shuttle.
Each-main category is further divided into subcategories and
individual entries. For each entry, a cross-reference
indicates the citation in the appropriate report.
5.0 MAJOR PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM A REVIEW OF THE ROGERS
COMMISSION REPORT - PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
This section distills the findings of the Rogers
Commission Report into nine specific problems involving
management, communication, safety, and logistics and presents
ten specific recommendations on how to remedy these problems.
It can be found in Appendix VIE.
6.0 POSSIBLE LIST OF QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WHICH MAY BE POSED
BY THE NRC COMMITTEE ON CRITICALITY REVIEW AND HAZARD
ANALYSIS
The shuttle hardware is composed of several thousand
critical components where failure in flight could have dire
consequences. The last section of this chapter, Appendix VI
F, contains a list of questions relating
prepared to help NASA respond to the
These questions are meant to stimulate
safety and reliability issues can be
monitored throughout the organization.
to SR/QA that was
NRC investigation.
thought as to how
implemented and
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APPENDIX VIA
ROGERSCOMMISSIONREPORTOUTLINE
During the second quarter of our research project, the
Rogers Commission released its findings on the investigation
of the 51L accident. Our research team had reviewed part I
of the Report in detail. The efforts resulted in the
generation of a detailed outline of the Rogers Commission's
opinions and findings as provided in the Report. From the
outline, several milestone charts were prepared. The
milestones were categorized according to their relationship
to the main points of Recommendations II and V of the Report
(which pertain to NASA's management structure and problems in
communication) as well as to the flight decision process.
These are presented in this appendix and in Appendix VI B.
Looking at the major problem areas as indicated in the
Report, namely : management structure
safety reliability quality assurance,
transition from R/D to Operations,
and communications,
data trending,
logistics support,
documentation, and the actual design/testing problems with
the SRB joint; all but the last item are closely related to
the regular training and functions of an Industrial Engineer.
It is also interesting to point out that those are areas
which is barely covered, if at all, by the other
'traditional' engineering disciplines within their regular
university training. We do intend to look somewhat further
into this observation and will report on any further findings
in our future reports.
9RESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER
OUTLINE OF CONTENTS
I. PREFACE, PAGE i. Background of why commission was appointed.
II. INTRODUCTION. PAGE 2-9
A_ INTRO, PAGE 2. Brief history of funding developments
of shuttle.
B. THE SPACE SHUTTLE DESIGN, PAGE 2-4. Brief history of
design and funding considerations in the early development
of shuttle.
i. FIGURE, PAGE 3. Schematic of stacked shuttle.
C. THE SPACE SHUTTLE DEVELOPMENT, PAGES 4-6.
i. Discusses which Center or contractor had
responsibility for what.
2. Lists flights with brief description.
3. Lists (at end of section) flights by orbiter.
m • ELEMENTS OF THE SPACE SHUTTLE, PAGE 6-9
I. Intro gives design limits and intended usage of shuttle.
2. ORBITER, PAGE 7. Discusses physical make-up,
constraints, and usage of the orbiter.
3. SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES, PAGE 7-8. Discusses
SSME's and their physical make up as well as
throttle ranges.
4. EXTERNAL TANK, PAGE 8. Physical dimensions, fuels,
attachment points, etc.
5. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS, PAGE 8-9. Physical dimensions,
detachment, construction, etc.
E . FLIGHT OF A SHUTTLE, PAGE 9.
landing, etc.
Brief description of exit, entry,
F. REFERENCES, PAGE 9.
III. CHAPTER II-EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE CHALLENGER MISSION, PAGE i0-
18
A. INTRODUCTION, PAGE i0. Early launch delays, payloads.
B. CREW ASSIGNMENTS, PAGE 10-13.
i. Description of crew.
2. PICTURE,PAGE i0. 51L on pad.
C. PREPARATIONS FOR FLIGHT, PAGE 13-15.
i. DIAGRAM, PAGE 12. MISSIO_ 51L MAJOR MILESTONE SU_I_:ARY
2. CIR and its rescheduling.
3. L-5 review.
4. Changes to baseline.
5. Crew training and compressed training time.
6. Launch date delays for 61C.
7. GRAPH, PAGE 14. CREW WORKLOAD COHPARISON.
D. FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW, PAGE 15-16.
Eo
F.
i. Description of FRR.
2. Launch window changes.
3. TABLE, PAGE 16. MISSION 51L ORBITAL ACTIVITY SCHEDULE
LAUNCH DELAYS, PAGE 17.
i. Launch delays.
2. problems-temperature, ice, cross winds, fire detector,etc
THE FLIGHT OF THE CHALLENGER, PAGE 18.
i • TABLE, PAGE 18. Chronological listing of events in
flight 2. During flight, no flight controller
problems, no alarms, no abort options.
IV. CHAPTER Ill.
A.
Bo
C.
D.
THE ACCIDENT. PAGE 19-39•
Analysis of the actual accident with concentration on the puffs
of smoke.
PICTURES OF ACCIDENT, PAGES 22-36.
TABLE, PAGE 37-39. STS 51-L SEQUENCE OF MAJOR EVENTS.
TABLE, PAGE 39. SHUTTLE TO GROUND TELEMETRY CHANNELS.
V. CHAPTER IV. THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. PAGES 40-81.
a. INTRO., PAGE 40. The loss of the shuttle was caused by the
failure of the joint.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT, PAGE 40-66.
i. 3 Critical questions:
a. What were the circumstances surrounding 51L that
contributed to the accident in contrast to the 24
successful predecessors?
b. What evidence pointed to the right SRB as opposed
to other components?
c. What was the mechanism of failure?
2. No evidence of sabotage.
3. ET, PAGE 41-42.
a. 20% recovered after accident.
b. list of possible ET causes of accident.
c. ET exonerated.
d. FIGURE i, PAGE 41. Cut away view of ET.
4. SSME, PAGE 42-45.
a. All 3 recovered.
••
7.
•
b. FIGURE 2, PAGE 43. Schematic of engines.
c. FIGURE 3, PAGE 43. Rear view of shuttle/engines
d. FIGURE 4, PAGE 44. Drawing of engine•
e. Discussion of possible engine problems and engine
performance.
f. Engines exonerated.
ORBITER AND RELATED EQUIPMENT, PAGE 45-48.
a. Definition of orbiter subsystems.
b. List of significant pieces of orbiter structure which
was recovered.
c. All fractures and failures on orbiter were result of
overload forces and not burn or explosion.
d. FIGURE 5, PAGE 46. Location of subsystems.
e. FIGURE 6, PAGE 47. Sketch showing location of
different fuselages.
f. Orbiter and related equipment exonerated.
PAYLOAD/ORBITER INTERFACES, PAGE 48.
a. Definition and exoneration.
PAYLOADS, IUS, AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, PAGE 48-51.
a. Definition of payload, 40k pounds, 5% recovered
b. FIGURE 7, PAGE 49. STS 51-L PAYLOAD CONFIGURATION.
c. possible contributing problems.
d. Payload exonerated.
SRB, PAGE 51-66
a. definition of 7 subsystems.
b. analysis of components of SRB
c. FIGURE 8, PAGE 52. Exploded view of SRB.
d. FIGURE 9, PAGE 53. RECONSTRUCTED LOADS COMPARED TO
MEASURE AND DESIGN LOADS.
e. All parts of SRB exonerated except right solid rocket
motor•
f. RIGHT SOLID ROCKET MOTOR, PAGE 53-66.
i. 4 areas analyzed= structural loads, case walls,
propellant,and seals.
ii. STRUCTURAL LOADS EVALUATION, PAGE 53-55
a) analyzed and exonerated.
b) FIGURE I0, PAGE 54. Drawing of ET showing
location of struts.
c) FIGURE ii, PAGE 55. Loads in the pitch plane.
iii. CASE MEMBRANE FAILURE, PAGE 55-56.
a) analyzed and exonerated.
b) FIGURE 13, PAGE 56. Cutaway of SRB showing
location of aft field joint.
iv. PROPELLANT, PAGE 56-57.
a) analyzed and exonerated.
b) bulk temperature above min specs.
v. JOINT SEAL FAILURE, PAGE 57-66.
a) location of failure.
b) field joints.
c) FIGURE 14, PAGE 5?, Cross section of joint
showing tang, clevis.
d) joint sealing sensitivity factors
e) ASSEMBLY DAMAGE CONTAMINATION, PAGE 58-60
f) FIGURE 15,PAGE 58. JOINT TANG / CLEVIS
INTERFERENCE.
g) GAP OPENING,PAGE 60.
h) FIGURE 16, PRESSURIZED JOINT DEFLECTION.
i) FIGURE 17, PAGE 60. DELTA GAP OPENING.
j) O-RING COMPRESSION AT LAUNCH (STATIC), PAGE 61-
62.
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k) FIGURE 18, PAGE 61. Progressive reduction of
gap.
i) JOINT TEMPERATURE.
m) FIGURE 19, PAGE 62. SUM_ARY OF DYNAMIC TEST
RESULTS.
n) FIGURE 20, PAGE 63. AFT RT SEG TEMP FOR STS
51-L.
o) FIGURE 21, PAGE 63. ApT LT SEG TEMP FOR STS
51-L
p) TABLE, PAGE 64. FIELD JOINT DISTRESS.
q) PUTTY PERFORMANCE, PAGE 64-66.
r) FIGURE 23, PAGE 65. O-RING RECOVERY VS. TIME.
s) TABLE, PAGE 66. Consequence of increasing the
pressure.
t) DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIELD JOINT
SEAL, PAGE 66.
ANALYSIS OF THE WRECKAGE, PAGE 66-69•
I. Sources of data for analysis•
2. Search area and location where parts found.
3. Discussion of photographs which are at chapter end and
which depict damage.
4. FIGURE 24, PAGE 67. EXPANDED SEARCH AREA.
5. FIGURE 25, PAGE 68. RH SRB RECOVERED DEBRIS AFT SEG.
6. FIGURE 26, PAGE 69. ANGULAR COORDINATE SYSTEM FOR SRB/M
FINDINGS, PAGE 70-72• These findings relate to physical parts
environmental conditions, and assembly which have been
discussed earlier in this chapter.
CONCLUSION, PAGE 72. IN VIEW OF THE FINDINGS, THE COMMISSION
CONCLUDED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT WAS THE
FAILURE OF THE PRESSURE SEAL IN THE AFT FIELD JOINT OF THE
RIGHT SOLID ROCKET MOTOR. THE FAILURE WAS DUE TO A FAULTY
DESIGN UNACCEPTABLY SENSITIVE TO A NUMBER OF FACTORS. THESE
FACTORS WERE THE EFFECTS OF TEMPERATURE, PHYSICAL DIMENSIONS,
THE CHARACTER OF MATERIALS, THE EFFECTS OF REUSABILITY,
PROCESSING, AND THE REACTION OF THE JOINT TO DYNAMIC LOADING.
REFERENCES, PAGE 73.
PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE, PAGE 74-81•
VI. CHAPTER V. THE CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT. PAGES 82-i19.
A. Introduction, PAGE 82.
i. The decision to launch was flawed.
2. The people who made the decision were unaware of the
history of problems concerning the seal and were unaware of
the initial rec. of cont. against launch
with temp. less than 53 F and the continuing opposition of
MTI engineers.
3. Did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's ice
concern.
4. If they had known it is unlikely they would have launched.
B. FLAWS IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS, PAGE 82-103.
I. Analyzed chain of decisions leading to launch.
2. Testimony revealed failures in communication.
3. DisCussion of FRR and its initiation.
4. Discussion of Mission Management Team, PAGE 83, and L-I
launch review.
5. TABLE, PAGE 83. READINESS REVIEWS.
6. PAGE 84. Identifies areas where Level III and cont
concerns were not communicated to Levels II and I.
7. PAGE 84. Schedule of memos leading to 51-L FRR, meeting
was held, Moore sends directive on FRR with no problems on
SRB being identified.
8. PAGE 84. Crit 1 and launch constraints.
9. PAGE 84-85. Independent reporting paths not effective.
i0. REPRINT, PAGE 84. TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE.
ii. PAGE 85. Apparently neither MTI or MSFC believed that seal
problem was critical in readiness reviews.
12. 51-L certified as flight ready, L-I review occurs.
13. PAGE 85, Mulloy's testimony on O-ring concerns.
14. Comm. concerned that contrary to above testimony,
seriousness of problem not conveyed in FRR.
16. Cold front approaching, exposure to rain, scrubs.
17. Chain of events starting at MTI plant.
18. PAGE 86, Eblings testimony on MTI meeting.
19. PAGE 86-87, McDonald's testimony on conversation with
Ebling.
20. Further development of 5:45 telecon.
21. PAGE 87-88, testimony of Lovingood and Reinartz on
teleconference.
22. PAGE 88, development of phase 2 of telecon at 8:45.
23. PAGE 88-90, Boisjoly's testimony on phase 2 telecon.
.....24. PAGE 89, REPRINT-OF CHARTS PRESENTED.
25. PAGE 90-91, McDonald's testimony on phase 2.
26. PAGE 91-92, Mulloy's testimony on phase 2. ......
27. PAGE 92, Mason's testimony on caucus.
28, PAGE 92"93, Boisjoly's testlmony on Lcaucus.
29. PAGE 93-94, Lund's testimony on decision, telecon, and
caucus.
30. PAGE 94. Lund's testimony on changing decision.
31. PAGE 94-95, Mason's testimony on Hardy/Mulloy comments.
32. PAGE 95, McDonald's comments on various subsystems
qualified to various temperatures.
33. PAGE 95-96, Mulloy's testimony on caucus and his April
statement.
34. PAGE 96-99, Mulloy's testimony on conclusion of telecon,
LCC, SRB seal being level III issue.
35. CHART, PAGE 97. MTI ASSESSMENT OF TEMP CONCERN ON SRM-25
(51-L) LAUNCH.
36. PAGE 99-100, Hardy's testimony on telecon.
37. PAGE i00, 5 a.m. meeting of Lucas, Mulloy, Reinartz only on
fact that meeting was held and temp concerns on O-rings had
been resolved.
38. PAGE i00, Mulloy's testimony on 5 am meeting.
39. PAGE i00-i01, Lucas's testimony on 5 am meeting.
40. PAGE i01, Clear that information on O-ring damage in
previous flights and about MTI's engineers concerns never
reached Moore or Aldrich.
41. PAGE 101-103, Aldrich testimony on breakdowns in
communication.
42. CHART, PAGE 102. SHUTTLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE.
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43. PAGE 103, Smith, Thomas, Aldrich, and Moore deny knowledge
of MTI objection to launch.
44. PAGE 103, Thomas testimony on LCC and temp.
L = [
FINDINGS, PAGE 104.
i. Serious flaw in decision process leading to launch, etc.
2. Waiving of launch constraints appears to have been at
expense of flight safety, etc.
3. Commission troubled at MSFC containment of serious problem,
etc.
4. MTI reversed its position at the urging of MSFC and
contrary to the views of its engineers, etc.
TABLE, PAGE 104-110. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATED TO
TEMPERATURE CONCERNS PRIOR TO LAUNCH OF CHALLENGER (STS 51-L).
TABLE, PAGE lll. FINAL TELECON PARTICIPANTS•
PHOTOGRAPHS, PAGE 112-113. Pictures of ice.
AMBIGUITIES IN THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS, PAGE 114-117.
I. Decision to allow water to run from system to prevent
freezing causes large amounts of ice to form.
2. Problem identified by ice team at 2 am, assessed throughout
night, culminating with 9am MMT meeting.
3. Rockwell describes work done and explains concerns with
Petrone's testimony, PAGE 114-115.
4. Glaysher's involvement and his testimony that Rockwell can
not assure that it is safe to fly.
5. PAGE 115, Cioffoletti's testimony about his concern.
6. PAGE 115-116, pressure for more detailed description of
Rockwell's launch recommendation and Petrone's response.
7. 2 things are clear: Rockwell did not feel it had sufficient
time to research and resolve the ice on the pad problem and
Rockwell's position on launch was not clearly communicated
to NASA officials in the launch decision chain.
8. Lamberth's discussion on Rockwell's commit to launch
language•
9. PAGE 116, testimony of Rockwell's Pellet concerning
telephone conversation with Moser confirms Lamberth.
i0. PAGE 116-117, Aldrich testimony on meeting of ice team,
Rockwell, Lamberth, and Colonna with Aldrich on problem.
ii. Aldrich had reports from contractors other than Rockwell.
12. FINDINGS, PAGE 117-118.
a. Rockwell's recommendation on launch was ambiguous.
b. Commission concerned about NASA's response to Rockwell
and finds the decision to launch questionable. NASA
appeared to be requiring a contractor to prove that it
was not safe to launch. Commission finds ice not a
cause and does not conclude NASA over-rode a no-launch
recommendation from a contractor.
c. Freeze protection plan for pad was inadequate.
H. REFERENCES, PAGE 119.
Vll. CHAPTER VI. AN ACCIDENT ROOTED IN HISTORY. PAGE 120-151
A. EARLY DESIGN, PAGE 120-122.
i. SRB problem began with design and continued through failure
to recognize problem and treatment as acceptable flight
risk.
2. MTI did not accept implication of early tests that design
had serious flaw.
3. NASA did not accept judgment of its engineers that design
was unacceptable and minimized problem as record grew.
4. MTI felt that condition was not desirable but was
acceptable.
5. Small history of letting of SRB contract.
6. Costs were first concern of NASA selection bd.
7. MTI's joint was selected for special mention by selection
bd.
8. Implies MTI's selection done primarily on cost basis.
9. Design of SRB based on Titan but there were differences.
i0. FIGURE i, PAGE 121. COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL DESIGN TO
DESIGN USED.
II. MTI design changed before production and MTI believed seal
had complete redundancy.
12. Pin problems.
13. Horizontal assembly required.
14. Testimony of MTI engineer McIntosh about concern with
horizontal assembly.
15. Test vents, O-ring manufacture, multiple firing
B. EARLY TESTS, PAGE 122-123.
i. Tests on SRB's began in mid-70's. 1977 hydro-burst test
shows joint rotation.
2. PAGE 122, MTI Thompson testifies to joint rotation but MTI
believed problem was minor and scheduled no further tests.
C. DESIGN OBJECTIVES, PAGE 123-124.
i. MSFC's reaction to early tests opposite MTI's.
2. PAGE 123, Eudy's memo to McCool on design problems and
suggested corrections.
3. 1977 Ray says not changing the design is unacceptable.
4. Miller's memo to Eudy describing joint problem.
5. Miller sends second memo objecting to seal design in
January 79.
6. Ray authored Miller memos and Miller concurred.
7. Ray visited O-ring manufacturers and they tentatively felt
O-ring was being asked to perform outside its intended
design.
8. PAGE 124, Ray testimony on reasons for writing memos in 78
and 79.
9. MTI was not informed of visit to O-ring companies.
i0. MTI's phase 1 certification review mentioned difficulties
with tests but did not list as a failure or problem.
D. VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION COMMITTEE, PAGE 124-5
I. Early static tests show joint rotation greater than
predicted.
2. NASA empaneles Space Shuttle Verification / Certification
comm. and they express concern about joint design.
Mentions wrong way pressurization of primary O-ring and
putty. Questions redundancy.
3. Comm says that from a telecon they felt redundancy was not
a requirement.
4. PAGE 124, Hardy's testimony on committee's understanding
conflicted with his.
5. Comm asks for for full-scale tests to verify joint. Quote
on PAGE 124-125 further defines test and problems.
6. NASA seems to decline tests with appeal to previous testing
and light weight case testing.
E. CRITICALITY CLASSIFICATION AND CHANGES, PAGE 125-128
i. NASA classes joint IR. Definition Of IR and rational for
classification (PAGE 125).
2. PAGE 125, Aldrich testifies rational presented means 1 to
him.
3. Joint carries IR from Nov 80 to Nov 82.
4. Early problems with O-rings and putty.
5. IR changed to I, Dec 82. PAGE 126 rational for change.
6. Rationale for retention of single O-ring seal by MTI's
HcIntosh has seeming conflict with rationale for crit i.
7. MTI and NASA still considered seal to be redundant even
with crit 1 change.
8. PAGE 126, McIntosh's testimony on felt was redundant due to
tests.
9. Temp not considered in early tests. Disagreement over
joint opening sent to ref.
I0. PAGE 127, Lovingood's testimony on redundancy of seal in
all but worst cases.
ii. Hardy and Mulloy shared Lovingood's view.
12. Waiver of Crit 1 status granted by level 1 and 2 in March
83.
13. PAGE 127, QUOTE on redudancy requirements implying reason
for waiver.
14. PAGE 127-128. Lunney's testimony on Crit 1 change and
reason for waiver.
15. Waiver process outside PRCB. Aldrich and Kohrs say waiver
approved so STS-6 could fly. Weeks denies this.
16. MTI officials denied notification of Crit change but HTI's
ops manager at MSFC (Parker) has signature on documents.
However several documents at MTI still have Crit IR long
after change.
F. STS 41-B O-RING EROSION, PAGES 128-132.
I. Prior to 41-B erosion/blow by infrequent.
2. Discussion of qualification motors, flight history, and
tests.
3. PAGE 128, Coats memo to Hardy on problems.
4. PAGE 128, Marshall Problem Assessment System Report QUOTE.
5. FIGURE 2, PAGES 129-131. O-RING ANOMALIES COMPARED _IITH
JOINT TEMPERATURE AND LEAK CHECK PROCEDURE.
6. PAGE 132, Moorefield memo to Mulloy on Titan experience.
7. 41-B erosion taken to 41-C FRR as technical issue.
Recommendation to fly approved with same rationale as used
at Level III FRR.
8. Directive sent from Hark to Mulloy, signed by Weeks
directing review of seals. This action preceded by
Abrahamscn letter to Lucas.
9. Mulloy had Wear send letter to MTI asking for review of
seals.
I0. MTI responds with proposal in May m84 and completes response
with HQ briefing in Aug 85.
G. LEAK CHECK AND PUTTY, PAGE 133-134.
i. FIGURE 3, PAGE 133. JOINT A_IOMALYFREQUENCY
VS. LEAK CHECK PRESSURE.
2. Miller writes memo to Hardy through Coats as result of 41-B
3. Blow hole through putty discussed.
4. Russell's letter to Ebling at MTI show erosion history,
test data, and express concern with putty.
5. Comments on leak test pressure with erosion.
6. PAGE 134, Russell and Mulloy's testimony on awareness that
increase in blow hole could contribute to erosion.
7. MTI and NASA accept increased pressure to insure passage of
integrity test in spite of awareness of blow hole problems.
8. Documentary evidence presented on MSFC's concern for putty
erosion/blow hole problem.
9. MTI identifies O-ring erosion as function of putty blow
hole size and free volume in mid 84.
I0. MTI response on tests for putty problems was slow. As late
as March 85 there are MSFC memos on lack of MTI action in
response to directive of Dec 83 on putty behavior vs leak
check pressure.
H. STS 51-C AND COLD TEMPERATURES, PAGES 134-136.
i. TABLE, PAGE 135. Awareness of different NASA officials of
O-ring problems.
2. 51-C launched with O-ring temp at 53 degrees. Discussion
of O-ring problems.
3. PAGE 135, Boisjoly's description of 51-C blow by erosion.
4. Boisjoly's description of race between erosion and sealing.
5. MSFC's problem assessment report describes O-ring burns as
bad or worse than previously experienced and changes are
pending on test results.
6. URGENT message from Mulloy to Wear on including O-ring in
51-E FRR, PAGE 136.
7. On Feb 8 85 MTI presents MOST DETAILED ANALYSIS TO DATE on
O-rings. Mentions temp as factor. Says condition is not
desirable but is acceptable.
8. At Level I FRR on Feb 21, no detailed analysis on O-rings
or temp presented. Erosion acceptable because of limited
exposure time and redundancy.
I. STS 51-B AND THE LAUNCH CONSTRAINT, PAGES 136-139.
i. Joint problems continue on next 4 flights.
2. MTI conducts tests relating to temp in early 85
3. QUOTE, PAGE 136-137. Russell letter to Thomas on test
report in Aug 85.
4. June 85, erosion of nozzel joint on 51-B (.171 in.) found
by MTI.
5. PAGE 137, Mu!loy testimony on 51-B problem.
6. Mulloy and Problem Assessment Committee place launch
constraint.
7. QUOTE, PAGE 137, from MSFC letter on assigning launch
conztraints.
8. Mulioy's rationale for constraint. Applies to all
d •
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subsequent flights.
9. MTI testified they were not aware of constraint but
subsequent letters referenced MSFC report which identified
constraint.
i0. Mulloy waived constraint for each subsequent flight.
Ii. PAGE 137-138, testimony of Mulloy and Wear on procedure.
12. Mulloy and Wear both testified the constraint was still in
effect for 51-L but said two entries were in error on
assessment report saying problem had been closed.
13. MTI's suggestion for closure had been rejected.
14. Level I and II unaware of launch constraint.
15. FIGURE 5, PAGE 139. AUGUST 19, 1985 HEADQUARTERS BRIEFING.
ESCALATING CONCERNS, PAGE 139-140.
I. Concerns begin to grow at HQ and MTI.
2. PAGE 139, QUOTE from July 31 letter of Boisjoly memo on
erosion expressing real fear.
3. More partial quotes about growing concerns over erosion
(mostly at MTI).
4. PAGE 140, Thompson's testimony on larger O-rings.
5. MTI's revised O-ring protection plan Aug 30 85 indicated
lack of agreement between NASA and MTI on magnitude of
joint rotation. A test to resolve this was to be devised.
DESIGN QUESTIONS RESURFACE, PAGE 140-142.
I. Late Aug MTI submits preliminary concepts for solving joint
sealing problems.
2. In Sept MTI's plans call for static firing• Also i0
briefings given to MSFC on erosion with temp not discussed.
3. PAGE 141, QUOTE, Kingsbury to Mulloy on desire to be
briefed on plans and the fact that seals require priority
attention of MTI and MSFC.
4. Lack of test results linked to lack of MTI management
concern•
5. PAGE 141, discussion and QUOTE from Ebeling's HELP memo on
problems and need for support.
6. 61-A launched Oct 30 85, has O-ring erosion which is not
mentioned in Level I FRR for 61-B. 61-B also has erosion.
7. MTI makes one test in Dec and decides chamber needs to be
redesigned•
8. Ebeling becomes so concerned that he felt that MTI should
not ship any more motors until problem is fixed.
9. PAGE 141-142, Ebeling's testimony on concern.
THE CLOSURE ISSUE, PAGE 142-145•
i. MTI requests closure of erosion issue includes 17 reasons
for closure in Dec 85.
2. PAGE 142-143, Russell's testimony on reasons for closure.
3. CONTRACTOR CLOSURE RECEIVED entered on all MSFC problem
reports. On Jan 23 another entry is placed on the same
reports indicating that the problem is closed.
4. PAGE 144, Testimony of Mulloy and Wear that the above
entries are in error•
5. PAGE 144-145, Testimony of Mulloy about original response
to erosion.
M. TEMPERATURE EFFECTS, PAGE 145.
N •
i. Only limited consideration was given to the past history of
O-ring damage in light of temperature.
2. Number of flights but not frequency was considered.
3. History indicates that the probability of O-ring distress
is increased to certainty if the temperature of the joint
is less than 65.
FRR, PAGE 145-148.
i. Clear that both NASA and contractor felt erosion should be
considered by FRR process.
2. PAGE 145-147, QUOTE from policy manuals listing objectives
of FRR.
3. FIGURE 6, PAGE 146, PLOT OF FLIGHTS WITH AND WITHOUT
INCIDENTS OF O-RING THERMAL DISTRESS•
4. Treatment of O-ring erosion in FRR's is presented in some
detail including partial quotes.
O. FINDINGS, PAGE 148.
•
•
•
The genesis of accident began with decision in design and
in failure by MTI and NASA's SRE project office to
understand and respond to test results•
Neither MTI nor NASA responded adequately to internal
warnings or developed a solution to unexpected occurrences.
Both accepted problem as unavoidable and as an acceptable
flight risk.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS.
a. Joint test and certification program was inadequate.
b. Neither NASA nor MTI understood the process by which
joint sealing took place•
c. Both accepted escalating risk because they got away
with it last time.
d. The FRR flight anomaly tracking mechanism failed.
e. The briefing presented to NASA HQ in Aug 85 was
sufficient to require corrective action prior to next
flight•
f. A careful analysis of history would have shown
correlation of O-ring damage with temperature. Since
no one had done analysis they were unprepared to
evaluate the risk of 51-L launch.
P. REFERENCES, PAGE 149-151.
VIII.
A.
CHAPTER VII. THE SILENT SAFETY PROGRAM. PAGES 152-163.
INTRODUCTION, PAGE 152.
i. Commission surprised that NASA safety staff was not
mentioned.
2. If exacting standards of Apollo program had been used
then demand of accelerating schedule might have been met.
3. Alrich listed 5 communication failures, 4 of which related
to safety• These 4 are lack of problem reporting
requirements, inadequate trend analysis, misrepresentation
of criticality, and lack of involvement in critical
discussions.
4. Safety program fell short.
S . NASA'S SAFETY PROGRAM, PAGES 152-153.
i. Definitions of safety, reliability, and quality. Brief
description of SR/QA.
2. Ability of HQ chief engineer to manage SR/QA is limited
by structure. Details of staffing.
3. JSC with large number support SR/QA but expertise with
MSFC hardware is absent.
4. KSC has large number who support SR/QA but they report
to supervisors who are responsible for processing, a clear
failure•
5. MSFC suffers from an equivalent lack of independence and
also suffers from a lack of manpower.
C. MONITORING SAFETY CRITICAL ITEMS, PAGE 153.
m •
I. Definition of Crit I, 2, 3, IR, 2R.
2. Discussion of how Crit's are assigned.
3. Component criticality is related to test requirements in
OMR/S Document published and maintained by Level II.
4. For the orbiter, references from the Crit Items List
to the requirements and specifications document is
traceable in both ways and is complete: not so for the SRB.
5. Discussion of the Ops and Maintenance Instruction with
suggestion that if this indicated when work was to be done
on Crit 1 item then all would be alerted.
6. The same point applies to MTI production where criticality
should be directly incorporated into manufacturing quality
planning.
PROBLEM REPORTING, PAGE 154-155.
o
o
•
4.
5.
6.
Prior to 83, Level Ill was required to report all flight
critical problems, trends, and closeouts to Level II. This
requirement was changed to include only common hardware or
physical interface elements.
This change signed by Jackson for Lunney and submitted
by Raines resulted in Level II losing insight into Level
III problems.
In May of 86, Raines wrote memo tO streamline system since
old requirement was not productive for operational system.
Commission does not understand why memo written or why
Level II approved.
The Level III open problems list was not distributed to
Level II during 84 or 85 nor to Rockwell.
REPORTING OF IN-FLIGHT ANOMALIES, PAGE 154-155.
a. Discussion of way in-flight anomalies are handled
and responsibilities.
b. PAGE 154, QUOTE from 81 letter on procedure mentions
example from STS-I.
c. Example furnished pertains to test data (first four
flights). Also 83 change might have been interpreted
as superseding 81 letter particularly since program
became operational in 82.
More on the reporting of anomalies.
Crit 1 should reach all levels of management.
NASA does not have concise set of problem reporting
requirements.
d.
e.
f.
E. SAFETY PROGRAMFAILURES, PAGE 155-160
i. MSFC SR/QA HAS dual role of assuring delivered hardware
meets specs and of serving as a watchdog on engineering
judgment on use and appraisal of hardware.
2. _atchdog role could have prevented accident.
3. TREND DATA, PAGES 155-156.
a. Trend data is a standard function of SR/QA.
b. Trend history took bad turn in jan 84.
c. PAGE 155, QUOTE from Bunn (director, SR_QA, MSFC)
on ease of recognizing trend in retrospect.
d. No trend analysis was done.
e. Series of changes to SRB processing listed which has
probable correlation to high anomaly rate.
f. history of nozzle problems is similar to field joint
problems.
g. PHOTOGRAPH, PAGE 156. Pressure test putty bubble.
h. Lack of trend awareness is QUALITY ESCAPE.
i. Likely cause of O-ring erosion appears to be increased
pressure test.
4. MANAGEMENT AWARENESS, PAGES 156-159.
a. Commission heard a lot of argument on criticality of
joint and references to redundancy. MSFC and MTI paper
listed as Crit IR.
b. Failure of proper categorization of joint linked SR/QA
failure and makes informed decisions by key managers
impossible.
c. NASA CHART, PAGE 157-158, SRB CRITICAL ITEMS LIST.
d. PAGE 159, Bunn's testimony on error of using IR.
5. THE IMPACT OF MISINFORMATION, PAGE 159.
a. PAGE 159, Moore's testimony on impact of
misinformation.
b. No one told or reminded Moore that while nozzle
joint was IR the field joint was Crit I, or about blow
holes, or about new test procedure, or about erosion
was the enemy and increased pressure was its ally.
c. The reporting procedure was not making problems visible
with accuracy and emphasis.
6. REPORTING LAUNCH CONSTRAINTS, PAGE 159.
a. Commission was surprised to learn that constraint was
imposed and no one outside of MSFC was informed.
b. Discussion of launch constraint."
c. Problem Reporting and Corrective Action document (JSC
08126A, para 3.2d) requires Level II to be informed of
launch constraints and neither I or II was so informed.
7. I_LICATIONS OF AN OPERATIONAL PROGRAM, PAGES 159-160.
a. Declaration of operational found many SR/QA staffs
reduced or reorganized.
b. Less SR/QA required due to routine flights was apparent
reason.
c. Reasons why this is faulty are listed.
d. 2 problems on 61-C (wheel brake and erosion) were not
evaluated before next flight (51-L).
e. SR/QA must be strengthened to come to grips with
critical safety issues before next flight.
f. Complacency and failures in supervision and reporting
aggravate flight risk.
g. NASA must elevate and strengthen SR/QA function and
augment with flight safety program which oversees
traditional functions.
F. AEROSPACESAFETY ADVISORY PANEL, PAGE 160.
•
2.
Discusses development, structure and function of Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel.
Efforts of panel were not sufficiently specific and
immediate to prevent 51-L accident.
G. SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM CREW SAFETY PANEL, PAGE 161.
i •
2.
3.
Panel formed in 74, expired in 81.
Discussion of composition and function of Panel.
Panel lost focus and leadership•
H. THE NEED FOR A NEW SAFETY ORGANIZATION, PAGE 161.
i. ASAP valuable but too broad•
2. The ability of any panel to function depends on focused
scope of responsibilities•
3. Operational safety requires combination of NASA and
contractors to work effectively on a coordinated basis at
all levels.
4. Commission believes that top-to-bottom safety emphasis
can best be accomplished by a combination of a strong
central authority and a working level panel devoted to
operational aspects of shuttle flight safety•
I. FINDINGS, PAGE 161.
d •
K.
i. Reduction in SR/QA at MSFC and HQ have seriously limited
capability in those vital functions•
2. Organizational structure at KSC and MSFC have placed SR/QA
under the supervision of those organizations whose efforts
they are to check•
3. Problem reporting requirements are not concise and fail to
get critical information to proper levels•
4. Little or no analysis was done on O-ring erosion/blow by.
5. As flight rate increased, MSFC's SR/QA staff was decreased
which adversely affected mission safety•
6. 5 weeks after accident, criticality of SRM field joint was
still not properly documented in the reporting system at
MSFC.
REFERENCES, PAGE 162
PAGE 163, BLANK•
IX. CHAPTER VIII. PRESSURES ON THE SYSTEM. PAGES 164-177.
A. Introduction, PAGES 164-165.
I. NASA began a planned acceleration of schedule on
completion of test flights in 82.
2. Early plan called for a flight a week which in 85 had
evolved to 24 a year by 90.
3. Becoming obvious that even two flights a month was overly
ambitious.
4. Due to inadequate provision of resources 9 mission rate of
85 was straining resources.
5. Evidence suggests that NASA would not have accomplished 15
flights scheduled for 86.
6. PAGE 164, Reagan QUOTE on policy for direction of space
program.
7. From inception NASA advertised that shuttle would make
space ops routine and economical which implies that a
higher flight rate will yield greater routinization and
economy which in turn increases pressure.
8. The build up to 24 brought difficulties: compression of
training, lack of spares, focusing of resources on near
term problems.
9. One effect of accelerated rate was dilution of resource
which could be applied to a particular flight.
i0. Part of system which converted mission requirements and
objectives into software, trajectories, and crew training
was hard put to keep up in 85 and would not meet milestones
in 86 due to strained resources and having to respond to
constant changes in schedule.
Ii. NASA had trouble changing from a single flight focus to a
system which could efficiently support projected flight
rate.
12. Slow to develop the capabilities that would allow it to
handle higher volume of work associated with higher flight
rate and in developing a hardware maintenance plan for a
reuseable fleet.
13. Need to meet customer commitments which translates into
launching a given number per year and launching on time
generated pressure.
14. These considerations may have obscured engineering
concerns.
15. Managers may have forgotten that Shuttle was still in R/D
phase.
16. PAGE 165, Beggs' testimony on NASA commitment in May 82.
17. 16 months later Beggs say NASA can start on space station
at any time and that shuttle is operational.
18. Managers were determined to prove shuttle operational.
19. Following sections discuss pressures generated by flight
rate, optimistic schedule, and assumption of operational
status.
B. PLANNING A MISSION, PAGE 165.
i. Discussion of mission planning•
2. Discussion of freeze points and what they'entail.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF FLIGHT PRODUCTS, PAGE 165-166.
i. Discussion of production process.
2. Discussion of parallel and serial work.
3. Discussion change causing cascade effect•
4. System was falling behind. Analysis of training schedules
and their projected trend shows this.
5. GRAPH, PAGE 166, SHUTTLE MISSION SIMULATOR TRAINING.
6. Production system disrupted by increased flight rate, lack
of efficient production process, and manifest changes.
D. CHANGES IN MANIFEST, PAGE 166-170
• Changes in 85 usually were mandatcry, perhaps some of the
manifest changes were not.
2. 4 different types of manifest changes listed.
3. 2 options to a change are to maximize the benefit to a
customer or to minimize the impact on Shuttle ops.
4. Long and detailed discussion on changes and their impacts.
5. TABLE, PAGE 167, 1985 CHANGESIN THE MANIFEST.
6. GRAPH, PAGE 168, IMPACT OF MANIFEST CHANGESON WORKLOADAT
JSC.
7. GRAPH, PAGE 169, SIMULATION TRAINING.
8. QUOTE, PAGE 170, from Hartsfield on less time than desired
to train.
E. OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES, PAGE 170-171.
i. Pressing immediate requirements divert attention from what
is happening to system as whole.
2. Shuttle program tried to adapt philosophy, attitude, and
requirements to operational era. But era came suddenly.
In some cases not enough preparation for what operational
might entail.
3. Lists examples of why system was not prepared to meet
operational schedule.
4. Comprehensive requirements process with checks and rechecks
was developed but was not capable of meeting flight rate
goals.
5. System developed plans to support flight rate through
streamlining process through automation, standardization,
and centralized management and to carry from developmental
to mature system without compromise in quality.
6. Increasing flight rate had priority and only what was left
after supporting flight rate could be used.
7. In 85, NASA was attempting to develop a production system
but was forced to do so while responding with the same
personnel to an increasing flight rate.
8. Number of skilled personnel reduced by retirements, hiring
freeze, transfers to other programs (space station) and
transitioning to contractors.
9. Flight rate was not based on assessment of resources and
was not reduced to accommodate the capacity of workforce.
i0. STSOC transition discussed along with its impact as a
disturbance.
ii. Simulator problems discussed.
F. RESPONDING TO CHALLENGES AND CHANGES, PAGE 171-173.
i. Can-do attitude was a problem in achieving flight rate.
2. Retrieval missions discussed.
3. NASA cannot continue to accept spur of the moment missions
and develop discipline required to operate on a routine and
cost effective basis.
4. While NASA may can do anything it cannot do everything.
Disruption generates cost.
5. Officials are not willing to say they do not have resources
to respond to change.
6. PAGE 172, Draughon QUOTE on saying NO to achieve 86 flight
rate.
7. Hardware problems generate choice of responses. Movement
of commercial payload off of 41-D to next flight causing
other flights to slip is listed as example. Draughon's
QUOTE, PAGE 172, about not having to do it is included.
8. NASA was too bold in shuffling manifests and this increased
near-term focus.
9. NASA did not have a way to forecast the effect of a
manifest change.
i0. PAGE 172, Nicholson QUOTE on being spread to thin to get
forecasting tool developed.
ii. Even easy changes put demands on system• Mid-deck
requirements listed. Not enforced. Payload specialists
added after 5-5. Draughon's QUOTE, PAGE 172 on spending
large amount of time on unimportant items because of late
changes.
12. Those directing change were not sensitive to the problem.
Resources of system were being eaten up by late changes
with low priority.
13. PAGE 173, Holloway QUOTE on flight rate vs. manifest
flexibility.
14. PAGE 173, Nicholson QUOTE on bringing late change concerns
to HQ.
15. NASA must establish realistic expectation and approach it
carefully, based on realistic assessment and not on what is
possible with maximum effort.
16. The ground rules should be firmly established and then
enforced.
17. The word "operational" can mislead. Operational should not
imply any less commitment to quality or safety.
18. Correct attitude listed as WE ARE GOING TO FLY HIGH RISK
FLIGHTS THIS YEAR: EVERY ONE IS GOING TO BE A CHALLENGE,
AND EVERY ONE IS GOING TO INVOLVE SOME RISK, SO WE HAD
BETTER BE CAREFUL IN OUR APPROACH TO EACH.
G. EFFECT OF FLIGHT RATE ON SPARE PARTS, PAGE 173-174.
i. Brief history of logistics plans and problems.
2. Budget reductions caused logistic implementation problems.
3. Reductions in spares provided funds to meet revised
budgets. PAGE 173, Aldrich QUOTE on fund contentions.
Actions result in spares shortage and this leads to
cannibalization.
5. 45 out of 300 required parts cannibalized for Challenger.
6. PAGE 174, Weitz QUOTE on cannibalization concern.
7. KSC QUOTE on manpower drain cannibalization causes•
8. Prior to Challenger this had no flight impact but this was
expected to come to a head in Spring 86.
9. PAGE 174, Lamberth QUOTE on problem coming to a head in
Spring 86.
i0. Logistics program one year behind in Spring of 86.
ii. Spares problem another illustration Shuttle not prepared
for operational schedule.
H. THE IMPORTANCE OF FLIGHT EXPERIENCE, PAGE 174-175.
I. Flight experience is important to developmental program.
2. Rapid succession of flights made it difficult to analyze
data before next launch.
3. Problems with 61-C which were not considered for 51-L the
next launch are discussed in some detail.
I. EFFECT ON PAYLOAD SAFETY, PAGES 175-176.
I • NASA policy is to minimize involvement in payload design
process leaving responsibility for safe design to
••
4.
•
6.
7.
developer.
Payload Safety Panel at JSC does phased series of safety
reviews. Some problems are identified late. However
process has worked well.
Discussion of Centaur along with safety issues.
Centaur had passed 3 of 4 safety reviews as of Challenger
but unresolved problems from last two reviews remained.
Safety waivers had been granted and others were pending.
Improvements in military version had not been incorporated
because of press to get missions off.
After Challenger NASA allotted more than 75 million to
incorporate improvements to Centaur.
Even though we will never know if safety program would have
allowed flight in 86, had they done so, it would have been
without level of protection deemed adequate after accident•
J. OUTSIDE PRESSURE TO LAUNCH, PAGE 176.
i. Long discussion on absence of political pressure to launch.
2. List of live telecasts scheduled from orbiter•
no FINDINGS, PAGE 176-177•
i. The capabilities of system were stretched to limit to meet
flight rate in winter of 85/86 and would have been exceeded
in Spring/Summer of 86.
2. Spares are in short supply due to decision to decision to
postpone procurement in favor of higher p{iority budget
items. This would likely limit 86 operations•
3. Stated manifesting policies are not enforced. Changes have
occurred• Some impacts are listed.
4. Scheduled flight rate did not accurately reflect
capabilities and resources. Flight rate not reduce_ to
accommodate periods of adjustment to work force capacity.
No margin to accommodate unforeseen hardware problems•
Resources were primarily directed toward supporting flights
and not available to improve or expand facilities needed to
support higher flight rate.
5. Training simulators supporting 12-15 flights a year may be
limiting factor on flight rate.
6. With flights in rapid succession, current requirements do
not ensure anomaly resolution from one flight to the next.
L. REFERENCES, PAGE 177.
X. CHAPTER IX. OTHER SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS. PAGES 178-197.
A. INTRODUCTION, PAGE 178.
i. Commission became aware of matters which played no part in
51-L but have potential for safety.
2. Some of these safety considerations were brought forward by
the astronaut office which resulted in special hearing.
3. This chapter is in 2 sections: critical aspects of Shuttle
flight and testing, processing, and assembling procedures•
B. ASCENT: A CRITICAL PHASE, PAGES 178-186.
I. Particular concern to commission are abort capabilities,
b_
C.
d.
e.
f.
options to improve those capabilities, options for crew
escape, and the performance of the range safety system.
2. Commission believes highly unlikely that any of systems
discussed below would have save crew of 51-5.
3. ABORT CAPABILITIES, PAGE 178-180.
a. Design requirement to abort to survivable landing if 1
SSME is lost has been met.
Discussion of different type of aborts.
RETURN TO LAUNCH SITE ABORT, PAGE 178.
TRANSATLANTIC ABORT, PAGES 179-180.
CHART, PAGE 179, SHUTTLE ABORT REGIONS.
DESIGN, PAGE 180.
i. Not designed tO manage abort if 2 or more SSME's
fail.
ii. 2 or more failing in first 5-6 min. results in
CONTINGENCY ABORT with landing in water.
iii. Shuttle not designed to survive SRB failure.
iv. Crew survival rest on assumptions:
a) SRB will work from ignition to separation.
b) If more than 1 SSME fails the crew must be able
to survive a water landing.
4. SHUTTLE ABORT ENHANCEMENTS, PAGE 180.
a. Discussion of abort provisions considered between 73
and 83.
b. Philosophy that first stage ascent must be assured has
been accepted and reviewed and is being reviewed again
in light of 51-L.
5. EARLY ORBITER SEPARATIONS, PAGE 180.
a. If orbiter must separate from SRB then this must occur
extremely quickly.
b. Normal separation of Shuttle from rest of system takes
18 sec., too long for use in first stage contingency.
c. Discussion of fast separation of ET disdussed and
listed as impractical if SRB's still thrusting.
d. Further discussion of use of fast separation.
6. THRUST TERMINATION, PAGE 181.
a. Discussion of thrust termination which concludes with
this might allow ejection or fast separation in first 2
min. of flight.
b. Drawbacks of thrust termination listed and history
discussed.
c. QUOTE, PAGE 181, from Griffin letter on thrust
termination justifying ceasing termination study. Says
conditions requiring thrust termination are either very
remote or a result of primary structure failure.
d .... POSSIBILITY OF SRB FAILURES WAS NEITHER VERY REMOTE
NOR LIMITED TO PRIMARY STRUCTURAL FAILURE.
e. Thrust termination is key to first stage abort.
f. Further discussion on required safety issues for thrust
termination.
7. DITCHING, PAGES 181-182.
a. Ditching window 50-70 sec. after launch.
b. Discussion of early tests at Langley and probable bad
consequences.
c. Crew Safety Panel and Orbiter flight techniques
meetings conclude: ditching is more hazardous than
suggested by Langley tests and that ditching is not
survivable.
d. QUOTE, PAGE 182, from Griffin letter to Abrahamson on
ceasing studies on ditching or bailout due to technical
infeasibility.
e. No evidence to suggest crew would survive water impact.
f. PAGE 182, testimony from _°Jeitz on inability of Orbiter
to survive any ditching (water, land, or any unprepared
surface) and necessity for means of getting crew out of
vehicle before it contacts Earth.
8. CREW ESCAPE OPTIONS, PAGE 182-184.
a. TABLE, PAGE 182, 1971 ROCKWELL DATA ON EJECTION
SYSTEMS.
b. Ejection seats, encapsulated ejection seats and
separable crew compartment studied early.
c.. Discussion of problems with these.
d. Remaining options fall into 3 categories: Escape
Module, Rocket-assisted Extraction, and Bail-out
System.
e. Discussion of these terminates with Escape Module
offering widest range of options with others being
practical only during gliding.
f. None of alternatives were implemented because of
limited capability andprogram impact.
g. Disagreement over which system is feasible or whether
any provide protection.
h. PAGE 184, astronauts seem to agree that impractical to
modify Orbiter for escape module but disagree on other
two. Weitz's testimony discusses disagreemenk.
i. In 82 Annual report, ASAP lists crew escape as priority
item warranting further study.
j. Commission supports further study and believes crew
should have means of escape in gliding.
k. Should incorporate systems that provide some chance of
escape in emergencies.
I. Commission accepts Crippen's QUOTE, PAGE 184, on
knowing of no escape system which would have saved crew
of 51-5.
9. RANGE SAFETY, PAGE 184-186.
a. Discussion of necessity of range safety and
organization and control of same.
b. SPACE SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY, PAGES 184-185.
i. Discussion of Space Shuttle range safety system.
ii. DIAGRAM, PAGE 185, RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS.
iii. Removal of ejection seats,
iv. Range safety still needed but should be re-
exaimined by NASA and Air Force to see if destruct
on ET might be removed,
c. RANGE SAFETY ACTIVITIES, JAN 28, 86, PAGE 185-186
i. Listing of range safety activities on day
ii. QUOTE, PAGE 185, from range safety officer Maj.
Bieringer's written statement on his activities.
iii. More discussion on range safety activities that
day.
iv. While Eastern Space and Missile Center and NASA
have initiated a review of range safety, this
review should study combining range safety with
thrust termination system.
i0. POSTFLIGHT ANALYSIS, PAGE 186.
a. Discussion of post-flight analysis of data done by
flight controllers explains why they noticed no
anomalies.
b. Flight control system responded properly and continued
to control vehicle until time of accident.
c. No indication that crew had any warning.
ii. FINDINGS, PAGE 186.
a. Space Shuttle System was not designed to survive SRB
failure. No corrective action can be taken if SRB's do
not work, i.e., separation or escape.
b. Neither Mission Control Team or crew had any warning.
c. Even if there had been a warning, no action available
to mission control team or crew.
C. LANDING: ANOTHER CRITICAL PHASE, PAGES 186-192.
I. General discussion on importance of entry and landing.
2. ABORT SITE WEATHER, PAGE 186-187.
a. Discussion of criticality of weather.
b. Program decision to accept worse weather for abort
sites is not consistent with conservative approach to
flight safety.
_. Commission recommended that subject be reviewed and
those reviews are currently underway.
3. ORBITER TIRES AND BRAKES, PAGES 187-190.
a. QUOTE, PAGE 187, on concern of ASAP in annual report of
82 for landing gear.
b. ORBITER TIRES, PAGES 187-188.
i. Discussion of tires, crosswinds, testing.
ii. Tires are Crit I.
iii. Orbiter tire in use meets specs and has been
certified in testing, however, testing has not
reproduced KSC runway results.
iv. Some improvements considered.
v. 2 blown tires before nosewheel touchdown would be
catastrophic, and potential should b_ minimized. :
NASA has directed testing for Fall 86. i
c. ORBITER BRAKES, PAGES 188-190.
i. Response to problem with brake design was to
extend runway.
ii. Discussion of brakes.
iii. Brake damage on most flights and this has required
special crew procedures to be developed.
iv. QUOTE, PAGE 188-189, Young describes problem
commander has with procedure.
v. History of problems and qualification testing did
not point our current thermal problems.
vi. Limits should be reinvestigated and 61-C damage
should be understood and destructive testfng
accomplished to understand short runway limits and
factors before brake design continues to fly.
vii. NASA is considering improvements and testing is
underway.
viii. QUOTE, PAGE 189, from ASAP 85 annual report on
NASA's efforts.
ix. History of reviews and concern over brake
problems.
x. QUOTE, PAGE 189, ASAP 82 annual report over
concern.
xi. Conservative approach to landing phase demands
reliable performance by all critical systems.
4. KSC LANDINGS, PAGES 190-192.
a. Original plan called for routine landing at KSC to
minimize turnaround and cost.
b. Tires, brakes and weather call this plan into question.
c. Discussion of risks and cost of Edwards landing and
concludes that they are minimal when compared with
those of a space shuttle mission.
d. Discussion of KSC runway and fact that NASA felt that
this was the best that could be built as of design in
73.
e. Discussion of weather predictability and shuttle
systems wear influence on KSC landings.
f. PAGE 190, QUOTE by Charlesworth on his reaction to
blown tire incident.
g, Minor improvements followed and led to deciding KSC was
safe for landing for 61-C and subs.
h. 61-C landed at Edwards but there were still brake
problems.
i. PAGE 190-191, QUOTE by Charlesworth on assessment of
brake problem.
j. Nosewheel steering is fail-passive not fail-safe.
k. History of planned KSC landings and diverts indicates
NASA must plan to use Edwards routinely and
consequences.
i. PAGE 191, CHART, LANDING SITE CHANGES.
m. PAGE 191, QUOTE from Crippen on weather unpredict-
ability at KSC.
n. Discussion of weather and the impact of unstable
weather.
o. Landing routinely at KSC is not wise under present
circumstances.
p. Decisions governing Space Shuttle Ops must be
consistent with philosophy that unnecessary risks have
to be eliminated.
q. Margins of safety cannot be assured if performance not
understood and cannot be deduced from previous flight's
success.
r. Program cannot afford to operate outside its experience
in the areas of tires, brakes, and weather.
D. SHUTTLE ELEMENTS, PAGES 192-193.
i. Discussion of SSME's and their problems.
2. Number of test firings per month has _ecreased over last 2
years but program has not demonstrated limits of engine or
included tests over operational envelope.
3. Discussion of problem with disconnect valve between EY and
Orbiter.
4. Discussion of ET problems.
E. PROCESSING AND ASSEMBLY, PAGES 193-194.
I. The following are problems which the commission felt could
bear on safety of future flights.
2. STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS, PAGE 193.
a. For 51-5 waivers were granted on 60 of 146 structural
inspections.
b. Formal structural inspection plan for fleet had not
been developed.
c. Waivers requested by Level II to minimize flight delay.
d. Inspection requirements are new and not mature.
e. Commission feels that these inspections should not he
waived.
3. RECORDS, PAGE 193.
e•
•
a. Large number of errors in paperwork for SSME and
Orbiter with problem lying in documentation _nd not
with work which was usually accomplished. .,
b. Op Maintenance Instructions need review and update to
be improved.
MISSED REQUIREMENTS, PAGE 193. Lists area where
requirements were not met and were not formally waived or
excepted.
INSPECTIONS BY PROXY, PAGES 193-194.
a. Designated verifiers discussed.
b. Independent check system declining in effectiveness
because of this.
ACCIDENTAL DAMAGE REPORTING, PAGE 194.
a. Removal of accidental damage forgiveness reporting
policy by SPC is causing damage to go unreported.
b. This situation has severe implications if left
uncorrected•
F. LAUNCH PAD 39B, PAGE 194.
i. Anomalies of 39B are listed.
2. Loss of bricks discussed.
G. INVOLVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT CONTRACTORS, PAGES 194-195.
i. Shuttle is clearly a developmental program and must be
treated as such by NASA.
2. Chief difference between Shuttle and previous programs is
that Shuttle is principally a transportation system and has
reuseable hardware.
3. Reusability implies a new set of functions which must be
addressed by program.
4. NASA is striving to implement processing procedures of
transportation industry. While this is useful, there is
not a direct analogue.
5. The demands of developmental aspects must be met with the
following strategies:
a. Maintain significant engr design and development
capability among contractors and an ongoing engr
capability within NASA.
b. Maintain active analytical capability so evolving
capabilities of Shuttle can be matched to demands of
Shuttle.
6. In-house experience must be maintained for NASA and
contractors.
7. Listing of development contractors with responsibilities -
along with discussion of SPC.
8. Discussion of Lockheed's performance and problems.
9. Some development contractors have been excluded from SPC
and this causes difficulties.
H. REFERENCES, PAGE 196.
I. BLANK PAGE 197.
XII. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT,
PAGES 202-205. Listing of Commission members with brief
biographies and listing of PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION STAFF, PAGES
204, 205.
: XI. RECOMMENDATIONS, PAGES 198-201_
"" RECOMMENDATIONS REPRODUCED IN FULL.
Recommendations
- .
-.:i-.lr--r'_ he Commission has conducted an ex-
tensive investigation of the Challen-
ger accident to determine the prob-
able cause and necessary corrective
actions. Based on the findings and determinations
of its investigation, the Commission has
" hh'animousfy adopted recommendations to help
assure- the- return ;t._.'safe flight.
g
The Commission urges that the Administrator
of NASA submit, one year from now, a report
to the President on the progress that NASA has
made in effecting the Commission's recommen-
dations set forth below:
B
m
° w
Design. The faulty Solid Rocket Motbrjoint and
seal must be changed. This could be'a new design
•"eliminating thejgint, or a redesign of the current
joint .and seal. No design options should be
prematurely precluded because of schedule, cost
or reliance on existing hhrdware. All Solid Rocket
Motor joints should satisfy the following
requirements:
• The joints should be fully understood, tested
and verified.
• The integrity of the structure and of the seals
of all joints should be not less than that of the
case walls throughout the design envelope.
• The integrity of the joints should be insensitive
to:
-Dimensional tolerances.
-Transportation and handling.
--Assembly procedures.
--Inspection and test procedures.
-- Envirani'nental effects.
-Internal case operating pressure.
-Recovery and reuse effects.
-Flight and water impact loads•
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The certification of the- new design should
include:
--Tests which duplicate the actual launch con- -
o.
figuration as closely as possible.
--Tests over the full range of operating con-
ditions, including temFerature.
• Full consideration should be given to conduct-
ing static firings of the exact flight configura-
tion in a vertical attitude.
Independent Oversight. The A_ministrator of
NASA should request the National Research
Council to form an independent Solid Rocket
Motor design oversight committee to implement
the Commission's design recommendations and
oversee the design effort. This committee should:
• Review and evaluate certification require-
ments.
• Provide technical oversight oPthe design, test
program and certification.
,+,.
• Repbrt to the Adminisiratbr of NASA on the
adequacy of the design and make appropriate
recommendations.
lib
Shuttle Management Structure. The Shuttle
Program Structure should be reviewed. The proj -'-'\
ect managers for the various dements of the Shut-
de program felt more accountable to their center
m_.._anagement than to the Shuttle program organi-
ration. Shuttle element funding, work package
de__finition, and vital program information fre-
q_u__tly bypass the National STS (Shuttle) Pro-
grarr£ Manager.
A redefinition of the Program Manager's respon-
sibility is essential. This redefinition should give
the Program Manager the requisite authority for
all ongoing STS operations. _Program funding
and all Shutde Program work at the-.centers
should be placed clearly under the Program
Manager's authority.
Astronauts in Management. The Commission
observes that there appears to be a departure from
the phildsoph_ of the 1960s and 1970s relating
to the use of astronauts in management positions.
These individuals brought to their positions flight
experience and a keen appreciation of operations
and flight safety.
• NASA should encourage the transition of
qualified astronauts into agency management
positions.
• • The function of the Flight Crew Operations
director should be elevated in the NASA orga-
nization structure.
Shuttle Safety Panel. NASA should establish an
STS Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS
Program Manager. The cha._er of this panel
should include Shuttle operational issues, launch
commit criteria, flight rules, flight readiness and
risk management. The panel should include
r_ from the safety organization, mis-
sion operations, and the astronaut office.
i
. III
o "-'" "w
Criticality Revie_ and Hazard Analysis. to flight to ensure mission success and flight safe-
NASA- and the.; primary Shuttle contractors . ty. An Audit Panel, appointed by the National
_hould review all Criticality 1, IR; 2, and 2R Research Council, should v_rify the adequacy of
items and hazar_i..analyses. This review should the effort and report directly to the Administrator
identify those item_ that must be improved prior of NASA: --
Safety Organization. NASA should establish an
Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality
Assurance to be headed by an Associate Ad-
ministrator, reporting directly to the NASA Ad-
ministrator. It would have direct authority for
safety, reliab, ility, and quality assurance
throughout the agency. The office should be
assigned the work force to ensure adequate over-
sight of its functions and should be independent
of other NASA functional and program
responsibilities.
i
The responsibilities of this office should include:
• The safety, reliability and quality assurance
functions as they relate to all NASA activities
and programs. :
• Direction of reporting and documentation of
problems, problem resolution and trends
associated with flight safety.
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•mproveB-Communicatlons. The Commission l
found that Marshall Space Flight Center project
managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to
management isolation, failed to provide full and
timely information bearing on the safety of flight
51-L to other vital elements of Shuttle program
management.
• NASA should take energetic steps to eliminate •
)this tendency at Marshall Space Flight Center,
-_,hether by changes of personnel, organiza-
tion, indoctrination or all three.
A policy should be developed which governs
the imposition and remova! of Shuttle launch
constraints.
• Flight Readiness Reviews and Mission
Management Team meetings should be
recorded.
The flight crew commander, or a designated
representative, should attehd the Flight
Readiness Review, participate in acceptance
of the vehicle for flight, and certi_, that the
crew is properly prepared for flight.
" Landing Safety. NASA must take actions to ira- •
prove landing saf_t),.
• The tire, brake and nosewhee] steering systems
must-be improved. These Systems'do not have
sufficient safety margin, particularly at abort
landing sites.
• The specific conditions under which planned
-'landings at Kennedy would be acceptable
should "be determined. Criteria must be
• established ,for fires, brakes arid nosewheel .
-: steering. Until the systems meet-those criteria
in high fid_Litg testing that is verified at
Edwards, lan'ding at Kennedy should not be
planned. "-
Committing to a specific landing site requires
that landing area weather be forecast more
than an hour in advance. During unpredict-
able weather periods at Kennedy, program of-
ficials should plan on Edwards landings. In-
creased landings at Edwards may necessitate
a dual ferry capability.
VII
Launch Abort and Crew Escape. The Shuttle
program management considered first-stage abort
options and crew escape options several times
during die history of the program, but because
of limited utility, technical infeasibility, or pro-
gram cost and schedule, no systems were im-
plemented. The Commission recommends that
NASA:
• Make all efforts to provide a crew escape
system for use during controlled gliding flight.
• Make every effort to increase the range of flight
conditions under which an emergency runway
landing can be successfully conducted in the
event that two or three main engines fail early
in ascent.
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Flight Rate. The nation's reliance on the Shut-
de as its principal space launch capability created
a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the
flight rate. Such reliance on a single launch
- capability should be avoided in the future.
NASA must establish a flight rate.that is consis-
tent with its resources. A firm payload assignment
policy should be established. The policy should
include rigorous controls on cargo manifest
changes to limit the pressures such changes exert
on schedules and crew training.
A
m IX m
Maintenance Safeguards. Installation, test, and
maintenance procedures must be especially
rigorous for Space Shuttle items designated
Criticality 1. NASA should establish a system of
analyzing and reporting performance trends of
such items.
Maintenance procedures for such items should
be specified in the Critical Items List, especially
for those such/as the liquid-fueled main engines,
which require unstinting maintenance and
overhaul.
!
".. ,b.
77ze Commission urges that. NASA conlin_ to receive
the support of thg'ddministration and the nation. The
agency constitutes a national resource that plays a critical
role in space exploraKbn and development. It also pro_
oides a symbol of natiimal pride and technological
kad_ship.
With regard to the Orbiters, NASA should:
• Develop and execute a comprehensive
maintenance inspection plan.
• Perform periodic structural inspections when
scheduled and not permit them to be waived.
• Restore and support the maintenance and
spare parts programs, and stop d,ie practice of
removing parts from one Orbiter to supply
another.
Concluding Thought ......... ,.......
The Commission ap/flauds "NASA's spectacular achiev e-
menls of the past and anticipates impressive achievements
to come. The findings and recommendations presented in
this report are intended to contribute to the future NASA
successes that the nation both ¢x,pects a_d requires as the
21st century approaches. •
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APPENDIX VI B
ROGERS COMMISSION REPORT MILESTONES
The intent of the development of milestones for
recommendations II, V, and the Flight Decision Process is to
outline the relevent references in the Roger's Commission's
Report Volume I (here-to-fore referred to as the Report)
pertaining to the above, and to provide a reference to the
location of such material within the Report.
To facilitate the task, recommendations II and V were
broken down into their major parts. References in the Report
pertaining to these parts were noted in addition to those
relating to the Flight Decision Process. These were then
later grouped under the following headings:
Recommendation II
Management Structure (M)
Astronauts in Management (A)
Shuttle Safety Panel (S)
Recommendation V
Communication problems at Marshall (C)
Launch Constraint Policy (LCP)
Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
Flight Crew Representation (FCR)
Flight Decision Process (F)
In the following pages, these milestones are presented
in tabular form, preceeded by a summary and explanation of
the tabulated information where applicable. No references to
the Appendices were included directly in the milestone tables
as key quotes/information of the Appendices are provided in
the main body of the Report referenced by the milestones, and
all milestones are listed in order of appearance in the
Report.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION II
establish a STS
Program Manager.
presented to the
The Commission's Recommendation II addresses the need to
review the STS management structure, encourage the transition
of qualified astronauts into agency management positions, and
Safety Advisory Panel reporting to the STS
In order to determine what evidence was
Commission that led to these
recommendations, the Rogers Commission Report was reviewed to
find this information. This evidence is presented here in
the form of milestone charts.
the following convention:
astronauts in management,
Panel, code "S".
The Commission
project managers for
Each chart
management
is labeled using
structure, code "M" ;
code "A" ; and Safety Advisory
states in Recommendation II that the
the various elements of the Shuttle
program felt more accountable to their center management than
to the Shuttle program organization, and that shuttle element
funding, work package definition, and vital program
information frequently bypass the NSTS Program Manager.
Also, a definition of the Program Manager's responsibility is
necessary, giving him the requisite authority for all ongoing
STS operations and program funding.
that the bypassing of information
Manager could also be
Recommendation V, which
However, it was noted
from the NSTS Program
considered as pertaining to
deals with improved communications.
Therefore, all Recommendation II
to the lack of information flow
and upper management Levels I and II.
Another point in Recommendation
transition of qualified astronauts into
type "M" references allude
between Level III management
crews in the Report.
On the subject
issues raised in the
of the Shuttle Safety Panel,
Report immediately relating
subject are given in pages 160 to 161, where the Commission
considers the efforts of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
to be "not sufficiently specific and immediate", and that the
merger of the Space Shuttle Program Crew Safety Panel in 1981
left the STS program with "no focal point for flight safety",
thus the need for a new safety organization.
It should be noted that from a broader perspective, the
Commission's recommendation on the need for the Shuttle
Safety panel basically arises
issues uncovered during the
majority of which appears in
from the many safety related
investigation and review, the
chapter VII of the Report.
the key
to this
positions. It also suggested that the function of the Flight
Crew Operations director should _ be elevated in the NASA
organization. Recommendation II type "A" citations primarily
indicate evidence that increased astronaut input would
improve the NASA decision making process. Also, passages that
suggest possibly detrimental effects on shuttle crews through
the lack of astronaut input have been noted. However, these
citations do not indicate every specific mention of shuttle
II concerned the
agency management
Therefore, in generating the milestones, all references to
safety related items are considered. Milestones pertaining
to problems in management, astronaut concerns, communication
failures, and other flight decision process inadequacies are
deemed to be related to the Shuttle Safety Panel issue but
are not repeated again in the milestone table on safety
unless it is considered to be of special significance.
m
Shuttle Management Structure Milestones - Page 1
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
Those Making The Decision To Launch Were
Unaware Of The SRB O-Ring Problem And Did
Not Have A Clear Understanding Of
Rockwell's Concern About Ice On The Pad
Testimony Revealed NASA Management
Structure That Permitted Internal Flight
Safety Problems To Bypass Key STS Managers
Relevant Concerns Of Level III NASA Mgmt.
Not Adequately Communicated To The NASA
Level I and II Mgmt.
Launch Constraints Imposed By Mulloy Not
Communicated To Level I Or II Mgmt.
Separate and Independent Paths Of System
Reporting Of SRB Joint Anomalies
Discussion Between Mulloy, Lucas, And
Reinartz On Temperature Effects On O-Rings
Lucas Statement Saying Mulloy-Lucas-
Reinartz Meeting Was Not A Proper
Reporting Channel
MTI-Lucas Discussion 53F Launch Temp.
Limit For SRBs
Aldrich Statement That SRB Data Not Sent
To Level II Mgmt. By Levels I Or III
Aldrich Statement That Budget Does Not
Come Through Level II Mgmt.
Commission Findings Of Management
Isolation And Bypassing
Conversation Between Mulloy, Lucas, And
Kingsbury On Temperature Effects On
O-Rings And Final Resolution
I
Lovingood-Lee Conversation On The Events
Surrounding MTI's Written Recommendation
To Launch 51L
82 1 1 2-15
82 1 3 1-7
83 2 2 2-16
84 2 1 1-5
84 2 2 1-17
I00 1 3 i-8
I01 1 6 1-7
I01 2 6 1-6
102 1 2 1-13
102 1 5 1-9
104 2 1 i-i0
iiO 3 8 1-3
109 3 14 1-3
Shuttle Management Structure Milestones - Page 2
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
STS-2 SRB O-Ring Erosion Not Reported In
Level I FRR For STS-3 On 3/9/82
Marshall Monthly Problem Reports Not
Distributed To Level II Management
SRB Launch Constraint Not Communicated
To Level I Or II Management Contrary To
Problem Reporting & Corrective Action
Report
125 2 3 9-13
159 2 3 1-5
154 1 4 1-4
Astronauts in Management Milestones
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
Rogers Commission Concern For Shuttle
Astronauts
Compressed Training Time Of 51L
Crew Resulted In Peaks Of 65 To
70 Work Hours Per Week
51L Launch Weather Conditions And
Effects Not Discussed With The Crew
515 Crew Unaware Of Hazardous, Icy
Emergency Escape Routes
Chief Astronaut John Young's
Description Of His Awareness Of
SRB O-Ring Problems
51L Crew Unaware Of Orbiter Wheel
Brake Failure On Mission 61C
Space Shuttle Program Crew Safety
Panel Discussion
Crews On Flights Scheduled After 51L
Would Have Had Significantly Less
Training Time For Their Flights
Astronaut Henry Hartsfield Testimony
On Extremely Short Training Time
Commission Findings Of An Unacceptable
Compression of Time For Accomplishment
Of Crew Training
Crew Members Recommend That The
Orbiter Nosewheel Steering System
Be Modified To Achieve Full Redundancy
John Young Testifies That Shuttle
Brakes Are Difficult To Use
Captain R. Crippen Testifies That The
Astronaut Office Would Not Disagree
With The Premise That One Is Safe_
Landing At Edwards AFB Than Kennedy
1 1 5 5-9
15 1 3 1-8
17 2 3 3 -8
118 1 2 I-i0
135 Figure 4 1-2
160 1 2 3-7
161 1 1-4 all
170 1 1 8-12
170 1 2 i-ii
176 2 3 7-10
4 22-25187 2
188 2 4 1-9
191 i 3 4-12
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAFETY PANEL - PAGE 1
Milestone Page Col. Para.
Commission's mandate 1
Commission's focus 1
Compressed training time 15
Na indication of problems during 51-5 18
II 18
NO survivable abort options during SRB thrusting 18
Flt. safety problems bypass key Shuttle managers 82
O-ring erosion not believed to be critical 85
Findings on flawed decison process 104
II z04
Findings on ambiguous decision process 117
II 118
Accepting O-ring design problem as
acceptable flight risk 120
No further testing of O-ring performance
when "joint rotation" was observed 122
// 123
NASA flying "not well understooded" motors 132
Increasing joint test pressure 134
Assumption of backup available when system
classified with criticality 1 136
Limited/incorrect consideration of past
O-ring damage(temperature) data 145
// 146
Findings on past O-ring damage(temperature)
data 148
Lack of representation of safety staff
on significant launch related decisions 152
Ineffective safety, reliability, and quality
assurance programs after the lunar program 152
4 out of 5 "failures" of NASA as described by
Aldrich to the commission relates directly
to faults in the safety program 152
" II 152
Commission's overview of SR/QA's role in NASA 152
Commission's overview of the faults of SR/QA
in JSC, KSC, and Marshall 153
Lack of reference from the SRB critical item
list to the Operational Maintenance
Requirements and Specifications 153
Operations and Maintenance Instruction doesnot
indicate criticality of components 153
Level II lost insight into safety issues
resulting from a change in problem reporting
approved by Level II in 1983 154
Lines
1 5 1-5
2 1 6-10
1 3 all
1 1 1-3
2 1 1-3
2 2 all
1 3 all
1 3 all
1 1 3-6
1 2 1-2
2 4 13-15
1 1 6-7
1 1-3 all
1
all
2 6 20-25
1 1 all
1 1 25-28
1 ii all
1 4 4-9
i0
all
5
1
3
1
2-5
1-4
2
3
1-4
1
1
2
2
all
all !
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
8-14
6-9
all
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON SAFETY PANEL - PAGE 2
L
Milestone Page Col. Para.
Lack of clear and concise reporting for in-
flight anomalies 154 i 5
// 154 2 1-2
Commission's view on reporting for in-flight
anomilies 154 2 3
// 155 1 1-2
Inadequate SR/QA resources and its
inappropriate location in Marshall limited
its effectiveness to prevent the accident
of 51-L 155 1 3-4
Inadequate inappropriate trend analysis 155 1 5
// 155 2 1-4
// 156 1 1-2.
// 156 2 1
Misrepresentation of criticality and lack
of management awareness 156 2 2
// 157 all all
// 158 all all
// 159 1 all
// 159 2 1
Failure "in reporting launch constraints to
Levels II and I by Marshall 159 2 2-3
Faulty implications of an "Operational"
program reduced SR/QA functions in NASA 159 2 4
// 16o l 1
Shuttle program moving too fast relative to
its SR/QA support 160 1 2
Strengthening of NASA's SR/QA functions 160 1 3-4
Overview of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel and its duties 160 2 1-3
Functions of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, and that the Panel's "efforts were
not sufficiently specific and immediate to
prevent the 51-5 accident" 160 2 ' 4
Overview of the Space Shuttle Program Crew
Safety Panel, and that after the merger
of the panel in 1981, "the NASA Shuttle
Program had no focal point for flight
safety" 161 1 1-4
The need for a new safety organization 161 2 1
Findings on NASA's SR/QA organization 161 2 2-7
Pressure to meet customer commitments may have
obscured engineering concerns 165 1 1
Changes in manifest pushes the system to its
limits 170 1 1-2
Lines
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
1-6
all
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONSON SAFETY PANEL - PAGE 3
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
Lack of "operational" capabilities to support
increased flight rate placed strain on the
system, depicted by a liquid oxygen depletion
incident on 1-6-86 171 1 2 all
NASA's "can-do" attitude towards challenges 171 2 1 all
Commission's view on attitude towards NASA's
challenges 173 1 2-3 all
Lack of spare parts to support the flights
due to fund contentions 173 2 3-4 all
Cannibalization is threat to flight safety 174 1 1-2 all
Post flight inspection should preceed
subsequent launch 174 2 4 5-12
// 175 1 1 14-17
Payload safety concerns 175 2 1 all
Findings on pressures on the system to support
the flight rate: system capability stretched
to the limit, spare parts shortage, late
manifest changes, training simulator could be
the bottleneck, and lack of review of
preceeding flight's anomilies 176 2 3-5 all
// 177 1 1-3 all
Other safety concerns not related to the
51-L accident 178 1 1 all
Shuttle design do not require survivable
abort options in certain cases during ascent 180 1 1-2 all
Philosophy of assured first stage ascent 180 1 5 1-6
Orbiter seperation not useful during SRB burn 180 2 3-4 all
Thrust termination is key to successful first-
stage abort 181 2 2 all
Orbiter ditching not survivable, as expressed
by Griffin and Weitz 182 1 1-4 all
Further study of crew escape options warranted 184 1 3 all
Range safety data inadequate for decision 185 2 2 all
Mission control had no warning of 51-L problem
before vehicle disintegrate 186 1 1 1-3
// 186 1 3 6-9
Findings on the ascent flight safety 186 2 1 all
Abort site weather concerns 186 2 3 10-13
// 187 1 1 all
Orbiter brakes have little safety margin 188 1 5 all
Brakes difficult to use as expressed by Young 188 2 4 all
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel's concerns
over the Orbiter braking system 189 2 1 all
// 189 2 3-4 all
KSC landings concerns • 191 2 5 all
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONSON SAFETY PANEL - PAGE 4
Milestone Page Col. Para.
mumm
Overall views on Orbiter landing concerns 191 2 6
// 192 1 1-2
Implementation of high-pressure pump
improvements important 192 2 1
Increase engine tests 192 2 2
Concerns over disconnect valves between ET
and Orbiter 192 2 3
Concerns over vent valves in ET 192 2 4
Structural inspection concerns 193 1 3-4
Errors in records 193 1 5
Missed documentation/requirements 193 2 1-7
Inspection by proxy 193 2 8
Accident damage not consistently reported 194 1 1
Launch pad 39B safety issues 194 1 2
// 194 2 1
Direct involvement of contractors in pre and
post flight processing desirable 195 2 2
Lines
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION V
The commission's recommendation
communication primarily focuses around
concern :
V on
four general
improved
areas of
i. First, the commission points toward the management
isolation at Marshalls. It point at the various flaws
in decision making process and the failure to inform and
report numerous anomalies and launch constraints to
level I and II. The commission concludes that the
failure of Marshalls to communicate flight constraints,
anomalies and concerns by Thiokol resulted in the bad
decision by NASA management. It recommends that
energetic steps should be taken to eliminate this
tendency at Marshalls.
ii. Second, the commission found an incohesive policy
toward the imposition and removal of launch constraints.
It found that the waivers were repeatedly signed without
informing level I and II. Similarly some of the
problems were being closed without actually finding a
proper solution. The commission also found it mandatory
to have a post-flight inspection list.
iii. Third, the commission found a lot of ambiguity in the
way people understood the same conversation. In this
iV.
regard, it specifically
incidence in which
different way. It
proceedings of the
refers to Rockwell and NASA
each understood the other in a
therefore recommends that the
Flight Readiness Review and Mission
Management meetings should be recorded.
Fourth, the commission fmund a surprise absence of
astronauts from all of the Flight Readiness Review
process. It found that the crew was not informed of the
effect of low temperatures and were unaware of the
anomalies in the system. The commission found that the
crew of 51-5, which was to land at KSC, was also not
informed of the brakes problem in the previous landing
at KSC. It therefore saw the need for a new safety
panel with crew given proper representation. The
commission also recommends that the flight crew
commander, or a designated representative, should attend
the Flight Readiness Review, participate
of the vehicle, and certify that the crew
prepared for the flight.
in acceptance
is properly
The first- and the last recommendations are deemed
necessary by the commission to improve communication within
the organization so that a better decision can be made and a
disastrous decision such as that of 51-L can be avoided. The
other two recommendations on communication are more in line
of providing a safeguard for such a plan.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
C
LCP
FRR
FCR
COMMUNICATION
LAUNCH CONSTRAINT POLICY
FLIGHT READINESSREVIEW
FLIGHT CREW REPRESENTATION
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMMUNICATION
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
Flaws in the decision making process 82 1 1-3 all
Inadequate communication to level I and II 83 2 2 2-16
Marshall failure to inform level I and II 84 2 2 all
// 85 1 1-2 all
// 85 2 1 all
// 88 1 7 all
Thiokol's reasons for reversing the decision 94 2 3 9-17:
Mulloy's reasons for not communicating to L-I 98 1 2-4 all
Management isolation at Marshalls I01 1-2 all
// 102 1 1-2 alll
// 103 2 11-12 all
Commission's findings on decision making flaws 104 1 1 all _
// 104 2 2 all _
Marshalls failure to report previous anomolies 125 2 3 all
NASA's awareness to O-ring problems 135 2 4 Figure 4 i
// 136 2 1 all!
// 138 2 3 13-21
Marshalls failure to report previous anomolies 141 2 1 all
// 147 1 1 all
// 147 2 2 all
Marshalls failure to report launch constraints 147 2 3 13-20
// 148 1 1 19-23
Commission's findings on joint design 148 1 2 all
Description of comm. system failure by Aldrich 152 1 2 all
Management isolation at Marshalls 154 1 3 all
Anomalies reporting at NASA 155 1 1-2 all
Management awareness of the seal problem 156 2 2 4-19
Misinformation about joint seals 159 1 5 all
Misinformation about seal launch constraint 159 2 2 1-9
// 159 2 3 all
Improper documentation of problems 161 2 4,7 all
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONSON LAUNCH CONSTRAINTS POLICY
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
Six consecutive waivers prior to 51-L without 84 1 5
informing Moore or Aldrich 84 2 1
Commission's findings on launch constraints 104 1 2
waivers 104 2 1
Signing-off of waivers on previous occasions 128 1 1
Launch constraints and sub. waivers by Mulloy 137 1 6-7
// 137 2 1-2
// 138 2 3
Closing of unsolved O-ring problems 142 1 7
// 143 2 4-9
Commission's findings on waivers record 148 2 4
Need for mandatory post-flight inspection list 175 1 1
5-12
all
all
all
all
all
all
1-12
all
all
all
all
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON FLIGHT READINESS REVIEW
Milestone Page Col. Para.
Flight Readiness Review for flight 51-L 15 2 1
Confusion in communication between Rockwell 115 1 2
// and NASA 115 2 1-4
// 116 1 1-6
// 117 1 6
Commission's findings about comm. confusion 117 2 3
// 117 2 4
Lines
all
all
all
all
all
1-6
all
MILESTONES OF RECOMMENDATIONS ON FLIGHT CREW REPRESENTATION
Milestone Page Col. Para.
No information to 51-L crew about low temp. 17 2
// 118 1
Chief Astronaut's infor, about O-ring problem 135 2
No brake problem information to 51-L crew for 160 1
KSC landing
Program crew safety panel's role • 161 1
Need for new safety organization 161 2
Compression of the training schedules 164 2
// 165 2
// 17o l
1,3,4
1
1
6
1-2
Lines
3 3-8
2 all
1 Figure 4
2 1-7
all
all
6-11
8-14
all
FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS
The Commission's criticisms on the Flight Decision
Process are concentrated in chapter V of the Report (pg. 82
to 119). Major issues seemed to center around the failure of
the system to communicate critical safety related issues to
management responsible for launch decisions, and that NASA's
decision to launch given the data that they had is flawed.
In generating the milestones for this subject, all
milestones included in
Decision Review, and
Launch Constraint Policy, Flight
Flight Crew Representation are
considered to be part of the milestones for Flight Decision
Process but are not seperately listed here: Similar ratiQnal
applies to the milestones pertaining to problems in
communication, management structure, astronaut issues, and
other safety issues if one takes a broader view of the
decision process.
Description of the "informal decision process" (outside
of formal meetings) during the pre-flight activities of 51-L
given in chapter V are not included in the milestones. The
part of the decision process between MTI and Marshall is also
not included here.
4
MILESTONES OF FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS - PAGE 1
Milestone Page Col. Para.
Overview of flight preparation activities
for 51-L 13 1 5-6
// 13 2 all
// 14 1-2 all
// 15 1 l-4
Overview of Level I FRR for 51-L 15 1 5-6
II 15 2 1-3
Three launch delays of 51-L 17 1 1-4
Description of pre-launch activities of 51-L 17 1 5-6
II zv 2 l-5
The launch decision was flawed, those who made
the decision were not aware of critical
safety problems and contractor concerns 82 1
// 82 1
Failure in communication and management
structure resulted in the flawed decision
to launch 82 1 3
Overview of the FRR 82 2 1-3
// 83 1 all
// 83 2 1
Crucial contractor concerns not communicated
from level III to Levels I and II 83 2 2
Notifications of FRR sent for 51-L 84 1 1-2
Post FRR directives from Moore and Aldrich 84 1 3-4
O-ring launch constraint waivers 84 1 5
II 84 2 1
O-ring anomilies not included in FRR 84 2 2
O-ring problems not included in Certification
of Flight Readiness 85 1 1,2
Mission management team's meetings, discussions
on weather related matters 85 2 2-4
Mr. Reinartz admitted his decision of keeping
MTI's concern on temperature effects on O-ring
problems to level III 88 1 3-8
MTI being put in a position to prove that NASA
shouldnot launch (Boisjoly's opinion) 93 1 5
// 93 2 1
MTI being put in a position to prove that NASA
shouldn't launch (Lund's opinion) 94 2 2-4
Mulloy's rationale for not discussing O-ring
problem with Aldrich 98 1 4
Aldrich's testimony on failure of the decision/
communication system I01 2 9-11
// 102 all all
// 103 1 all
II 103 2 l
.
2
Lines
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
1-6
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
all
12-17
all
all
all
all
3-8
all
all
all
all
all
all
MILESTONES OF FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS - PAGE 2
Milestone Page Col. Para. Lines
Thomas's comments on not launching should the
relationship of temperature and seal was
available to him
Findings on the flawed decision process
Freeze protection plan for launch pad
not followed for 51-L
Rockwell felt unsafe to launch due to ice
conditions (testimony by Petrone, Glaysher,
and Cioffoletti)
//
//
Ambiguity in the flight decision process
(Rockwell's unsafe-to-fly position)
//
Ambiguity in Rockwell's position (Lamberth's
testimony)
//
Aldrich's testimony concerning the decision
_to launch in view of Rockwell's ambiguity
//
//
Findings on the decision to launch, that
Rockwell's position was ambiguous, that
NASA didnot considered Rockwell's input
appropriately, that the freeze plan was
inadequate, and that ice on the crew
emergency slide wire baskets was harzardous
//
O-ring criticality change and subsequent
waiver by NASA (lunney's testimony)
//
//
41-B O-ring erosion briefed as "technical
issue" in Level I FRR
O-ring blow-by and erosion considered
"acceptable" in Level I FRR
61-A O-ring anomalies not mentioned in
Level I FRR for 61-B
Overview of FRR and its objectives
//
FRR inattention to O-ring problems from
STS-2 through 41-B
Discussion of o-ring problems from 41-B
through 51-F in FRR's
//
103 2 8-13
104 I-2 all
114 1 ,i
114 2 1-7
115 1 1-5
115 2 1-2
115 2 3-7
116 1 1-6
all
all
9-24
all
all
all
all
all
116 1 7-8 all
116 2 1 all
116 2 2-5
117 1 1-6
117 2 1
117 2 2-4
118 all all
127 1 5-6
127 2 I-i0
128 1 1
132 1 6
136 2 1
141 2 1
145 2 3-6
147 1 1-2
147 1 3-4
147 1 5-6
147 2 all
all
all
all
alll
all
all
ali
all
1-6
a11_
all
all
all
all
all
all
MILESTONES OF FLIGHT DECISION PROCESS - PAGE 3
Milestone Page Col. Para.
Commission's observation of trends in the
treatment of O-ring problems in FRR's 148 1 1
Finding's on the historical developments
contributing to the 51-5 accident 148 2 2-4
Lack of SR/QA in the flight decision process 152 1 1
Lines
all
all
all

APPENDIX VI C
AN INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE ON THE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE
CHALLENGER ACCIDENT
1.0 INTRODUCTION
On reviewing the Rogers' Commission Report to the
President, time and again, citations were listed which deal
with typical industrial engineering functions. The intent of
this paper is to point out many
Commission which relate to functions
industrial engineer. Additionally,
of the findings of the
of a modern, typical
the intent is to give
some idea of the scope and breadth of the Commission's work.
Being a relatively young discipline, industrial
engineering has sometimes suffered from a lack of recognition
and identification for its unique and increasingly important
role in this complex
we operate. While
engineering to the
manufacturing and service,
other engineers seem to
understanding of the work
content of the profession.
and ever changing environment in which
the contributions of industrial
industrial sector, particularly
have
have
effort,
Those
been well recognized, most
little awareness or
education, and skill
who. do profess to an
understanding often associate the profession with work study
and time and motion analysis, and have little appreciation of
the scope and depth of the skills that the modern industrial
engineer possesses. One of the real strengths of industrial
engineering which often is not
qualifications to serve as an
engineering design community and
recognized is its unique
interface between the
the business or production
world. Paradoxically, the inability to smooth the interface
between design and production is one of the recurring themes
of the Rogers' Report. Most IE's, because of their education
and work experience, have an understanding of both the design
and production sides of the system. For these and other
reasons, the Commission Report should be both educational and
useful to industrial and other engineers, and to engineering
noted
managers.
It should be
intend this paper to be critical
Program, and certainly
perfection of hind sight.
that the authors do not in any way
of NASA or the Shuttle
hope to avoid the twenty-twenty
The comments contained herein are
simply an in-depth examination of the Commission findings
concentrating on factors which are related to industrial
engineering and engineering management, and those related to
smoothing the interface between design and production. It
should also be pointed out that NASA has made 24 successful
flights with the Shuttle in an extremely hostile environment
with austere fiscal constraints. Their record of high
performance under difficult circumstances should not be
buried as an aftermath of the accident.
2.0 THE REPORT
The Commission Report consists of five volumes, the last
four of which consist primarily of appendices to support
volume one which contains the findings of the Commission. It
is the first volume which will be addressed in this paper.
The contents of volume one are illustrated in Table i. The
first four chapters discuss the accident and its
investigation, leading to the conclusion that the failure of
the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right Solid
Rocket Motor was the cause of the accident. These motors are
manufactured in segments by Morton Thiokol, shipped by rail
to Kennedy Space Center, and assembled there. The O-rings in
one of these field joints leaked and caused the accident.
The Commission went on to say that the failure was due to a
faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors
including temperature, physical dimensions, the character of
the materials, the effects of reusability, processing, and
the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading.
While all of the report is interesting and informative,
the first four chapters were primarily factual descriptions
of the Shuttle Program, the Challenger accident, and the
analysis of its mode of failure. It is from Chapter V
onwards that the root causes of the accident and other
contributing factors are discussed. These issues will be
discussed in the later parts of the paper.
Chapter I
IHTRODUCTI ON
• Cover• the topics of design, funding hi•tory, development,
element• of the •huttle, and flight of • space shuttle
Chapter II
EVENTS LEADING
UP TO THE
CHALLENGER
HZSSION
l_al• vith the events 1eading leading up to the Challenger
mission including crew aaslgnments, preparation• £or flight,
flight readiness review, launch delays, and the actual flight
of the Challenger
Chapter III
THE ACCIDENT
* Reports the actual accident vtth uumsrous photographs
• howing vhJt happened
Chap tar IV
THE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT
* Pre•ents the aualy•l• of the accident by identifying all
possible faults that could o_lglnste in [he flight element•
of the •pace shuttle
* Commi•slon concludes that the c•u•e of ChAllenger accident yes
the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field Joint of the
right Solid Rocket Hotor
Chapter V
THE
COHTRI BUTI HG
CAUSE OF THE
ACCIDENT
a Deals with the flaws and ambiguitie•in in the decision making
proces• leading to the launch of Flight 51-L
a Presents the testimony of the people Involved which shove
failure in the communication process
a Comm/•alon expresse• concerns •bout •afety
Chapter VI
AH ACCIDENT
ROOTED IN
HISTORY
a Discu•ae• the historical roots of the Solid Rocket Hotor Joint
seal problems from the early designs, tests, design objective•,
verificatioo and certification committee to criticality
cla•alflcation end change•
• Commission concludes that both NASA end t_Le\contrector failed to
understand end respond to facts obtained du_lng the testing and
internal w•rniugs of Joint problems
Chapter VII
THE SILENT
SAFETY PROGKAH
Covers problems found by the commission with the safety program
The commission recommends the form4tioo of a hey safety
organization in NASA
I
Chapter VIII I * Pressures relating to increased flight rate were uncovered by
| the commi•siou
PKESSURES ON J • Logistic• problem• and change• In the --nlfes t vere Important
THE SYSTEM I i [ema
Chapter IX * Discusse• the safety considers[ions like abort capabilities,
crew escape options, Landing options, ate.
OTHER SAFETY
CONSIDERATIONS
m m _ m m mm mllll _mmll mill mlllmlllllSmlmmllllmlmlmllll I lllml lllli llmlmmmSmllllll lmlllilllllll
TABLE l - ROGERS' COMMISSION REPORT CONTENTS
3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission concluded its work with nine
recommendations. These are illustrated in Table 2. A few
observations about these should help to illustrate the scope
of the Commission's work.
The work of the Commission was rather broad, and their
recommendations ranged from design considerations to
astronauts in management. The Commission called upon the
National Research Council to serve in an oversight capacity
in several places. The Commission did not confine itself to
just the accident; some of the recommendations deal with
issues that the Commission felt would be future problems and
some deal with things the Commission felt NASA just ought to
do. The Commission also urged NASA to respond to the
President in one year with a report showing the progress that
they had made in effecting the recommendations.
4.0 THE PROBLEMS
In order to bring perspective to the Commission
findings, a different organization of topics than those used
in the Report is beneficial. While the failure of the joint
in the aft segment of the Solid Rocket Motor was the cause of
the accident, there were numerous underlying problems
identified by the commission related to both the joint
problem and other safety or performance issues. The attempt
Recommendation
!
SOLID ROCKET
MOTOR DESIGN
* The Solid Rocket Hocor Joint sn8 seal must be changed
* List of standards that the SR_ design must meet
• Formation of en independent Nstionll Research Council Solid
Rocket Hotor committee to oversee the redesign effort
kecomeendation
II
• HANACEHEKT
STRU_RZ
ASTRONAUTS
IN NGMT.
* SAFETT pANEL
• Shuttle Program Structure should be reviewed
* Project Managers made to £•el more responsible to the Program
Heoager thin tO the various center where they ire located
* The Program Haneger's responsibility should be redefined
* Funding should be pieced under the Program _eoager's authority
• Astronauts should be used more in management
• A gaiety Advisory Panel should be formed which reports to the
Program flanegmr
i
Eeco0unendation * NASA and contractors should review all critical items end to
111 leek improvements
• An National Research Council Audit Panel should verify the
adequacy of the effort and report directly to the Administrator
of NASA
CRITICALITY
REVIEV
I
Reco=menda rind
• ZV
SAF£T¥
ORGANIZATION
• NASA should establish an Office of Safety, Reliability, and
Quality Assurance
• The of£ice should be headed by an Associate Admlnlstretor
reporting directly to the NASA Admlnlstrator
• The org. should be independent of other NASA responsibilities
Recommends tlon
V
IHPROVED
COHHUHICATIONS
* Hanagemant isolation at HarJhsll should be eliminated
• Development of a policy for the imposition and removal of
launch constraints
• High level mgmt meetings Just prior to launch should be recorded
* The flight trey commander should participate in these meetings
accepting the vehicle for flight and certifying the crew is
properly trained
Recommendation
Vl
LANDING SAFETY
• The tire, brake, and nosevheel steering systems must be improved
• Criteria for Kennedy landings, tires, brakes, and nosewheel
steering must be established
Recommendation • NASA should make all efforts to provide i crew escape system for
VII J use during controlled gliding flight
I • NASA should increase the range o£ flight conditions under which
LAUNCH ABORT an emergency runway landing can be made 11 the engines fall
& CREW ESCAPE
_e_m_mmm_mm_i_m_m_m_m_m_i_°_m_m_m_°im_°°_
Re¢ommendatlon
VIII
FLIGHT RATE
* Reliance on a single launch capability should be avoided
* The established flight rate must be consistent rich resources
• Establishment of a firm payload assignment policy
Recommends tion
ZX
HAINTEN/J_CE
SAFEGUARDS
• Eatabllahment of 8 system that analyzes and reports performance
trends for critical items
• Development of a.comprehensive maintenance inspection plan
• Performance of periodic structural inspections when scheduled
and not permit them to be waived
• Restore and support the maintenance end spare parts programs
• Stop the prattles of parts "cannlbelizatlon"
TABLE 2 - ROGERS' COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS ORIGINAL PAGE _S
OF POOR QUALITY
here is to
categories which should
engineer or industrial
safety, reliability, and
divide
be familiar to the
manager. These are:
quality assurance;
the discussion germane to this paper into
industrial
processing;
trending
analysis; logistics; and communications and management.
5.0 PROCESSING PROBLEMS
The processing of the Shuttle comes in two separate
parts. First there is the manifesting and integration of the
cargo, training, flight definition, data and control
development, and related items most of which are done at
Johnson Space Center (JSC). This processing is very complex
and involves long lead times, with the bulk of the work being
done in the 18 to 20 month time frame. At Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), the actual physical parts of the processing are
accomplished with some of the hardware such as Solid Rockets
and External Tanks being furnished as sub-assemblies by
contractors. Solid Rocket Motors are assembled, inspections
on equipment are performed, the Solid Rockets and external
tank are mated with the Orbiter, propellants are loaded, and
other processing steps are performed, leading up to the
actual launch. The control of the design and quality of some
of the sub-assemblies resides at other centers. As an
example, Marshali Space Flight Center (MSFC) has control of
the Solid Rocket Motors, the External Tanks, and the Space
e
Shuttle Main Engines. For the most part, it is only when the
,2
interface between a sub-assembly at one
assembly at another center is affected that
information between the centers about changes
occur.
center and a sub-
exchanges of
or problems
Designing fo____rproduction. One of the common problems of
processing is that of having a design which is conducive to
production. With NASA, as the Shuttle Program matured, the
fact that items were to be reused gave the agency a new set
of problems which they had not dealt with before. In
addition, the Shuttle is still developing and changing, yet
some of the early developmental contractors were excluded
from the processing contracts, thereby losing to NASA a
f
valuable experience base. Both of these are related to the
adage of "get the operators into the design and get the
designers into the operation".
Assembly. The Commission listed the following problems which
they felt would bear on the safety of future flights in their
discussion of assembly: for flight 51-L (Challenger) 40%+ of
the structural inspections were waived: a formal structural
inspection plan for the fleet had not been developed; waivers
were requested by Program management
delay; the inspectionrequirements were
there was a large amount of errors
papers; the operations maintenance
reviewing and updating;
to minimize flight
new and not mature;
in the work control
instructions needed
some requirements were not met,
INCREASED
PRODUCT10N
RATES
ASSEMBLY
CHANGING
MANIFESTS
_-'-_L DESIGNING
FOR
_ PRODUCTION _._-"_- _
--_.__ __._- _T EM ._-_
INCREASED LOAD AND PRESSURE ON
SYSTEM INCREASES RISK OF FAILURE
waived or excepted; some inspections were done by proxy
thereby reducing the effectiveness of independent inspection
of contractor work by NASA; and the damage reporting
procedure was changed, removing the forgiveness clause which
was thought to encourage reporting. Most of these comments
refer to common problems found in any routine processing or
manufacturing industry. However, routine processing is new
to NASA.
The above problems related to work documentation and
work control become more significant in light of the
sensitivity of the proper performance of the joint on the
Solid Rocket to its assembly. This assembly of sections of
the Solid Rocket could at best be described as tricky with
considerations having to be given tO
testing of O-rings, insulating putty,
out-of-round because of reusability.
proper seating and
and segments becoming
In fact one of the
conclusions of the Commission was that, among other things,
the joint design was unacceptably sensitive to processing.
Shoot the engineer _ Manifest Changes. A comment often heard
in the operations world is that someone should shoot the
engineer so that operations could get on with the job of
producing the product without having to deal with never-
ending design changes. In the Shuttle Program, these changes
bubble up as changes in the manifest. With the long lead
times of work at JSC, manifest changes occurring relatively
late in the process cycle cause a large amount of lost work
and rework. These changes were occurring routinely in the
Shuttle Program. Sore of these changes had a low priority
and all were using up the resources of the system. This in
turn increased the pressure on the system.
requires some degree of flexibility in
responsive to user needs, the Shuttle
relatively young, was having difficulty
large amount of variability induced by late changes to the
manifest. The stated lack of sensitivity of those directing
the changes to the impact of the changes is reminiscent of
the usual conflict between sales and production in many
While any product
order to remain
Program, being
dealing with the
industries.
Increasin_ the production rate. There are numerous reasons
why NASA wishes to have an increased flight rate: meeting
customer demand; flying scientific experiments; funding
considerations; supporting the space station; defense needs
etc. For whatever the reason, NASA has been planning and
moving to meet an accelerated flight rate and this has caused
processing problems. The beginning of these was perhaps when
NASA declared the Shuttle Program to be operational.
Operational to NASA seems to mean that a program has moved
out of the phase where the primary emphasis is on design
development and testing into a phase where the emphasis is
shifted towards satisfying the needs of users. What is new
for NASA with the Shuttle Program is the consideration of
having routine timely performance. While many managers may
have, in the Commission's view,
was still in an R/D phase, others
that it was operational.
misleading and may have
quality considerations.
forgotten that the Shuttle
were determined to prove
This concept of operational may be
lead to a reduction of safety and
Then the flight rate being increased
and projected to go higher caused the system to get further
and further behind. Time was being devoted to immediate
problems with little time left for long range problems. The
capabilities of the system were stretched to the limit to
meet the flight rate of the winter of 1985/1986, and would
have been exceeded in the spring/summer of 1986. Training of
astronauts and flight controllers was becoming inadequate
because of the increased rate. Projected schedules in the
Commission's view did not accurately reflect capabilities and
resources. Logistics-fell behind. There was no margin in
the system to accommodate hardware problems. The flight rate
was not adjusted to accommodate periods of adjustment for the
workforce. These problems were acerbated by the cascade
effect of a delayed launch. When a launch is delayed, other
than the obvious problems with some work at KSC having to be
put on hold until the current flight is out of the way, there
are design considerations concerning launch constraints which
must be reworked. Even a small delay ripples through the
system, causing an enormous amount of problems and unplanned
work. These problems are in turn increased if the time to
the next launch is short.
So the problem here is the common one of pressure on
operations to produce
With NASA, the processing system
regarding routine timely operations,
being encountered in dealing with
and to get the most out of a system.
is young, particularly
and difficulties were
this pressure and in
developing the capabilities to cope with the increasing rate.
One of the manifestations of this increased pressure was
the willingness by NASA to accept escalating risk. With the
joint seal, this meant that when the seal did not perform as
expected, they were willing to believe that this would not
lead to problems since the last poor performance did not lead
to any. Another manifestation was the willingness to fly
flight 51-L even though the launch pad was covered with ice
from the night before due to an inadequate ice protection
system. Along this same line, the increased rate was causing
anomalies from the immediately preceding mission to go
unresolved and misunderstood before the next mission was
launched.
6.0 SAFETY, RELIABILITY, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE (SR/QA)
The Rogers' Commission "focused'its attention on safety
aspects ... with the objective being to return to safe
flight" (page 152). The fact that SR/QA is of prime
importance to the Space Shuttle Program, and that its failure
was one of the underlying causes of the Challenger accident
is repeatedly reinforced by the Rogers' Commission throughout
the Report. It should be noted that from a broader
perspective, one could argue that all problems pointed out in
the Report, including those in management structures,
communications, flight decision process, engineering design
and testing, logistics etc. are inevitably safety issues
since one of the main emphasis on the Shuttle Program should
be safety.
SR/QA problems to those
stated them as such.
The Commission was
We will, however,
where
limit our discussion on the
the Commission explicitly
surprised to find the lack of SR/QA
representation on critical issues and launch decision
processes, that the "extensive and redundant" safety program
during the Apollo era had become "ineffective". In fact, the
Commission was amazed when they realized after many hours of
testimony that no SR/QA staff was ever mentioned. The
structure of the SR/QA organizations within NASA and its
centers, placing SR/QA under Engineering and Processing, the
very organizations whose
significantly reduced the
SR/QA in its "watch dog"
functions SR/QA was to monitor,
independence and effectiveness of
role. This was compounded by the
lack of commitment in resources, and a lack of centralization
and focus of the SR/QA
organization. In fact, the
reduced in NASA after the
"activities within the NASA
SR/QA staff was significantly
Shuttle Program was declared
"operational" after the four test flights. The need for a
"top-to-bottom" emphasis on SR/QA was deemed necessary by the
Commission in order for NASA to re-establish the key role
l
that SR/QA should play in the Space Program. Recommendations
II, III, and IV by the Commission specifically addressed
these issues (see Table 2), pointing to the need for a new,
independent SR/QA organization in NASA, headed by an
associate administrator, together with other related panels
to ensure the proper functioning of SR/QA and criticality
related issues.
The extent of the SR/QA involvement, or lack of it, in
the Challenger accident is further depicted in the testimony
given to the Commission by Arnold Aldrich, the Space Shuttle
Program Manager. He identified five major organizational /
communications problems in the program that had contributed
to the eventual failure in launching 51-L, four of which
relate directly to failure in the SR/QA program: inadequate
reporting requirements of problems; trend analysis problems;
criticality representation and tracking in the system; and a
lack of SR/QA involvement in the discussion of critical
issues. The Commission further reflected on its emphasis on
SR/QA at several points in the Report, and went as far as
stating that "an effective functioning SR/QA organization
could have taken action to prevent the 51-L accident" (page
155), and that "if the program (SR/QA) had functioned
properly, the Challenger accident might have been avoided"
(page 156). It is important to note that no other causes had
been identified by the Commission in
correction of which could have prevented
Another rationale for strengthening the
was tied to the need for an increased
the Report, the
the accident.
SR/QA function
flight rate. As
pointed out in the previous discussion, NASA currently lags
behind in its capability to move into the "operational" era.
As it attempts to move into the operational mode from a
traditionally R/D based posture, both R/D to operations and
SR/QA efforts must be significantly improved. It should be
noted that both SR/QA and operations management are part of
the regular IE's training and function. One does not have to
look too far to see that courses such as Quality
Control/Assurance, Reliability Engineering, and Safety
Engineering being regular, and very often required, courses
in the IE curriculum. The rigorous, mathematically based
analysis in these courses ensures the competence and
dominance of the IE in the practice of SR/QA relative to
other engineering disciplines.
Take Quality Control
statistically based methods
inspection, IE's also place
for example: besides the
developed for sampling and
emphasis on human reliability
aspects through their thorough
factors. The fact that it is not
figures of 25% or more among
understanding of human
uncommon to find error
the experienced quality
inspectors [G. K. Bennett, 1975] would certainly substantiate
the need for the modeling of human factors into Quality
Control schemes. One may even be able to apply these
concepts to the solution of the documentation error problems
as discussed earlier. The many theories developed in IE need
to be thoroughly understood before a successful SR/QA program
can be implemented.
7.0 TRENDING ANALYSIS (TA)
"Development of trend data is a standard and expected
function of any reliability and quality assurance program"
(page 156). This was reiterated in the Report at several
points. It was also linked to the possible prevention of the
51-L accident. Although considered to be part of the SR/QA
function, the importance of trending analysis as reflected in
the Report necessitates the separate discussion of the topic.
The main concern around trending analysis, or rather the
lack of such, has to do with the effect of temperatureand
the amount of blow-holes in the insulating putty on the O-
ring performance. The asbestos-filled putty was used in the
SRB to prevent the hot combustion gas .from damaging the O-
ring. Early on in the Shuttle Program, it was believed that
blow-holes in the putty contributed to O-ring erosion
problems. It was also believed that pressurized checks of
the O-rings created more blow-holes in the putty. There had
been changes in the pressurized checks from 50 psi to 200
psi, and if one was to plot the leak check pressure against
flight anomaly frequency (in terms of O-ring performance) as
the Commission did, the trend is rather apparent that O-ring
anomalies increase with higher leak check pressures.
The Commission found that out of 20 launches with
ambient temperatures of 66 degree Fahrenheit or greater, only
three showed signs of O-ring thermal distress; however, each
of the launches below 65 degrees Farenheit resulted in one or
more O-rings showing signs of thermal distress. The ambient
temperature at the time of launch of 51-L was 36 degrees
Farenheit, 15 degrees colder than any previous launches. O_
the limited considerations given to temperature effects on
the O-ring performance by NASA managers, the amount of O-ring
thermal distress per flight was charted against temperature
for ONLY those flights with O-ring anomalies. In such a
comparison, no trends were detected. However, when all the
flights were included in the chart by the Commission, the
effect of low temperature on the O-ring performance was
obvious, that "the probability of O-ring distress is
increased to almost a certainty if the temperature of the
joint is less than 65" (page 145).
Other than the abov_ mentioned trending/analysis
scenarios as discussed in the Report, one could extrapolate
the application of similar types of trending or data analysis
that would be of significant importance to the Space Shuttle
program as it matures into the operational phase. One item
that comes to rmind is the development of learning curves for
the various components of the system, which will enhance the
accurate planning for the operations mode in the future. It
will also be very useful in the analysis of flight rate
capability, an issue of major concern to the Commission.
Trending analysis can also be used to assist in logistics and
inventory control, which is also a key problem area as
discussed by the commission.
8.0 LOGISTICS
The problems in logistics within the
program are best illustrated through the
provisioning in support of the flight plans.
Space Shuttle
spare parts
Examples were
cited where a three-to-one ratio of future cost to current
savings in the deferral of spare parts provisioning was
common, and this ratio has gone up as high as seven-to-one in
some instances. The fact that NASA management
to cover "other more pressing activities"
implementing the logistic plans
flight rate again reflects a
importance of a system's view
implementation within the operations environment, where long
term, sustained and stable operating environment should take
precedence.
The practice
removed from one
devoted funds
rather than
to support the intended
lack of appreciation of the
point in the planning and
and bolts to a control actuator,
51-L flight.
The Commission is of the
were cannibalized for the
opinion that the Shuttle
of "cannibalization", in which parts were
orbiter to another as replacements, has
significantly threatened flight safety as extra handling and
installation are required. Extra time and cost are also
involved in the processing of the flights. The extent of
such practice can be seen if one considers the fact that 45
out of approximately 300 required parts, ranging from nuts
program is still in an R/D stage, instead of being
"operational". As such, the many problems the program
experienced could be attributed to a lack of an operational
capability, which in our opinion must be based on a sound
knowledge of operations
planning and analysis.
which illustrates the
still operating in NASA,
management type problems.
management and logistics based
"Cannibalization" is one example
project type management philosophy
amid many other operations
9.0 COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
The Commission showed its concern for
communication problems with 2 of the 9
addressed specifically to these issues.
others refer less directly to these type of concerns.
management and
recon%mendations
Several of the
Project versus process management. A comment of the
Commission was that NASA was having difficulty getting away
from a single flight focus; in other words, NASA could not
leave project management and engage in process management.
Much of the work at NASA is on a per flight basis. The
increased flight rate made this problem more severe. This
situation is similar to smoothing the flow of any product
from its design stage into production. While this is a
familiar problem to industry, it should be recalled that few
products have the complexity, cost, visibility, and potential
for impact on the reputation of the Nation as does the
Shuttle.
Budgets. Budgets and money with this program, as with any
program, caused problems. Here the problems included budgets
for some of the projects going through center directors and
not going through the Program Manager. In addition, money
had to be diverted from spare parts support in order to meet
the perceived more pressing needs of the increasing flight
rate. Another budgetary aspect was that costs and their
control was the first and most important concern of the
selection board which chose Morton Thiokol (MTI) as the
contractor for the Solid Rocket Motor.
Management isolation. The problem with isolation was
increased by the fact that the project managers often times
felt more responsibility towards center directors at JSC,
KSC, or MSFC, for example, than they do
Manager. In light of the budget structure,
surprising. In the Commission's view, the
Marshall was particu],arly
Manager, along with other
to the Program
this is not too
isolation at
critical information from Marshall.
had information indicating that
performing poorly and this was not
Manager's direct attention.
As an example, Marshall
the joint design was
brought to the Program
severe and resulted in the Program
key managers, not receiving
RID
ORIENT ATION
/,, ISOL AT ION
Y k,...,_.j)
ENGINEER
f VS 1
MANAGER
oPs
OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF
TRANSITION FROM RID
SMOOTH MANAGEMENT
TO OPERATIONS
En@ineer versus manager conflict. In any program which is
moving towards an operational environment, there are numerous
difficult decisions and judgement calls which must be made.
The question with an engineer turned manager often reverts
to: When should one think like an engineer and worry with
design considerations, and when should one think like a
manager and worry with operational considerations? On the
evening preceding the launch, the engineers at Morton Thiokol
became concerned with the effects of the predicted cold
temperature on the joints. The meeting that was held was at
the tail end of a long chain of concern by MTI engineering.
The result was that the engineers recommended not to launch
at the predicted cold temperature. Subsequently, several
meetings and tele-conferences were held with MTI management
and their NASA managers from Marshall. The result was that
management decided the temperature concerns were not
sufficient to cancel the launch. None of these concerns were
ever brought to the Program Manager's attention until after
the accident.
As a related problem, Rockwell,
built the Orbiter, was also concerned
the contractor which
about the ice on the
launch pad. In particular Rockwell felt that they did not
have sufficient time to research and resolve the ice problem.
However, in the Commission's view, their recommendation on
launching was ambiguous and poorly communicated to the NASA
officials in the flight decision process.
Perturbations in the system. On January
consolidated its entire contractor workforce
company. This came at a time when the system
i, 1986, JSC
under a single
was performing
at its full capacity to meet its 1986 flight rate. In some
of the areas, many of the contractor employees chose not to
change companies, leaving the consolidated contractor short
of needed critical skills.
Another problem was that NASA was experiencing a
reduction in skilled personnel caused by retirements, hiring
freezes, transfers to other programs such as the space
station, and transitioning to contractors. So the system was
changing while responding to an increased production rate
with a reduced number of skilled personnel.
Flaws in the decision process. The Commission concluded that
there was a serious flaw in the decision making process
leading up to the launch. They felt that the rising doubts
about the joint seal should have been flagged and brought to
management attention.
have occurred was in
where contractors meet
Program Manager, and Headquarters to consider
launch.
Because of increased erosion in the seals
A specific place where this should
the Flight Readiness Review meetings
along with NASA project offices, the
the upcoming
in the Solid
Rocket Motor joints, the project office at Marshall imposed a
launch constraint against launches after July of 1985.
However this constraint was subsequently waived for each
launch and the constraint was never communicated upward to
the Program Management or to Headquarters. All of these are
examples of communication problems in the system.
i0.0 CONCLUSIONS
Among the root problems identified by the Commission,
there is a close relationship and similarity between these
problems and the focus and functions of the industrial
engineer. Many of the problems are related to thetransition
of a program and its related product from an R/D environment
to an operational one. As the flight rate increased and
pressure developed, the system was having a difficult time
changing from the comfortable environment which it knew and
understood, that of research,
development to the relatively new
which it had little experience.
problems outlined in the Report
It would be difficult to say
design, testing, and
world of operations with
In fact, most of the
are operational in nature.
that the involvement of
IE's in the above situations could have changed the course of
events. However, one cannot deny the emphasis in industrial
engineering education on concepts related to these problems.
Processing, safety, work control, statistical modeling and
analysis, operations analysis, management, quality control,
and forecasting, to name a few are all IE subjects.
To pick a specific example, the emphasis {n both the
training and practice of the profession on statistical skills
Jf .
SYSTEM RELATIONS BETWEEN PROBLEMS
will increase the awareness to develop and analyze trends.
The normal undergraduate curriculum has two courses in
statistics not to mention the application of these
statistical concepts and skills in
division courses. Conversely, it
statistics course requirements in some
disciplines. A lack of statistical
detrimental to an engineer who has
changing and stochastic environment.
to point out that the statistical
to
It would
modeling
most of the other upper
is common to find no
other engineering
concepts could be
practice in an ever
be only fair
and analysis
skills of a typical IE would go beyond the simple trending of
data, and lead to the ability to perform an in-depth analysis
of the relevant factors involved.
Of course, the various problems identified by the
Commission as contributing causes of the 51-L accident are
interrelated. One can see that almost all of the problems
are common to the practice of industrial engineering,
indicating a strong need for an increase of IE awareness in
the NASA Organization.
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APPENDIX VIE
MAJOR PROSLEM$ RESULTING FROM A REVIEW OF THE ROGERS
COMMISSION REPORT PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
JLH 3 JULY 86
i. OPERATIONAL CONTROL IS HELD TOO CLOSELY TO THE TOP.
The control of the day-to-day running of the
organization is held too closely at the top of the management
structure. As long as the manager of the program is deeply
immersed in the day-to-day affairs of the program, then there
is insufficient time for the development of plans. Somehow
the manager needs to find the time to get out in front of the
organization. In order to do this it is essential that the
every day running of the organization be delegated to a
deputy manager. The manager's time should be spent dealing
primarily across and up the organizational structure and only
rarely down. I know of no other industry where the manager
spends anywhere near an equivalent amount of time with daily
operations as that spent by the manager of NSTS.
2. THERE IS A LACK OF DISCIPLINE IN THE SYSTEM.
The commission report, time and again, pointed out
instances of less than satisfactory paperwork in work control
documents, certification documents, and safety documents.
The facts that these errors would occur and be allowed to go
uncorrected is indicative of a lack of discipline in the
system. This item will be further addressed in the SRQA
section.
3. NASA'S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS CAUSED AND WILL
CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS.
NASA has very limited
programs. The more extensive
all had a limited horizon
specific number of flights
CONTINUE IO
experience with open ended
programs prior to the shuttle
and had been closed ended. A
was to be flown and the program
closed out thereafter. In addition, very little, if any, of
the hardware was to be reused. The Shuttle program, on the
other hand, is relatively open ended and uses reuseable
hardware. Another difference is that the Shuttle is basically
a transportation system.
The engineers at NASA are relatively old and relatively
inexperienced in a true operational environment. In addition
at this point in time it does not seem if the organization is
willing to change its outlook and learn operational skills.
Once the program was considered to be operational the
SR/QA function was assigned a diminished importance. This
concept is described by Rogers as if SR/QA was important as
long as the program was felt to developmental but an
operational program did not require the same amount of safety
structure or rigor within that structure.
NASA has a large amount of experience in
management but almost none in process management.
project
In a
truely operational era the mind set will have to be changed
to one of managing processes as opposed to thinking of the
work on a flight by flight basis. NASA would look at its
history but only consider how it applied to the next flight
as opposed to the process of flying as a whole. This leads
to a short term view point and works against developing an
overview of the work.
There is little if any crosstraining between the design
and the operations function. In addition there seems to be
no real awareness of the importance of this crosstraining or
any movement to initiate any such training.
i
4. THE SR/QA FUNCTION IS NOT EFFECTIVE.
The fact that numerous errors in the paper work were
allowed to go uncorrected is an important indicator of the
lack of effectiveness of the SR/QA function. The absence of
trend analysis and flying with
lends strength to this conclusion.
report to the operations management
magnitude and generates significant
effectiveness of the SR/QA function.
unresolved anomalies also
Having the SR/QA offices
is an error of large
pressure to reduce the
.
A well accepted principle
that cannibalization is almost
causes lost work and increases
inability of top level management
THE LOGISTICS FUNCTION IS WELL BEHIND.
in operations management is
always a mistake since it
turnaround time. The
to get out in front of the
program was probably the reason
behind. In addition inadequate
problem.
why logistics got so far
funding had a part in this
6. THERE WERE AND
PROBLEMS.
These problems
decision process and
MAY CONTINUE TO BE SEVERE COMMUNICATION
include the
extend deeper
management isolation at Marshall
magnitude of this problem.
joint problem, the flight
into the system. The
iS an example of the
7. THE MODERN MANAGERIAL ANALYTICAL SKILLS SEEM TO BE ABSENT
OR IN LITTLE USE. THIS CONCEPT PARTICULARLY EXTENDS TO
TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING CONCEPTS.
No trends analysis, distrust of statistics, little if
any knowledge of process management are a few of the examples
leading to this conclusion.
8. THE LINES
DIFFERENT.
The budget
center director.
OF AUTHORITY AND OF RESPONSIBILITY ARE
of the program manager goes through the
The elements that support the program at
different centers have their budgets go through different
centers. This helps to enforce isolation and can lead to
confused lines of responsibility.
9. THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM IS DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER PROGRAM
THAT NASA HAS DONE.
WERE SUCCESSFULWITH
DIFFICULTIES.
The shuttle program is different as has
previously. The natural tendency will be
methods which were successful in the past.
workforce is different
care should be used
particularly if they
environment and problem.
THE ATTE_PT TO RETREAT TO METHODS _ICH
PREVIOUS PROGRAMS MAY LEAD TO
and the problem is different.
older methods are
adapted to the
before
are not
been mentioned
to retreat to
However the
Great
employed
current
RECOM}IENDATIONS :
i. A DEPUTY MANAGER OF NSTS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED THE EVERY DAY
RESPONSIBILITY OF RUNNING THE PROGRAM.
2. SR/QA SHOULD BE ORGANIZED AS AN INDEPENDENT GROUP I_HICH
REPORTS ONLY TO MANAGEMENT AT THE VERY TOP, PERHAPS TO A
DEPUTY MANAGER OF NETS. THIS GROUP SHOULD HAVE SUFFICIENT
AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPPORT TO INSURE SAFETY. THIS
RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD INCLUDE TRENDS ANALYSIS AND REPORTING.
3. TRAINING IN
IMMEDIATELY.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS SHOULD BE BEGUN
4. CROSS TRAINING, CENTER TO CENTER,
DESIGN SHOULD BE BEGUN IMMEDIATELY.
AND OPERATIONS TO
.
SKILLS INTO THE ORGANIZATION SHOULD
ADDITION, AN OFFICE OF
ESTABLISHED AND REPORT
PROGRAM. THIS GROUP COULD THEN
PROBLEMS AS THEY ARISE.
A PROGRAM TO INFUSE NEW BLOOD _JITH INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING
BE BEGUN IMMEDIATELY. IN
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING SHOULD BE
DIRECTLY TO THE MANAGER OF THE
BE USED TO ADDRESS ISSUES AND
p
6. NSTS SHOULD BE PULLED OUT OF THE CENTER ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE WITH THE MANAGER OF NSTS GIVEN BUDGETARY CONTROL OF
ALL ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS. A STRUCTURE TO CONSIDER HERE IS
SUGGESTED BY THE WAY UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES ARE HOUSED ON
BASES BUT ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE BASE COMMANDER.
7. TRAINING IN MODERN MANAGERIAL COMMUNICATIONS SKILLS AS
WELL AS IN EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT NEED TO BE STARTED FOR TOP
LEVEL MANAGEMENT. THE TENDENCY FOR MANAGEMENT ISOLATION AS
WELL AS CLOSET DECISION MAKING WITH LITTLE EMPLOYEE
INVOLVEMENT MUST BE CHANGED.
8. THE U OF H TEAM, IN PARTICULAR, DR. HUNSUCKER, NEEDS TO
BE TIED CLOSER TO THE PROGRAM OFFICE AND HAVE ITS EXPOSURE
INCREASED. NO NEW EXPERIENCE, NO NEW INSIGHT.
9. NSTS NEEDS TO HAVE A DEPUTY MANAGER IN CHARGE OF
PLANNING.
i0. A TASK FORCE NEEDS TO BE ASSIGNED THE DUTY OF EVALUATING
THESE RECOMMENDATIONS,AS WELL AS EQUIVALENT RECOMMENDATIONS
FROM OTHER SOURCES, AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL. DR.
NEEDS TO APPEAR BEFORETHIS GROUPAND GIVEN THE
TO OFFER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR EACH
RECOMMENDATIONS. EVALUATIONS FROM
OF NASA SHOULD ALSO BE SOUGHT.
HUNSUCKER
OPPORTUNITY
OF THESE
OTHER SOURCESINDEPENDENT

APPENDIX VI F
F
POSSIBLE LIST OF QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WHICH MAY BE POSED BY
THE NRC COMMITTEE ON CRITICALITY REVIEW AND HAZARD ANALYSIS
CRITICALITY REVIEW AND HAZARD ANALYSIS
i. How is what NASA is currently doing
it did originally? If there is no substantial
will not NASA go down the same path as before?
issues really be found from this process?
different from what
difference
Will new
2. How does what NASA is doing
state of the art techniques?
between the NASA work and the
industries such as nuclear power?
in this area compare with
Is there any correlation
work done in other critical
3. How does the work of the contractors factor back into or
interface with the NASA management decision structure?
4. How is the work of original contractors integrated into
the current process, particularly if these contractors are no
longer involved?
5. What'management path is used to bring test results or
flight experience back into the FMEA/CIL process? Is this
path adequate to surface essential concerns?
6. How is data that shows an increasing degree of failure
surfaced to managerial attention?
7. Why does NASA not
statistical techniques for
specific example how
quantitatively, and how
attention.
use some of the quantitative
failure mode analysis? As a
is trending data dealt with,
is it surfaced to managerial
8. How do items get either on or off the FMEA/CIL list?
the rules for this procedure the same now as previously?
are these rules changed?
Are
How
9. Is special attention paid to the items on the FMEA/CIL
list as regards flight history? What office has the
responsibility to check the flight history of these items and
to do whatever trend analysis that is needed? If
abnormalities occur, how is this information surfaced?
i0. How are items
grow longer? Will
Why?
waived and why? Will the FMEA/CIL list
the number of items waived grow longer?
ii. Who assesses the inter-relationship of items on the
•FMEA/CIL list? How is this inter-relationship assessed?
12. How does FEMA/CIL and HA differ? How are they
integrated and coordinated?
13. It may well be true that a minor item might fail
causing another minor item to fail which causes another minor
item to fail and so on. None of these items might be on the
list. However, the combination of them all might cause a
significant failure. Has any analysis of this type
reflecting the inter-relationship of systems been done? If
so, by who and how?
14. What is a FMEA and what is
before a FMEA?
a CIL? How can you do a CIL
15. As a result of the reviews, how do the current Crit 1
lists stand? What is the change, both numerically and
percent wise, on the various subsystems? Why have the lists
changed this way?
16. How is human error being dealt with? Of particular
concern is the error which will occur in processing a complex
piece of equipment. Is there some sort of FMEA/CIL or HA
equivalent to deal with human error?
17. Is there a rational way to priortize concern on the CIL
list?
18. Should the whole FMEA/CIL-HA system be
another more responsive system be introduced?
scrapped and
19. HOW does NASA's history
industry in general?
in these areas compare with
20. How is the overall FMEA/CIL HA process related to the
general SR/QA structure?
21. Is the FMEA/CIL HA process uniform, center
and contractor to contractor?
GENERAL QUESTIONS oN SAFETY WHICH MAY sURFACE,
to center,
i. Who do the SR/QA people report to and what authority do
they have? Is all the safety work integrated and
coordinated?
2. How is the SPC rewarded? Is it based on flight rate?
3. Who is going to integrate all of the safety
concerns to insure nothing gets omitted?
reviews and
4. What guarantee is there that NASA is not going down the
same track as before 51-L?
5. Will flight rate issues
pressure on processing?
emerge to apply substantial
6. Will manifest instability do the same thing?
w
7. How does all of this relate to the commit to launch
criterion and the launch decision process?
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CHAPTER VII. MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This year has been a year of turmoil and change. Much,
but not all of this turmoil has been due to the Challenger
accident in January of 1986. Also contributing to the
turmoil has been the high workload complicated by the late,
downstream changes in the manifest. A lot of the non-
Challenger turmoil was natural and should be expected in any
organization going through a major transition period.
During this year, the management structure has been
changed and most of the major players have been moved. These
include the head of NASA, the AA for space flight, and the
directors of Johnson, Kennedy, and Marshall.
changes have, of course, rippled through the
that support the shuttle program.
The normal
These personnel
program areas
work of flying the shuttle has, to some
degree, been put on hold while the
needs of its own investigation as
Rogers' Commission, Congress, and
Council. A large amount of time has
agency responds to the
well as those of the
the National Research
been spent and will
continue to be spent on both supporting these investigations
and on responding to the recommendations of the investigatory
bodies.
During this time the agency seems to have held up well.
There has been little, if any, finger pointing or evident
internal political turmoil as a result of the accident.
There have, of course, been some morale problems. Some
personnel have left the agency perhaps as a result of this.
The work in the rest of this chapter is influenced by
the above comments. This work is divided into 3 sections:
responses to the investigations, management philosophy, and
the need for an operational arm.
2.0 RESPONSESTO THE INVESTIGATIONS
Chapter VI contains most of the work of this team on the
analysis of the Challenger accident. However, there are some
additional comments which need to be emphasized.
The Changes Must be Coordinated: There are several problems
which may surface as a result of the investigations. One is
that of separating the important concepts from those of less
importance. Another is insuring that the important concepts
receive action. Yet another is that of coordinating all of
the efforts so that the right office and person receive the
action items.
The Same Path Should not be Traveled: One of the messages
that seems to be clear from the various investigations is
that even without the accident, NASA was having difficulty in
dealing with the high flight rates. This issue is also
discussed in the management philosophy section. Hopefully,
NASA will not travel down the same path as before, but will
find new methods of managing the shuttle program. tL
3.0 MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
Work Harder and Faster: There is a natural tendency with any
management to believe, during the time of increased
workloads, that by working harder and faster new, increased
production can be met. This will not happen with NSTS. The
research bears this out. The investigations address this
issue to some degree as does Appendix VII A of this chapter.
In this appendix, "Work Loading, JSC Professional Employees,
Fiscal 1985", it is predicted that some of the JSC
organizations would require as many as 10% or more additional
employees to meet the scheduled flight rate in 1986. Working
harder and faster will not be enough. Major structural
changes must be made. This lends weight to the operational
arm argument presented in section 4. As a specific example
of why this philosophy will not work, the large amount of
time that the shuttle and all of its parts and pieces spend
in transportation must be reduced if the flight rate is to be
substantially increased. Working harder and
going to move a major piece of hardware over a
any quicker. The real resolution lies in
process structure and having this
individuals who understand and
problems.
faster is not
long distance
changing the
change accomplished by
appreciate processing
Management Changes: In Appendix VII B, "Program and Fiscal
responsibility", the problem of divergence of program
responsibility and fiscal responsibility is discussed. This
leads to Appendix VII C,"General
Management Structure and Operations",
"Application of General Comments on
Comments on Assessing
and Appendix VII D,
Assessing Management
Structure and Operations". In these two appendices, a
general assessment strategy is discussed and its application
. " ais outlined These two then lead to Appendix VII E,
Proposed Reorganization of the
This last appendix was written
Crippen committe work on
NSTS Managerial Structure".
as a partial response to the
the Rogers' Commission
recommendation. It is the type of problem discussed in
Appendix VII B that must be corrected and it is the structure
outlined in the other appendices that must be used, before
major operational roadblocks are overcome.
Risk and Control: In Appendix VII F, "Risk and Control" the
concept is presented that NASA should go to school on the
investigations and the resulting analysis of entire system.
The intent of this process
management system while the
question to be addressed is
would be to evaluate the risk
orbiter is standing down. The
whether the risk management
system would have identified problems found during the stand
down in a timely manner if the system was still flying. If
the answer is no then the risk management system is
inadequate to meet
changed.
the needs of the system and must be
4.0 THE NEED FOR AN OPERATIONALARM
In Appendix VII G, "An Operational Arm for the Space
Shuttle", an argument is presented in 3 parts for the
establishment of a NASA operational arm. The first part of
this appendix lists complicating factors effecting the choice
of a management structure for the shuttle. The second part
lists criteria for the evaluation of different options and
uses this criteria in the analysis of the major options. The
conclusion of this part is that there are only two viable
alternatives: business as usual and an operational arm. Of
these two, the analysis prefers the operational arm. The
last part of the appendix lends weight to the argument of
separating R/D from operations. This appendix is the major
theoretical thrust of the efforts of the research team for
this year and should be read in detail.

APPENDIX VII A
WORK LOADING JSC PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES
FISCAL '85
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This report is an attempt to determine the level of
effort of the professional work force at JSC. In this sense,
the real question is to determine how close to capacity this
work force has been performing during the year. As the
flight rate increases, a reasonable assumption is that the
work load will increase, i.e., the work force
more loaded. With professional employees, work
difficult to determine.
There is
will become
load is very
a certain amount of elasticity in the work of
professional employees.
uniform with time. A
surges of effort and
Their work is
typical employee
also periods of
not necessarily
should experience
relatively quieter
point where it can
then various methods
times. If the work load increases to a
not be contained in the usual work week,
such as overtime, compensation time, and volunteer time are
used to finish the required work. Even a small amount of
extra work may have negative effects on work produced. Extra
work induces stress in employees by requiring them to spend
unplanned time at the work place and by reducing the amount
of time available for family and recreational activities,
among other factors. Work which
nature would seem to have a greater
from this induced stress.
is highly technical in
probability of suffering
2.0 METHOD
In this report the following organizations were studied
over the pay periods of fiscal 85 (with the exception of the
third pay period):
CA
D
E
F
L
M
S
FLIGHT CREW OPERATIONS
MISSION OPERATIONS
ENGINEERING
MISSION SUPPORT
NSTS PROGRAM OFFICE
SPACE SHUTTLE PROJECTS OFFICE
SPACE AND LIFE SCIENCES.
The variable, extra work, was defined each pay period as the
comptime earned less the comptime used plus the overtime.
EW=COMP EARN - COMP USED + OVERTIME.
The following are all problems with the EW variable:
o Different organizations handle comp time, overtime, and
volunteer time differently.
o In some organizations, comp time converts to overtime
while in others it is used or lost.
o Professional employees are, as a rule, unconcerned with
regularly reporting extra work. Therefore the EW
variable will be biased in the conservative direction.
Even with the problems mentioned above, the trending of
the extra work variable should give some indication of the
load on the work force as the flight rate increases.
The common unit throughout this paper is EPrs. The
final two variables of interest are:
o CAE=cumulative average EW in EP's
o %EP=CAE as a % of cumulative
employees.
average number of
CAE for any given pay period shows the number of
additional employees which are required to compensate for the
extra work from pay period 1 to
consideration. In other words, had
additional employees present from per
the period under
there been CAE(j)
1 to per j then the
cumulative extra work at period j would be 0.
%EP shows CAE as a % of the work force for comparative
purposes.
3.0 RESULTS
TABLE 1
ORG CA
PER CAE
l-flt 9.29
2 8.73
3-flt
4 6.18
5 5.89
6 5.33
7 4.24
8 4.43
9-flt 5.24
i0 5.61
ii 5.72
12 5.59
13 5.40
14-flt 5.40
15 5.62
16-flt 5.92
17 5.96
18 6.05
19-flt 6.36
20 6.54
21 6.67
D E
%EP CAE %EP CAE %EP CAE
7.43% 28.29 8.76% 14.00 2.22% 8.66
6.99% 16.07 4.97% 7.50 1.19%
4.92% 12.96 4.02%
4.68%
4.27%
3.41%
3.58%
4.24%
4.55%
4.65%
4.55%
4.39%
4.39%
4.57%
4.82%
4.85%
4.91%
5.16%
5.30%
5.40%
***
9.95 3.09%
7.99 2.50%
4.75 0.75% 5.30
4.57 0.73% 6.90
3.58 0.57% 6.16
5.69 1.79% 2.30 0.37% 3.76
5.85 1.85% 2.50 0.40%
7.08 2.19%" 3.15 0.51% 6-.08
6.90 2.07%
6.81 2.00%
6.16 1.77%
6.01 1.70%
6.60 1.85%
7.55 2.09%
9.07 2.49%
9.30 2.53%
9.17 2.48%
9.85 2.64%
9.41 2.51%
9.28
3.01 0.49% 6.87
2.89 0.47% 6.90
2.91 0.47% 6.37
3.00 0.49%
3.21 0.52% 6.15
3.73 0.61%
4.23 0.69% 6.54
4.28 0.70% 6.69
4.62 0.76%
4.96 0.81% 6.34
4.71 0.77% 5.71
2.46% 4.81 0.79%
F
%EP
1.98%
8.01 1.83%
1.21%
1.57%
1.42%
0.88%
5.15 1.21%
1.46%
1.70%
1.74%
1.65%
6.33 1.66%
1.64%
6.28 1.70%
1.78%
1.84%
6.45 1.79%
1.77%
1.61%
5.70 1.61%
22-flt 6.93 5.59% 9.82 2.59% 4.85 0.79% 5.65 1.61%
23 6.98 5.62% 9.74 2.56% 4.83 0.79% 5.55
24-flt 7.06 5.67% 10.47 2.74% 5.10 0.83% 5.33 1.53%
25 7.19 5.75% 10.49 2.73% 5.23 0.85% 5.39 1.55%
26 7.27 5.81% 10.27 2.67% 5.12 0.83% 5.49 1.59%
1.59%
The amount of loading for organizations L, M, and S was
considered to be insignificant in comparison to that of the
ones listed in the table above.
In figures 2-7, the extra work variable is plotted as a
function of the pay period. In Figure i, a composite chart
of CA, D, E, and F is presented.
4.0 INTERPRETATION
The figure of interest in the above table
figure in each column:
is the last
TABLE 2
CA D E F
CAE %EP CAE %EP CAE %EP CAE %EP
7.27 5.81% 10.27 2.67% 5.12 0.83% 5.49 1.59%
In organization CA, for example, 7.27 EP's were require
for the entire fiscal year in order to have the extra work
for that year to total to 0.
While the magnitude of the numbers presented may be
considered by some to be of little if any consequence, the
trending of the data is disturbing. In figures 2-4, for
instance, there is a definite trend upwards of the data. In
Figure I, the composite chart, the flights are marked on the
pay period scale. The organizations show an increase in load
immediately prior to a flight and then a slighter decrease
after a flight. Specifically, CA, D, and E do not seem to be
able to recover back to their pre-flight loading.
In fiscal 85, 8 flights were flown. In November of 85,
15 flights were planned for 85. A conservative assumption is
that the extra work variable is linear with the flight rate.
An assumption which is perhaps more accurate but one which is
not used here is that extra work is exponential with flight
rate. The linear flight rate assumption changes the figures
in Table 2 to:
TABLE 3
PREDICTED LOADING FOR '86
CA D E F
CAE %EP CAE %EP CAE %EP CAE %EP
13.63 10.89% 19.26 5.01% 9.6 1.56% 10.29 2.98%
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
The above figures in Table 3 are disturbing.
even more disturbing when their conservative nature
considered. Perhaps their major use is as part of
argument which supports two conclusions:
They are
is
the
o The flight rate will not be significantly increased
simply by working harder and faster in the same manner
as in the past. Significant changes in the way work is
done are necessary.
0 In order to increase the flight rate significantly,
everything in reason must become standardized.
and timely performance requires routine work.
work requires standard work.
Regular
Routine
M
5.
M
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APPENDIX VII B
PROGRAM AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY
PROBLEM i: The span of control for the manager of NSTS is
between 9 and 12 and could be construed to be as high as 14.
A span of control of this size from diverse elements of
the organization can be difficult to control. Consideration
might should be given to introducing a step between the 3 KSC
offices and the NSTS manager. Another thought is to have a
JSC shuttle manager, a KSC shuttle manager, a MSFC shuttle
manager, and a VLS shuttle manger to deal with the various
elements at each center.
to the manager of NSTS.
the management structure
One of
All of these managers would report
the dangers of lengthening
in any of these fashions is that
sensitivity might be lost to lower level problems.
PROBLEM 2: In many cases, the authority or responsibility
comes from one place and the money from another.
Any time an organization has its authority and budget
coming from different places, major problems are introduced.
At the very least, it would seem that budgets should flow
through the manager of NSTS in so far as they impact NSTS.
This could of course cause a lower level manager to have to
satisfy more than one upper level manager about a budget
request. This last concept can have both positive and
negative ramifications. Jurisdictional conflicts could be
negative. Having more than one upper level manager support
an item can apply effective budget control and well as needed
support.
APPENDIX VII C
GENERALCOMMENTSON ASSESSING MANAGEMENT
STRUCTUREAND OPERATIONS
1.0 DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of the rest of this paper the following
definitions will be used:
o STRATEGIC PLANNING-long range planning.
o TACTICAL PLANNING-planning affecting
short term.
o GOAL-a desired future state, oft
philosophical terms.
o OBJECTIVE-a specific action the accomplfshment of which
will help to obtain a goal.
the immediate or
times stated in
NOTE: The above definitions may not be uniformly accepted or
understood by the members of a management assessment team.
2.0 METHOD
In the beginning one must attempt to well-define the
term assessment. What is to be assessed and in what light?
How? The following steps constitute one method of doing an
assessment.
2.1 DETERMINE THE EXISTING STRUCTUREAND METHODOF OPERATION
There will be some difference between the specif{ed
formal structure and the actual working structure. Without
some determination of the specified structure and the actual
structure, with political considerations thrown in, the
assessment team may not be all working with the same set of
ground rules.
2.2 SEEK COMMONALTY ON THE CURRENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF
THE ORGANIZATION
To assess structure and operation of a management system
one must have a yardstick to compare them against. This yard
stick consists of the goals and objectives of the
organization. The assessment team,
under the same set of ground rules.
on the definitions of the goals
again, must be working
This demands commonality
and objectives of the
organization. As a specific example, if the goals and
objectives of an organization have changed then a change in
the structure or method of operation may be required.
2.3
At this step the
specifically under what
structure and operation.
DEFINE THE WORKING PARAMETERS FOR THE ASSESSMENT
assessment team begins to decide
light they are going to examine the
Most of these parameters are multi-
dimensional. As an example, suppose cost is a parameter used
to review the structure and operations. Then there will be
short term (tactical)
considerations.
and long term (strategic)
2.4 DETERMINE HOWWELL THE SYSTEM IS PERFORMINGIN LIGHT OF
THE WORKINGPARAMETERS
Many of the parameters used will be chosen because there
is concern for inadequate performance under these parameters.
Others will be chosen because of their significance. For
whatever reason they are chosen, this step involves the
determination of performance of the system in light of these
parameters.
2.5 DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES FOR OPERATION AND STRUCTURE IN
LIGHT OF THE WORKING PARAMETERS
Some consideration needs to be given here for the
working principle that "if it ain't broke then don't fix it."
However, in contrast to this last statement, even if the
system is performing well under a specific parameter
alternatives might be considered to make it perform better.
Typical methods to develop alternatives include brainstorming
and some sort of Delphi technique involving the power
structure of the organization. Great care must be used here
to filter out self-serving suggestions.
2.6 CATEGORIZE THE ALTERNATIVES IN LIGHT OF THE WORKING
PARAMETERS
This step involves the placing of the alternatives in
specific categories. As a specific example will this
alternative have a long term or a short term effect on a
particular parameter. In addition, at this point it may
become necessary to re-define the parameter list.
2.7 ANALYZE THE ALTERNATIVES IN
PARAMETERS WITH REGARD TO THE
OBJECTIVES OF THE ORGANIZATION
LIGHT OF THE WORKING
IMPACT ON THE GOALS AND
The usual methods such as pro and con lists or perhaps a
Delphi technique may be useful here.
2.8
consideration for implementation, consideration
given as to how these alternatives play one
other.
ANALYZE THE ALTERNATIVES IN LIGHT OF THE WHOLE SYSTEM
Once the list has been narrowed down to a set under
needs to be
against the
2.9 IMPLEMENT THE SET OF ALTERNATIVES WHICH HAS A POSITIVE
IMPACT ON THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ORGANIZATION
APPENDIX VII D
APPLICATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS ON ASSESSING
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS TO NSTS
1.0 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
From the 1985 Long-Range Program Plan, "Develop a fully
operational and cost effective Space Transportation System to
provide routine access to space for domestic and foreign
commercial and governmental users." This m_y be the most
current statement of the goal of NSTS. As example of the
importance of commonality of definitions, some individuals
may not feel that routine is either appropriate or desirable.
Surely there are other specified andworking goals in
existence.
2.0 WORKING PARAMETERS
o Safety. Perhaps the most important of the variables and
one which should permeate the entire discussion.
o Strengthening o_[f public confidence in and im___e of NSTS.
Consideration should be given to evaluating the system
fn light of the perception of safety and reliability.
• o Effective and efficient utilization of resources. Here
resources can be subdivided into three categories:
physical objects such as computers, equipment,
buildings, orbiters, etc.; people; and money.
o Ability t__o determine and maintain a realistic schedule.
This parameter is somewhat related to public confidence
and commercially viable. It is directly related to the
part of the goal statement addressing routine access.
o Strengthening commercial viability. This parameter is
directly related to the part of the goal statement which
addresses routine access to commercial users.
o Improve communications, particularly i__n th____e decision
loop. This parameter is related to the effective and
efficient utilization of re@ources and to the
improvement of image.
APPENDIX VII E
HQ AA FOR SPACE FLIGHT
I IDEP PDI
I I
OPS ENGR/
DEV
JSC
I
PROGRAM DIRECTOR
I
OPS
I I I I I
BUD/ SALES/ PLANNING/ SR/QA ENGR/
COST CUSTOMER TRANSITION/ DEVELP
CONTROL DEVELP INTEGRATION
ALL
CENTERS
CURRENT LEVEL III PROJECTS ARE SEPARATED INTO
AN OPERATIONAL ASPECT AND A DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECT.
THE OPS PART REPORTS TO PROGRAM OPS, THE DEVELOP-
MENT PART REPORTS TO PROGRAM ENGR AND DEVELOPMENT.
IN ADDITION, ALL PROJECT OFFICES WILL INTERACT WITH
THE OTHER 4 OFFICES AT THE PROGRAM LEVEL.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
PROGRAM DIRECTOR
ROLES: TO DIRECT NSTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOALS, TO
CONTROL PROGRESS TOWARDS THESE GOALS, TO ORGANIZE RESOURCES
FOR THEIR ATTAINMENT, TO PLAN FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT, AND TO
MOTIVATE THE WORK FORCE.
THE PROGRAM DIRECTOR SERVES AS THE CEO OF THE NATIONAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SPACE
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND FOR SEEING THAT THE SYSTEM
SATISFIES THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SYSTEM.
FOR REPORTING TO AND SUPPORTING THE AA FOR SPACE FLIGHT.
DEPUTY PROGRAM DIRECTOR r HQ
ROLES: TO SUPPORT THE PD BY SERVING AS A LIAISON BETWEEN THE
PD AND THE AA FOR SPACE FLIGHT.
TO DIRECT AND CONTROL THE HQ OFFICE OF THE PD.
TO SUPPORT THE AA BY SERVING AS AN INTERFACE BETWEEN THE
PROGRAM OFFICE AND HQ.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR EFFECTIVE
BETWEEN THE PD AND THE AA.
AND TIMELY INFORMATION FLOW
FOR REPORTING TO THE PD.
OPERATIONS OFFICE
ROLES: TO OPERATE THE NSTS ON A DAY-BY-DAY BASIS.
TO ACHIEVE THE OPERATIONAL GOALS ESTABLISHED BY THE PD.
TO CONTROL, DIRECT, ORGANIZE, PLAN AND MOTIVATE FOR ALL
ASPECTS OF PRODUCING FLIGHTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCHEDULES
DETERMINED BY THE PD INCLUDING THOSE ASPECTS OF THE
OPERATIONAL PROGRAM WHICH ARE LOCATED AT DIFFERENT CENTERS.
TO PERFORM THE MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS JOB SIMILAR TO AN OPS
MANAGER IN INDUSTRY.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR SUPPORTING THE PD. FOR PROVIDING
OPERATIONAL INPUTS INTO OTHER AREAS OF THE PROGRAM.
ENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
ROLES: TO PROVIDE THE SUSTAININGENGINEERING AND DEVELOPMENT
NECESSARY TO INSURE SAFE AND EFFICIENT FLIGHTS.
TO INSURE THAT SOUND ENGINEERING JUDGEMENT IS INCLUDED IN ALL
DECISIONS.
TO DESIGN, DEVELOP, AND TEST NEW CONCEPTS WHICH LEAD TO SAFER
AND MORE EFFICIENT FLIGHTS.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR SUPPORTING THE PD. FOR CONTROLLING
ENGINEERING IN ALL PROJECTS REGARDLESS OF THEIR LOCATION.
PLANNING, TRANSITION, AND INTEGRATION OFFICE
ROLES: TO PROVIDE LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR NSTS.
TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION TO AN OPERATION ENVIRONMENT.
TO SERVE AS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICTS
BETWEEN OPERATIONS AND ENGR/DESIGN.
TO SERVE AS AN AD HOC TEAM TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS AS
ASSIGNED BY THE PD.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR SUPPORTING THE PD.
FOR DETERMINING REALISTIC PRODUCTION RATES IN
TERM AND THE FAR TERM.
FOR CONTROLLING PLANNING, TRANSITION, AND INTEGRATION ASPECTS
OF ALL PROJECTS.
BOTH THE NEAR
SR/QA
ROLES:
FLIGHT PRODUCTION PROCESS.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR DEVELOPING ADEQUATE
PROCEDURES FOR THE ASSURANCE OF SAFETY AND QUALITY.
FOR SUPPORTING THE PD.
FOR SUPPORTING THE HQ SR/QA OFFICE WITH TIMELY AND
INFORMATION FLOW.
FOR COORDINATING THE SR/QA WORK AT LOWER LEVELS.
TO INSURE SAFETY AND QUALITY IN ALL ASPECTS OF THE
REPORTING
ADEQUATE
SALES/CUSTOMER DEVELOPMENT
ROLES: TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL
ASPECTS OF SHUTTLE FLIGHT.
TO FACILITATE THE INTERACTION OF THE USER COMMUNITY WITH
NSTS.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR SUPPORTING THE PD.
FOR SUPPORTING THE PLANNING OFFICE WITH REALISTIC PROJECTIONS
OF USER NEEDS IN BOTH THE NEAR TERM AND THE LONG TERM.
FOR SERVING AS AN INTERFACE BETWEEN THE USER COMMUNITY AND
NSTS.
FOR FINDING NEW MARKETS FOR SHUTTLE SERVICES.
BUDGET AND COST CONTROL OFFICE
ROLES: TO SERVE AS THE MAIN FISCAL OFFICE OF NSTS.
RESPONSIBILITIES: FOR SUPPORTING THE PD.
FOR DEVELOPING BUDGETS AND MAKING BUDGET PROJECTIONS.
FOR COORDINATING AND INTEGRATING ALL BUDGETARY INFORMATION
FROM LOWER AND PARALLEL OFFICES.
NOTES:
I. SALES AND CUSTOMER DEVELOPMENT
CONTROLOF THE PD. THIS WILL HELP
CHANGESAMONGOTHERTHINGS.
SHOULD BE UNDER THE
TO STABILIZE MANIFEST
2. THERE WILL PROBABLYBE AN SR/QA OFFICE AT HQ. THEREFORE
THE PROGRAMSR/QA OFFICE WILL HAVE TO COORDINATEWITH THEM.
3. THE INTENT WITH THE 6 OFFICES UNDERTHE PD IS TO GIVE ALL
OF THESE OFFICES A SAY IN WHENAND WHATTO FLY. IN OTHER
WORDS, THIS IS TO PUT THE OPERATIONAL PRESSURE TO MEET THE
IMMEDIATE FLIGHT NEEDS IN PERSPECTIVE WITH OTHER FORCESWHICH
SHOULDHAVE AN EQUAL DEGREEOF INPUT. A FLIGHT CANCELED
THIS YEAR MAY ALLOW MOREFLIGHTS TWO YEARS FROMNOW.
4. THE LOCATION OF THE DEP PD AT HQ IS AN ATTEMPT TO CLEAN
UP THE DECISION CHAIN BETWEENTHE CEO OF THE PROGRAMAND HQ.
PEOPLE IN THIS OFFICE SHOULD BE THERE ONLY ON A TEMPORARY
BASIS OF ONE TO THREE YEARS.
5. ALL CURRENT PROJECTS WILL BE BROKEN UP UNDER THIS
ARRANGEMENTINTO THEIR OPERATIONAL ASPECT AND THEIR
ENGINEERING/DEVELOPMENTASPECT AND REPORT TO THE APPROPRIATE
OPS OR ENGROFFICE AT THE PROGRAMLEVEL.
6. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE PLANNING/TRANSITION/INTEGRATION
OFFICE ARE RELATIVELY NEW. THIS OFFICE SHOULDSERVE AS A
FOCAL POINT FOR PLANNING. AS SUCH THE CHANGES WHICH ARE
NECESSARYTO MOVE INTO THE OPERATIONAL ERA COME NATURALLY
INTO ITS PURVIEW. INTEGRATION REFERS TO RESOLVING THE
NATURAL CONFLICTS WHICH WILL DEVELOP BETWEEN CHANGES
SUGGESTEDBY SR/QA AND ENGRTO THE OPS OFFICE AND THE CHANGES
SUGGESTEDBY THE PLANNING FUNCTION. THE INTEGRATION FUNCTION
ALLOWSTHEM TO STAY TIED TO THE REAL WORLD. HOWEVER, GREAT
CARE MUST BE EXERCISED TO INSURE THAT INTEGRATION DOES NOT
BECOMETHEIR ONLY REAL FUNCTION. IN ADDITION, THIS OFFICE
COULD SERVE AS AN INVESTIGATORY AGENT OF THE PD AND BE
ASSIGNED ON AN AD HOC BASIS TO DEVELOP INFORMATION NEEDEDTO
MAKE TIMELY DECISIONS.
7. THE PD WOULDBE EXPECTEDTO SPEND A CONSIDERABLEAMOUNT
OF TIME AT HQ. ONE WEEKIN FOUR, AS AN EXAMPLE, WOULD SEEM
TO BE NECESSARY.

APPENDIX VII F
RISK AND CONTROL
I. At this point in time there are several problems that are
surfacing with the Shuttle and its hardware. Problems with
pumps and main engines are candidate examples. From these
problems several questions arise. The most obvious of these
is whether the problems would have been found if the Shuttle
had continued to fly its ambitious schedule. If the answer
to this question is yes, then the next question is whether
the procedures to fix the problems are in place and what sort
of impact would the procedures have on the schedule. If the
answer to the question is no, then there could be several
causes. One is that the problems are due to the stand down,
i.e., they would not have occurred if the equipment had
continued to be used in a regular fashion. The other cause
is perhaps more severe. It may be that the testing procedure
is inadequate to locate the problems during the intense
activity surrounding flying. Another possibility is that the
testing procedure may have found the problem but been to slow
to react. There is no doubt that the people who are
uncovering these areas are sensitive to the above comments.
However the problem is that some important issues may fail to
be surfaced or fail to be acted on. These considerations
lead to the following recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION: A procedure needs to be developed that deals
with these issues as they occur. This procedure should
include a central control point
issues pass. At the control
categorized into sets such as:
through which all of these
point each issue should be
a) would not have occurred during regular flight
b) would have occurred but would have been
resolved with no major impact on schedule
c) would have occurred and been found but would
major impact on schedule
d) would have occurred but would not have been found.
found and
have a
This sorting of the issues could then be
managerial attention to the correction of
problems.
used to direct
any significant
!
e
that affects systems when
components. This condition
of the system is perceived
troublesome than the others.
the most dangerous element
There is concept which we will called "perceived danger"
they have numerous dangerous
occurs when one of the elements
to be more dangerous or
Attention is concentrated on
and controls are built to reduce
or control the level of risk of this element. Then, as the
system matures, another element malfunctions and a serious
problem occurs. As an example of this concept, are the
controls on the rest of the system as stringent as those on
the SSME's? Some attempt must be made in the system to level
out the degree of protection for all elements of the system.
This is normally done at the onset of system development, but
as the system matures and the perceived most dangerous
element begins to be identified there is a natural tendency
to shift increasing attention to this dangerous element. The
usual result is an unbalanced system with extreme protection
and control being used on the dangerous element and other
elements having less protection. These considerations lead
to the following recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION: An evaluation needs to be done on the
protection and control system of all parts of the system with
the objective of evaluating whether the protection and risk
control is of an equal level for all parts of the system.
This evaluation should be done by an agent which has no
emotional attachment to the outcome and which has no previous
bias. The intent of this evaluation is not
protection of minor items with virtually no impact
the same as for major items with serious impact.
is that the protection for all
equally protected.
that the
should be
The intent
items with equal impact are

APPENDIX VII G
AN OPERATIONAL ARM FOR THE MANAGEMENTOF THE SPACE SHUTTLE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The basic
the determination of the organization and structure
management of the Space Shuttle Program. This issue
new to the National Space Transportation System
problem on which this paper concentrates is
of the
is not
(NSTS).
Numerous papers and reports have been written on the subject
and have been presented to NASA management. Two factors make
this problem worth revisiting. One is that a significant
amount of flight history has occurred. The second is the
Challenger accident and the resulting world wide interest and
concern with NASA and NASA management. In addition, major
strategic changes, such as those considered in this paper,
have a long lead time. This alone, makes this issue one
which should be revisited periodically.
2.0 INTRODUCTIONAND BACKGROUND
2.1 PROBLEMIDENTIFICATION
In order to deal with questions concerning management
structure, the first step is to look at the mission of the
organization. A basic consideration for NSTS is to fly the
shuttle as often as necessary and to fly it safely. In this
consideration the question arises as to the definition of "as
often as necessary". To begin to answer this question it is
necessary to analyze the formal objective of NSTS as of 15
August 86 which is:
"to establish a national space transportation capability
that will (i) substantially reduce the cost of space
operations, and (ii) be designed to support a wide range
of scientific, applications, defense, commercial and
international uses." [Vol 1 07700 series, Level II
Program Definitions and Requirements]
As with many formal organizational objectives, there is
the strong possibility of confusion, ambiguity, and lack of
commitment throughout the organization. This is particularly
true when the objectives get transformed into operational
strategies. For the shuttle, for example, is the strategy to
realize short term gains and fly this generation of vehicles
as often as possible as soon as possible? Or is the strategy
to go to school on this generation of vehicles in order to
identify problems which must be resolved before the next
generation of vehicles can make space flight more routine?
Or is perhaps the strategy some combination of the two?
Regardless of the current strategy, in order to reduce
costs and to provide broad access to space, at some point in
time the shuttle operation must become more routine and more
standardized. In other words it must become more operational
in nature. Here operations is defined as routine timely
performance with emphasis on cost control. It is in light of
this reasoning that the possible management structures are
analyzed. This is done with the full realization that these
considerations are long lead time items and the question of
who will manage the operational era is the
This question will not go away; in fact, it
with the space station. For these and
strategic decisions should be made as
order to support the program in the
operation becomes more routine.
prime concern.
will reappear
other reasons,
early as possible in
out years when the
2.2 COMPLICATING FACTORS
There are numerous problems complicating the choice of
management structure for NSTS. While the alternatives for
the management of the
starting with section
choice must first be
space shuttle program are discussed
four, the factors complicating this
understood. These factors are
summarized in Table 1 and discussed below.
Variability in processing: There is a large amount o_
variability in processing the shuttle. The Committee Of
Science And Technology pointed this out when it stated that
each shuttle flight is unique, and requires, unique
preparations (22, p. 122). This is evident on even a casual
reading of Figure 1 which shows the turn around or processing
times for the shuttle in the 3 major facilities: the orbiter
!1 COMPLICATING FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATIONti
OF MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
* VARIABILITY IN PROCESSING
* NOT DESIGNED FOR PRODUCTION
* UNIQUENESS OF THE VEHICLE AND THE
PROGRAM
* SPACE STATION AND SPACE SHUTTLE
* DOWNSTREAM CHANGES
* PROJECT VS. PROCESS MANAGEMENT
* LACK OF OPERATIONAL EXPERTISE
* DEMOGRAPHICS
* NATIONAL INTERESTS
TABLE 1
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processing facility (OPF), the vehicle assembly building
(VAB), and the launch pad (PAD). Over the 16 flights listed
in this figure, the shuttle averaged 71.5 days in the OPF,
7.9 days in the VAB, and 27.2 days on the PAD. The total of
these times is shown in Figure 2. In both figures the times
have high variability, making it difficult to come up with
reasonable estimates for the future missions.
There is of course some chance that this variability is
controllable. Figures 3 and 4 seem to disprove this
assumption. In Figure 3 the planned versus the actual
workdays at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) where the shuttle is
processed is presented. In the 18 flights listed, the plan
was only achieved once. There are 6 flights with a variation
of approximately 50% or better of the delta to the plan. Of
these one was 99% and one was 212%. Figure 4 shows much the
same data with a listing of the amount of months of launch
slip. The conclusion to be drawn from these first 4 figures
is that there is a large amount of variability in the
processing times for the shuttle and that this processing
time is hard to control.
NO£ designed fo___[ production:
processing facilities at KSC
In the shuttle fleet, each vehicle is different
next. This makes it difficult to develop routine
which apply to all vehicles. During the time
shuttle was designed there was little experience with routine
Neither the shuttle or the
were designed for production.
from the
processes
that the
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space flight. This of course
how to design for production. This is
sensitivity of the Solid Rocket Motor
processing (13).
made it difficult to predict
illustrated by the
joint design to
At KSC the process flow lines are relatively long with
many of the moves being difficult and complex. As an
example, the shuttle on the Mobile Launch Platform takes a
full day to travel from the VAB to the pad. Another example
involves the mating of the external tank to the orbiter in
the VAB. This move requires an external tank to be lifted
over 100 feet in the air in order to clear a sill in the VAB.
This moves takes at least a shift to accomplish. If there is
an orbiter stored in the VAB then it must be moved out of the
way in order to lift the tank. This of course adds more
time. Much of the processing assembly structure at KSC was
inherited from earlier days when time was not as severe as a
constraint. Much of the material handling equipment at Ksc
is unique. The Mobile Launch
one example. Another deals
Platform mentioned earlier is
with the Solid Rocket Motors.
Once these are flown they are retrieved from the sea and
cleaned at KSC. Then they are loaded on special railroad
cars and carried to Utah where the propellant is added. From
here they are shipped back to KSC again on the same special
railroad cars. Needless to say the railroad cars are unique
and the scheduling is complex due to the small number of the
cars. These are just a few of the problems illustrating that
the processing facility was not designed for routine
processing.
Uniqueness of the vehicle and the program:
orbiters in existence capable of flying,
production. There is a hanger queen which
There are only 3
with a fourth in
will never fly
again still around and of course the Challenger was a flying
vehicle. There is a strong probability that these will be
the only vehicles of this type which will be built. As time
passes these will more than likely be replaced with different
designs, even though this will be some time in the future.
This generation of vehicles was the first of their type in
that part of the vehicle is returned and flown again. Both
the orbiter and the Solid Rocket Boosters are returned to fly
again. This is a new concept and like most new programs
still has many problems to be resolved. As a specific
example of the uniqueness of the vehicle, the Solid Rocket
Boosters are the largest solid propellant motors ever
developed and the first to be used on a manned craft
(22, p. 42).
The program is likewise unique. Indeed, few products
have the complexity, cost, visibility, and potential for
impact on the reputation of the United States as does the
space shuttle (13). Dealing with hardware reflight issues is
new. While manned flight is not new, it is young. Also, the
shuttle has new issues in manned flight such as space repair
of satellites and controlled landings. Adding to these
issues is the increased volume of space cargoes intended for
flight. Then there is of course the Strategic
Initiative which ties space closer to the defense
Country. Other countries such as Russia and the
Space Agency have programs with the same concerns_
Defense
of the
European
However,
due to national interests, there is at best limited access to
the knowledge that these programs may possess.
There is some tendency to equate shuttle operations to
airline flight or military operations. This is a gross
oversimiplification of the issues
similarity is disclaimed in National
(23, p. 29).
involved and in fact this
Research Council (NRC),
All of these factors combine to illustrate that there is
no large base of knowledge dealing with programs such as the
shuttle.
R/D nature of th____eproduct and of the program: The product in
this discussion is defined to be the basic vehicle with all
its components along with the missions into space with all
their components. Since the product is relatively new, it is
unreasonable to suppose that major significant changes will
not continue to occur in the product. In fact, the shuttle
is not out of the development stage (23, p. 33; 25, p. 194).
Furthermore, the shuttle is too complex to ever be considered
operational (26, p. 14). Specifically figure 5 shows the
number of major changes to the vehicle throughout one of the
latter years of the shuttle's history. It is worth noting
that there were a significant number of planned changes and
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that the number of unplanned changes is non-trivial. This is
of course to be expected with any developmental vehicle.
While it is hoped that the number of changes reduces with
time, it would be folly to assume that they will reduce to
near zero. In other Words, the shuttle has a strong R/D
nature now and will more than likely continue to have a large
amount of development throughout its history as the business
of flying in space matures and the shuttle changes to
accommodate new knowledge. On page 14 of the Lessons Learned
Report, it is pointed out that the shuttle is too complex to
ever be considered operational. Figure 6, showing anomalies
by flight, adds credibility to this argument.
In a similar vein, space missions have changed
significantly in the last several years. New satellites are
being developed with new requirements. Several years ago,
few people would have guessed at the success of the shuttle
in its repair role with malfunctioning satellites. The space
station along with SDI may also change mission concepts.
Even a causal reading of the report of the National
Commission on Space (24) illustrates that the role, scope,
missionsand shape of
changing.
f
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Space Station and
in space is going to be continually
These two programs are
interreia£ed. Much of the use of the shuttle will be towards
supporting the space station. This support must be provided
in a routine regular fashion. In addition the interface
Space Shuttle:
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between them must be constructed so as to provide for routine
interaction. In fact the tie between them appears to be so
strong that it is difficult to imagine an effective
management structure which separates these two programs very
far. The assumption here is that the operation of the
shuttle and the space station must be tied closely together.
The NRC report (23, p. 16), lends weight to this argument
when it points out that the heaviest launch demand on the
shuttle will be the space station. This demand is so strong
that it could not be supported by 3 orbiters. Also, unless
the shuttle fleet is maintained during the 1990's at
approximately the realistic flight rates in the NRC report,
the necessary foundations for the space station, SDI, etc.,
will not exist (23, p. 47).
Downstream changes: The product
of the major contributing factors
issue of manifesting missions.
of NSTS is complex and one
to this complexity is the
The product cycle for
missions is relatively long and begins in earnest at Launch
minus 15 months (L-15) when cargo mixes are established and
baselined in the Flight Definition And Requirements
Directive. This product cycle is being shortened but as of
1985, at approximately L-10.9 there is a dry run on the cargo
integration review (CIRD) which baselines the authorized
requirements and oD3ec_ives rot a specific mission. This
review provides the authorization to begin the preparation of
the final engineering and flight design to determine mission
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bay changes, they do distract from the main business of the
flight contained in the cargo bay. In the mid deck changes
after L-5, 41 of the 62 changes occurred after L-3 further
impacting the time spent on the up-coming launch.
In summary, the process of manifesting is complex with a
long lead time. In its history, NSTS has
significant number of manifest changes late
cycle which have had a non-trivial impact on
budget. Thus, rigid manifesting criteria
established and enforced to reduce
remanifesting, and variability (26, p. 38).
experienced a
in the process
workload and
need to be
perturbations,
Project as opposed t__oo
history, NSTS has been
The managerial process
somewhat typical with
done on a flight by
process management: Throughout its
managed in a quasi-matrix structure.
is project like in nature as is
an R/D organization. Everything is
flight basis, and the increased flight
rate has made this problem even
does not get done then the
launch, is rolled back. In
been able to leave "project"
more severe (13). If work
project completion date, the
other words, NASA has not yet
management and engage in
"process" management (13). Historically this has not led to
too many problems. However, as the launch rate increases in
response to the increased need for flights, these roll backs
will have an impact which becomes increasingly severe. At
some point in time, it may be necessary to leave the project
structure and manage processes as opposed to projects.
Lack of operational expertise: Most of NASA's programs have
been sunset in nature. They had a definite start and a
definite end. As opposed to this the shuttle has
life baselined at 100 flight per vehicle.
considerable error in this estimate this yields
life of the order of magnitude of 20 years. This
of program with which NASA has little experience.
been a world leader in the R/D arena throughout its history
and it is in that arena that its expertise lies.
a product
Even with
a program
is a type
NASA has
Demographics: When the demographics of the Johnson Space
Center (JSC) are analyzed then it is found that the average
age of the technical employees is around 43 years, most of
the employees are engineers, 27% have a masters degree or
better, most are GS 13's or above, the average service with
NASA is 16.4 years, and the average start age with NASA was
in the late 20's. In other words this is an educated
experienced workforce which is in its middle age and whose
significant employment has been with NASA. This is a
workforce whose primary experience has been with R/D programs
and with those programs
However, during the
significant decreases in
reduction may have occurred in the safety, reliability,
quality assurance staff at NASA headquarters and at
Marshall Space Flight Center. Additionally, during
they have been quite successful.
last decade, NASA has had
manpower. A disproportionate
and
the
the
period preceding the Challenger accident, the Office of Space
_light also suffered a decline in staff (22, p. 154). NASA
technical expertise is further reduced by the departure of
highly skilled employees. During fiscal year 1985,
approximately 1500 employees left the agency, over one-half
of these (784) were engineers, technicians, and scientists.
If present trends continue, NASA can expect to lose between
7500 and 9000 technical and scientific employees over the
next ten years. While fifty percent of these personnel
losses are formally attributed to retirement, NASA officials
"know ... that many retirees leave NASA for higher paying
jobs in industry". Additionally,
departing employees acknowledge
for more financially rewarding
workforce reduction is also due
transfers to other programs (13).
seventeen percent of the
that they are leaving NASA
jobs (22, pp. 155-156). The
to hiring freezes and
National interests: The pride of this nation
success of the shuttle
impacts NSTS affects
between the shuttle
considered in dealing
structure.
The shuttle is a very expensive
is tied to the
program. Anything which adversely
our world esteem. This relationship
and national self esteem must be
with issues concerning managerial
National asset. The
costs of orbiters, launch sites, and missions runs into the
billions of dollars. However, loss of orbiters without
replacement ones would deal manned spaceflight a serious blow
(23, p. 48).
The shuttle
Congress and the
is also tied to National security. The
Executive Branch _ jointly developed the
policy that the space shuttle s_ould, in a reliable fashion,
and at an internationally competitive cost, provide for most
of the Free World's space launch needs (22, p. 119).
Needless to say,
shuttle. In fact,
the fleet at i the
imperative to build the foundation of SDI.
many of the surveillance satellites will
flown on the shuttle.
DOD is one of the major customers of the
according to NRC (23, p. 47) maintaining
flight rates shown in the report is
Even without SDI
most probably be
2.3. SUMMARY
The problem of determining the correct structure to
manage the shuttle program is a difficult one. There are
numerous complicating factors which impact the decision.
This problem of effective management will continue to grow in
size and complexity as the flight rate increases and as the
demand for launches goes up.
As a partial summary of the complexity of the issues
involved, the following statement from the Committee on
Science and Technology is offered (23, p. 22):
"The Space Shuttle has not yet reached a level of
maturity which could be called operational as that term
is used in either the airline industry or the military.
Each Shuttle flight is fundamentally unique, and
requires unique preparations. Therefore, small changes
in a mission can cause significant perturbations of
mission planning and crew training."
3.0 CRITERIA FOR THE COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
In order to make a choice between alternatives, the
criteria for selection needs to be formally stated and well
understood by the decision making body. To give the
discussion a logical basis, the following criteria are
presented. This list is, of course, only a partial list and
its use must be integrated with an understanding of the
complicating factors presented earlier. However, it offers a
starting point to begin to compare alternatives in light of
the complicating factors already discussed. These items are
presented in summary in table 2 and discussed below.
3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL FEASIBILITY
Feasibility must be considered from at least 3 different
aspects: technical, political, and cultural. In simple
terms, any organization can be thought to be made up of these
3 components. The technical aspect refers to the level of
technology within an organization necessary to satisfy goals
and objectives and covers items such as computer processing,
information systems, education, processing equipment, etc.
The political aspect deals with items such as the internal
CRITERIA FOR
COMPARISON
ORGANIZATIONAL FEASIBILITY
ECONOMIC VIABILITY
IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPACT ON FUTURE 8PACE DEVELOPMENT
EXPANSION OF THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY
CUSTOMER SUPPORT
SUPPORT OF ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES
TABLE 2
political structure within
pressure from outside.
such as the location
important. Outside the
the organization and political
Within the organization, questions
and possession of power become
organization, in the question of
shuttle management, the political aspect includes the normal
activities of politics in the national arena. The cultural
aspect of the issue deals with the cultural make-up of both
the work force and the organization and includes
value systems, historical values, and social norms
few. The question here is how successful
organization be in accepting, adapting to, and
imposed managerial structure.
beliefs,
to name a
will the
using an
3.2 ECONOMIC VIABILITY
Will NASA and the United States both be able and willing
to accept the cost of an imposed management system? Will
this acceptance be manifested in congressional approval of
funding? Is a given alternative a good use of the funds? Is
it cost effective? Both
considerations of funding
considered.
long term and short term
levels and cost control must be
3.3 IMPLICATIONS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Even though this was listed as a complicating factor it
is also a criterion for selection. Any imposed management
system must meet the needs of the Nation regarding security.
3.4 IMPACT OF THE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ON FUTURE SPACE
DEVELOPMENT
The question here is how will a given management system
affect future space operations and development. Does a
management system lend itself to the expansion of the shuttle
program into other areas and provide for a smooth transition?
Does a given choice hinder, aid, or not affect future space
R/D programs?
3.5 EXPANSION OF THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY
Here the issue is the degree to which a management
system allows for the expansion of technology and the related
dissemination of the new information. The influx of new
technology into our society is, of course, one of the reasons
our space program is so valuable to the American people.
3.6 CUSTOMER SUPPORT
Any management system must be able to support the users
of the product. In the case at hand, the customers of NSTS
consist of NASA itself, DOD, and commercial payloads. These
customers will, at the least, be concerned with timely
missions, reliability, ease of use, and good cost control.
3.7 SUPPORT OF ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Perhaps this goes with out saying.
included for the sake of completeness.
However, it is
Whatever the
objectives of the organization may be, any system must be
chosen with the intent of supporting these objectives both as
they currently stand and as they may be predicted to change.
4.0 ALTERNATIVES FOR THE MANAGEMENTOF NSTS
There are as many different options to manage the
shuttle as there are people to come up with ideas. The main
alternatives are listed in
being summarized in Table 4.
expansion of these tables.
Table 3 with the pros and cons
The following discussion is an
The idea here is to take the
alternatives which have
evaluate them by use of the criteria in section 3.
this process, while the complicating factors
may not explicitly appear, they certainly
implicit impact on the evaluation.
been considered in earlier works and
In doing
of section 2.2
will have an
4.1 DODAS THE PRIMARY MANAGER
The Department of Defense (DOD)
customers of the space shuttle program.
is one of the major
Consequently, there
are several advantages to DOD running the shuttle program.
From a national security standpoint it is hard to imagine a
more secure form of management. With the growing emphasis on
the Strategic Defense Initiative, this form of management
would certainly provide for a close relationship. DOD has
some experience with flying in space with its space command
and with its close relationship with NASA. This last
ii
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MANAGEMENT OF NSTS
* DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
* OTHER EXISTING AGENCY
* A NEW GOVERNMENT AGENCY
* PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT
* NASA DOING BUSINESS AS USUAL
* NASA BUILDS A NEW OPERATIONAL ARM
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relationship has also given them some insight into the
shuttle and its related problems. In addition, DOD has had a
large amount of experience with operational systems and
moving R/D projects to an operational status.
Economically, DODmanagement of the shuttle seems to be
almost neutral. In the short term, this would increase the
budget of DOD significantly but would not seem to be too
large an increment in the overall picture. In the long term,
DOD management would not seem to be conducive to allowing the
shuttle program to develop areas of economic return.
As has been pointed out earlier, the shuttle has and
will continue to have a large R/D component. For DOD to
manage the shuttle program would require a larger degree of
R/D expertise than DOD currently has with space hardware. In
this same vein, even though there is some degree of
nebulousness about the exact statement of the missions of the
two organizations, one thing is clear, there is a large
difference between them. To use DOD to manage the shuttle
would be a bad mix of these objectives and a would provide a
dilution of mission for both organizations. This would also
make for a competition for resources for space development.
There is a large probability that there would be
considerable political pressure against DOD managing the
shuttle. The US has taken a public posture on the use of
space for peaceful means. This political pressure could come
from both th% people of the US and from foreign countries.
There is no reason to suppose that DOD would be terrible
concerned with customer needs outside of DOD, thereby slowing
the commercialization of space. In
dissemination of space technology to the
might also conceivably suffer.
As a final point, DODmanagement would not
fertile ground for future space development
necessary narrow focus on national security.
includes the integration of the shuttle
station but other activities as well.
addition, the
American public
allow for a
due to their
This not only
with the space
4.2 OTHER EXISTING GOVERNMENTAGENCY
There are a few advantages to having another existing
government agency such as the Department of Transportation
taking over the management of the Shuttle. Perhaps the most
viable of these is that the agency would have to build a new
organization which would correspondingly have no in-bred bias
or preconceived notions.
built which would meet
transportation system.
This would allow structure to be
the specific needs of a space
As an example, a new organization
could be structured to take a very aggressive market position
to help allay costs of launches. Since the structure would
be new, there would no cultural difficulties with the mission
of the new organization.
Most of the disadvantages of DOD management apply to any
other government agency. These include dilution of mission
and a bad mix of organizational objectives along with future
w
space development problems and a competition for resources
for space development. Added to these considerations are the
fact that this would be an expensive option due to the need
for new structure to be built. In addition, another agency
would have little if any technical ability or experience with
space and no experience with the shuttle. Realistically, the
technical ability will come from existing NASA/contractor
personnel and would bring along all the biases, culture, and
preconceived notions that already exist in NASA.
4.3 A NEWGOVERNMENTAGENCY
In addition to the advantages listed above for an
existing government agency, building a new agency to manage
the shuttle would show a strong national commitment to space
transportation. The disadvantages are likewise similar with
one notable exception. Of all the options considered this
would perhaps be the single most expensive. A new
administrative structure would have to be built as well as
the operating struc£ure. In addition, it is
building a new government agency would
acceptable.
not clear that
be politically
4.4 PRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENT
The advantages of this management structure would
include those of any new organization built to manage the
shuttle. Included in these are the establishment of a
culture which would be supportive of the operational space
environment and taking an aggressive market position. This
type of structure has the potential to be very supportive of
the customer since private industry is, as a rule, used to
thinking in this vein.
Some technical expertise certainly exists in the private
aerospace community as well as operating experience although
it is not clear that any one company would have the amount of
expertise necessary to operate over the long term.
Politically, this system might be difficult to implement
for numerous reasons. The size of the contract would bring
"pork barrel" considerations to bear as well as perhaps be
damaging to free enterprise in the space realm.
This management style would be _ad for the future
development of space since it is not clear that private
enterprise can be far-seeing enough to meet future needs.
Specifically, the interface of
might suffer in the short
disadvantage national security
this style of management.
Perhaps the major disadvantage
the shuttle with the station
term. As another major
problems would abound with
to this style of
management is economic.
shuttle and its processing that
difficult for private industry
problem is compounded by the fact
There is so much variability in the
it would be extremely
to control costs. This
that in all likelyhood the
shuttle will never be cost effective in that flights will pay
for themselves.
4.5 NASA DOING BUSINESS AS USUAL
Because NASA has done a good job with national security
and the expansion of technology, this style is strong
regarding these two factors. It is not quite as strong for
the future development of space since operational concerns
will distract the R/D side of the house and will compete for
resources. Due to the visibility of flying this competition
for resources might be more favorable for operations than for
R/D. Technically, NASA has the expertise to fly but it is
not clear that they have the expertise to maintain an
operational program. The political question is a mixed bag
with the strong support NASA has had in the past having to be
tempered with the influx of various governmental committees
investigating NASA as a result of the Challenger accident.
In the short term, this is perhaps the least costly of the
alternatives. On the other hand, this may be a very costly
option in the long haul if the shuttle program does not meet
the needs of the nation.
Culturally, the present employees at NASA are not geared
to run an operational system over a long period of time. The
comments under the previous demographic section apply very
strongly here as do the arguments in section five. In
addition to this disadvantage, the operational objectives
compete with and do not mix well with the overall objectives
of NASA. As a last disadvantage, NASA seems to have had
difficulties in dealing with customers in the past. If
anything they have been overly responsive to customers
causing late manifest
cargo.
changes and lack of standardization of
4.6
This structure seems to be
for the long term management
this leaves the management of
which seems to be well met
NASA BUILDS A NEW OPERATIONAL ARM
the best of the alternatives
of the shuttle. Politically
space with NASA, an option
by the American people.
Technically, this would allow for strong ties with the R/D
community which designed the shuttle as well as allow for the
infusion of operational technical expertise. A culture could
be built in a new organization which was supportive of the
space operational environment. It would be at least as good
for national security, the future development of space, and
technology expansion as the business as usual option since
many if not all of these functions would be carried over to
the new operational arm. In fact, the operation of the space
station should be simplified. It could be structured to
exhibit more control and service for the customer service
area. It would also help to alleviate the problems
associated with the dilution of the organizational objectives
problem which business as usual would experience.
The major disadvantage to this option would be the fact
that it would be slightly more expensive than the business as
usual option in the short term due to the creation of a new
sub-administrative system for an operational arm. However,
this disadvantage should not be too severe since most of this
structure would have to be created under the business as
usual option anyway. In the long haul, this should have
economic advantages over the business as usual option in that
it would allow for a closer control of operational costs and
a cleaner separation of these costs from those of R/D.
To sum up the arguments presented, only two options are
in essence viable: business as usual and the operational arm.
The operational arm provides the best of both worlds in that
it carries with it the technical R/D expertise of NASA while
allowing for a cleaner operational environment. However, it
is fully expected that many will have trouble appreciating
the need to separate the operational realm from the R/D
realm. It is for this reason that the following section is
presented.
5.0 WHY SEPARATE R/D FROM OPERATIONS?
A simplistic answer to this question is because the two
management systems follow entirely different sequences and
neither can function smoothly inside the other. They are
inherently different because of the diversity of the
management structure, political system, and cultural
philosophy. The organizational ethos, motivational stimuli
and communication system are different (12). The functions
of one performed under the structure of the other is liable
to produce sub-optimal results. The desired operational
functions for the smooth operation and the future direction
of the space shuttle program cannot be completely fulfilled
under the present R/D structure at NASA. When the objective
of smooth performance cannot be reached under the present
structure, then a change is necessary.
At this point, the problem has
tentative solution has been proposed.
argument is to gain a better understanding of the two
management systems. This understanding, while clarifying
some of the aspects, should substantially both motivate and
ease the planning and implementation process. Furthermore,
while implementing the change, although it will be necessary
to study everything in detail as the plan proceeds, it often
helps to gain a macro perspective of the environment before
the start of the actual planning. Sections 5.1 and 5.2
provide a macro view of R/D and operations management. A
pair wise comparison of different organizational elements of
the two management systems (taken from referance 4) is
presented in Table 5. These thirteen elements will further
help in understanding the
change. The diversity of
apparent from the table,
been identified and a
The next step in the
phase for the planned transition. Section 6 provides
guidelines for adapting the proper mechanism of transition
and ends with some suggestions for facilitating the process.
system of before and after the
the two management systems is
which suggests a careful planning
TABLE _. CHARACTERISTICS CHART OF R&D vs. OPERATIONAL MANAGEME_
i
ELEMENTS OF
ORGANIZATION
1 .OBJECTIVES
AND
TARGETS
2.ORGANIZ-
ATIONAL
STRUCTURE
3.SYSTEM
HIERARCH-
IES
4. LEADERSHIP
BEHAVIOR
5.SYSTEM
MANAGEMENT
6.PERFOR-
MANCE
CRITERIA
R&DMANAGEMENT
* Discovering and furthering
knowl#dge under corporate
plannlng.
* Provide technical services
to functional departments.
* qbjectives are . generally
aerlnea as opposea to means.
* Lookinq for significant
breakthroughs.
* Fragmented: Divisional,
Functional, and Flexible.
* Allows easy transfer of info-
rmation and personnel (I0).
* Authority is based upon the
technical expertise (7).
* Commitment ho the task is
negotiated.
* Responsible to proyide input
to the strategic planning on
a Droactive basis, ana not
solely reactively (6).
* Proviae proper career
development .p rog rams for
scientlsts ano researchers.
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT
* Fullfilment of well defined
purpose which are reason for
its creatlon ana exlstance.
* Achievement of the economic
balance between demand and
resources.
* Looking for minor changes in
incremental fashion.
* Concerned about stability of
the system.
* Hierarchical.
* Specialized, and
defined tasks.
clearly
* Authority is based upon the
organiza%ional position _7).
* _esponsibilities are mostly
accepted.
* Provide behavioral and tech-
nical support at all levels.
* Provide motivation and the
targets for achievement.
* Uni£y of command.
* Frovlae technical guidance
on how and what as to De
performed.
Easy access to resources.
No short term work pressures.
* Co.rporate strategy must be
ariven without long formal
process.
* Self directed and mostly
responsible for own work
Open discussions.
Friendly competition.
* Decentralized power base
* Long-term, risk / reward
oriented on new businesses.
* Encourages the strategic
innovatzon.
* Defined/restricted access to
resources.
* Institutional organizational
channels.
* R&D and ventures must be
tied-in with other growth
oriented activities.
* Worker is a part of the"
whole; guidelines are there-
fore necessary for coordinat-
ing activities.
* More focused power base.
* Short-term, result oriented
on existing businesses.
* Short-term evaluation
programs are used where
exte?nal factors are easily
predlctable.
ELEMENTS OFORGANIZATION
7.REWARDSYSTEM
8.COMMUN-
ICATIONSYSTEM
9.INFORMAT-
ION SYSTEM
10.FLEX-
IBILITY
II.WORK ENV-
IRONMENT
12.CULTURAL
CLIMATE
13.POLITICAL
CLIMATE
TABLE5 (CONTINUED).
R&D MANAGEMENT
* Recognition, status, and
more complex assignments(10).
* Across the major operating
Units (10).
* Mostly informal networks of
communication.
* Communication at low level.
* Forward and outward oriented
towards future needs.
* Large amounts of the data
recelved and processed.
* Long-term commitment to the
Dro]ects.
* Flexible control of people.
* Mostly unaireg_ed activlty.
* Koom for creativity.
* Friendly, with respect for
Deers.
* Working with, instead of
working for.
* Intellectual freedom.
* Flexibility to some extend
in organizati_al rules.
Motivation by pe@r recoqnit-ion and job satls_action[18).
Internallzed stanaaras, as a
result of extensive training.
* Cqllegial @pproval sought;
otten based upon long run
quality (7).
* Loyal to profession and
organization; seek collegial "
approval and extern@l
recognition; identiry with
goals, values and incentives
of profession (9).
* Referent, . information and
expertise is the source of
power for people with high
maturity.
OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT
* Financial and hierarchical
progression (I0).
* Within major operatfng unit.
* Lateral communlcation is too
specialized and at high
levels.
* Formal communication network.
* Highly structured
the need of
businesses (i0).
* Minimum amount of
ion is handled.
towards
existing
informat-
* Competitive and financially
oriented.
* Motivated by rewards, job
satis£action, recognitlon ot
o_ work ana authorltv.
* Established norms _or the
overall Qrganizational
rationality; often basea on
short term efficiency.
* High work pressure.
* Loyal to organization; seek
super-ordinate approval and
recggnition; idehtify with
goals, values ana incentives
o£ organization.
* Organlzational .participants
are in contest for resources
and their control.
* Competitive and target
oriented.
* Structured work schedule#. .
* Conformance to organizatlonal
rules.
* Formal work environment.
* Short-term schedule of the
changes.
* Structured job discription.
* Limited undlrected activity.
* Flexibility to allow room
for produc%ivity.
5.1 WHAT IS R/D MANAGEMENT?
The key to a successful research and development
organization is the very presence of the atmosphere of
creativity (3). The approaches taken and followed by the
management have a tremendous potential to increase the morale
and productivity of the organization. Perhaps the most
important consideration for effective R/D management is the
judicious balancing of the behavioral and technoeconomic
factors. R/D requires a collaborative, rather than
competitive work environment and flexibility in the operating
procedures. The management job, while maintaining the
economic viability of the organization, is to provide the
following features for establishing a creative climate (15):
o Autonomy and challenge to the individuals and groups;
o Responsiveness to individual ideas:
o Nurturing of puzzlement and wonderment;
o Tolerance of differences of ideas; and
o Inter and intra organizational communication.
The extent to which the_e features are to be provided or
made available to a research group depends upon the type of
work involved. For example, the creativity of an undirected
research group follQwing an offensive/defensive strategy
should itself be "undirected", since ideally its desired
output is a continued but unspecified flow of novel inventive
ideas (15,19). Much of the work in this category involves
conceptualization and theoretical investigation (5). This
intellectually demanding activity performed mostly by highly
mature scientists demands low bureaucratic activity and a
more supportive work environment. Whereas, the success of
the company following an applications engineering strategy is
dependent upon the continued ability of its development
engineers to provide creative solutions to particular
problems in a timely manner (19). These two examples,
user
in a
way, are the two extremes of an R/D environment. Most
situations require a mixture of complete autonomy on some
subjects and considerable control on the others. Whatever
may be the situation, it is important to realize that the
very survival of an R/D organization is dependent upon its
ability to be creative and innovative_ and this objective
must not be sacrificed for any short term goals.
Effective Research and Development: The function of an
effective R/D management is not only that of the usual short
term planning for the control of uncertainties and daily
routines, but is also that of planning for the future growth
and direction of the organization (16). A representative R/D
organization may have
objectives along with
(6,19):
one or more of the following
some secondary objectives
primary
as well
o Discovering and expanding knowledge;
o Developing new products;
o Improving existing products;
o Finding new uses for the existing products;
o Improving production processes;
o Finding potential uses for by-products or waste products
o generated by the present production system;
o Providing technical services to the functional
departments in the organization;
o Analyzing and studying competitors.
How these functions and objectives are realized is the
responsibility of the R/D management. Quite often it is
possible that objectives may have conflicting requirements.
Under such circumstances, it is again the responsibility of
management to find a compromise
sacrifice organizational interests.
while making such decisions is to
survival of the R/D organization
ability of its members to
formula which does not
An important aspect
remember that the very
is dependent upon the
foster innovation. Any
organizational policy which curbs the innovative environment
will eventually result in substandard performance by the
organization. Indeed the organizational
produce creativity, but are aimed at
individuals to be creative (21).
Besides the proper environment,
requires the right kind of people to do the job (ii).
demands people like Newton who can work independently
come up with innovative ideas for undirected research.
attributes do not
motivating the
the organization
R/D
and
When
the research is of a directed
people like Archimedes who have
under pressure is warranted. In simple terms,
organization requires people who can perform
nature, then the hiring of
the capability of working
the R/D
the work
expected of them. Furthermore, a forum must be created that
allows the top researchers in the organization to effectively
communicate with each other and with the management of the
organization. The proper interface will help provide for a
better utilization of the resources and a closer conformation
to the corporate management strategy (ii).
The next issue is that of behavioral and technoeconomic
considerations for the highly motivated researchers. R/D
people are educated and mature. Inherently they require a
collaborative environment in which the decision making
process is shared. The day-to-day decision making is also
mostly delegated, and operating procedures are flexible to
support and encourage the ingenuity
interaction between superiors and
informal, is usually at a low key.
of the researchers. The
subordinates being
One common trait of R/D
people is their desire for perfection. At times the cost of
perfection goes beyond the limits of the control system. In
such situations, a compromise solution is necessary which
does not discourage the researchers.
Operational Characteristics of R/D Management: Difficulties
arise on the economic side of the R/D picture. While it is
mandatory for management to provide the right kind of
environment to foster innovation,
cost associated with the provision
problem is that everyone is not
organization does not need one
an Einstein and
either. What
unfortunately, there is a
of this environment. One
every
every
organization does require is economic viability. Moreover,
the lack of historical data to evaluate alternatives makes
the problem of economic analysis difficult, and the presence
of so many intangibles further complicates planning. Any
activity directed toward control could actually be curbing
innovation and should therefore be cautiously planned and
enforced. The question arises as to the solution of
maintaining such a delicate environment. The one phrase
answer to the situation is "balancing of behavioral and
technoeconomic considerations" (19). The responsibility of
R/D management is to perform that function without hindering
creativity.
5.2 WHAT IS OPERATIONSMANAGEMENT?
The function of operations management is to provide
goods and services to satisfy the anticipated demand. Due to
the quantitative nature of the function, this performance can
be evaluated on the basis of physical and economic
considerations (8,17). The criteria of physical performance
are those related to the quantity and the quality of the work
produced. Whereas those related to the economic
considerations are the measures of how effectively %he
resources were utilized to gain the overall objectives of the
organization. The economic considerations include timing and
location of the production, along with the equipment,
material, energy and labor utilization. All of these
considerations must be converted to common economic terms in
order to evaluate the contribution of the resources toward
the overall objectives of the organization.
The objectives of operations are well defined and
quantifiable, which simplifies their evaluation. Similarly,
performance is also measurable in terms of how well
management handles the conversion process that transforms the
inputs into the desired outputs.
working model and performance
management are well established.
This implies that the
criteria of operations
Moreover, because the
structure which forms the basis of management control is well
established, the working philosophy of the operations
management is relatively easy to implement.
Effective Operations Management: An important factor in the
smooth functioning of an operations management is the
presence of a well structured organization. The leadership
of the organization is instrumental in providing this
function. It is also responsible for the setting up of
operational objectives and smooth work flow. A major
function of the leadership of operations management is
maintaining the future direction for the economic growth of
the organization. In other words, it is responsible for what
the organization must do to remain economically viable. How
this goal is to be accomplished
participative environment in order
commitment of the employees. In
operations management requires:
should preferably be in a
to gain the support and
addition, the effective
o Healthy and competitive work environment;
o Judicious reward and incentive system;
o Independence in decision making in congruence with the
organizational guidelines;
o Formality in the procedures;
o Flexibility to change.
Characteristics of Operations Management: The evaluation of
operations management is much easier than that of R/D
management. Most of the variables in operations management
are quantitative and therefore can be measured and appraised.
The leadership function
management situation, is
environment. Unlike R/D,
of the organization is
of planning, as in any other
very important in the operations
where most of the future direction
prescribed by the scientists and
researchers working within the corpbrate philosophy, the
operations management has the primary responsibility for this
function. However, the planning function of "what has to be
done", performed by top management should not be interpreted
to imply non-participation by the employees. The employee
participation is very important in determining "how it could
I
be done", primarily because they have the expertise and
definite interests in the area. The absence of participation
in the latter situation can very likely result in low morale,
lack of commitment to the work, and eventually lower
productivity. The other requirement, as discussed before, in
the smooth functioning of operations is the presence of a
well defined structure. These two requirements may seem to
be at odds with each other, and indeed there is a delicate
relationship between them. There is a definite need to have
established operating units with defined functional
boundaries. Within the boundaries there is tremendous room
for employee participation which will enhance the smooth
working of the operating unit.
cooperation and participation
linkages are important from a
Further, there is a need for
between operating units. Such
macro perspective and they
reduce the need for a strict control system, thereby
improving the productivity. The organizational structure
must provide for such defined channels to insure that
cooperation can be achieved.
6.0 BUILDING AN OPERATIONAL ARM FOR THE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
As is apparent from the presentation of R/D and
operations management the two organizational structures
follow a different course of action. The diversity of the
two systems shows how difficult it is to manage the space
shuttle program under the present R/D management umbrella.
NASA has the people who have been performing the function of
running the shuttle program. For the kind of work involved,
they may have been working under what appears to be a sub-
optimal organizational structure. They are experts in an
area which is functionally different from the kind of work
they will be expected to perform in the long haul.
under such circumstances
structure, but also the
systems of the program.
The first step in satisfying
identifying the problem.
The need
only the
this need
The second step
is that of
is finding a
solution to the problem, followed by a way to implement the
solution. Finally, the last step is that of implementing the
solution.
When NASA is convinced that it needs to change the
present framework of the shuttle program to an operational
arm, it needs to go through an organizational transition to
reach the desired state of operation. The authors have
developed a "Transition Life Cycle Model" for organizational
changes (12). The problem of building an operational arm for
the space shuttle program is a candidate example for the
application of this theory. The characteristics chart of
Table 6 (taken from referance 12) presents the role of five
major elements of the organization during the four phases of
the transition management. The first phase of the above
model, called the creativity phase, requires a deliberation
process by all involved in the change process (4,12). The
requirement is that of establishing the uncertainty levels of
is that of changing not
technical, political, and cultural
_aLS 6. C&_CT_SI_CS _ OF _NSITICN _ LIFE CYULE
L_ENIS CF
RGANIZATICN
.OK_fZVES
AND
.C_CANIZ-
ATICNAL
LFAEERSHIP
B_AVICR
SYSTEM
!
CRFATIVITY PHASE
* Create awareness
for the chan_.
* St_ the p_blem.
* defihe ebjecti_s.
* Weigh alternatives.
* fo_ulate a mednan-
ism for d%_nge. _
* Gather support for
the dmn_.
* Info_l organizat-
ien structure. _he
ag_rymaintain its
capacity.
* Full ommitment to
, _managq_nt.
Provlde input to
strat_ic olanni_.
* Provid_ behavioral
and technical s_p-
ort at all levels.
* Decentralized Dower
base of transi%ion
* _o_ to the
mr_ the p ._n_
* Particlpatlcn in
decision making.
* _ strategic
innovatlon.
_ PHASE __ FHASE SE_ILIZATI_ PHASE
process develo_d
as a result of _el-
iteration activity.
* M_mitor the cost,
Derfon_anoe. and
time frame for the
d_x,=je. •
Matrixwith major
fooas ot control
towards transition
management gr_4D.
* Unity_ of ocm_and.
* _rovlde motivation
and targets for
achieverent.
_ Delegation of
__ibility.
Ize on
* Defined/restricted
acoess to the
_ Restrictedto st ategic plan.
Instuticniliz_
q;ganizational
ch_mrels for work.
Focused p_w_r base.
* (bnfo_manee to the
Strategic plan.
Critically review * Study the stablethe _ p ocess, organization an_
Plan and implement h_3othesize if the
strategy. * Disintegrate tran-
sition management
Matrix with focus
towards evaluating
and r_mn!_ th_
strategic plan.
Delegation of
br_i_ c_.
* Delegation of work
in the
* _uation of
the strat@gic plan.
* Instuticnizing the
ommunicaticn _han-
nels of the ne_
env_.
* Conf_ to the
strategic plan.
team.
Effectively utilize
human and nQn-human
•n the
new syst_n.
• Reorganization to
the _esired state
of operation.
• Stabilize the
system hierarchies.
• _ide motivation
for the people in
new env_nt.
• Plan and implement
the proper needs
of the new systan.
• Effectively util-
ize the employees
In rr_ new
positions.
• Perfon_anee in the
new syst_n.
the technical, political, and cultural aspects of the space
shuttle program. The choices" available from the literature
range from the Dissipative Change Model (2) to Logical
Incrementalism (18). In fact, both of these extreme
situations are rather infeasible in the case under study.
The experience obtained by several years of flying in space
has shown to a large degree that incremental change is far
too unresponsive to meet the rapidly changing needs of the
program. Similarly, because of the complexity of the
technical process, cultural diversity of the management
systems, and public exposure as a result of the space shuttle
Challenger accident, it would be
change in an instantaneous manner.
parallel track management model.
difficult to implement the
A realistic choice is a
The research oriented
cultural atmosphere prevalent at NASA'as well as their past
history lends weight to this choice. For a more in-depth
discussion of possible structures = see reference (14).
In the parallel track model, the two management
structures function simultaneously in the transition state:
" [
one conducts the organizational business as usual while the
other manages the transition (I). It is not uncommon for the
managers to function simultaneously in both structures.
During the change process, the rate of organizational change
is determined by the transition management team's analysis of
feedback from the environment, operational managers and
employees (14). The parallel track model provides a
structured direction for transforming the present set-up into
!
a new framework in which the management of the shuttle takes
place under an operational arm.
7.0 SUMMARY
The main conclusion of this report is nothing new. It
has been reached in most of the preceding studies considering
this question. Perhaps what is new is the logic leading to
the conclusion. If nothing else, it is of importance that
this conclusion was reached after both a significant amount
of flight experience and the Challenger accident.
The report can be thought of as consisting of three
separate parts: the first presents complicating factors and
criterion for evaluation, the second is the evaluation of the
alternatives leading to the operational arm conclusion, and
the third is the rationale for separating R/D and operations
and the methodology for transition. It is fully expected
that NASA management will for the most part agree with the
first part of this report. They will also agree that the
only two viable alternatives are the business as usual option
and the operational arm. However, it is at this junction
that the authors and NASA may diverge. For this reason, the
separation argument was presented in detail. Some may feel
with the separation of the shuttle program into a separate
office that an operations arm is already in place. This is
yet another reason for the presentation of the separation
argument.
What does seem
shuttle program as a separate entity
establishment of a parallel track
to be true is that the existance of the
is the beginning of the
system to create an
operational arm. If this is the case, then there needs to be
a creation of vision and strategic goals which clearly points
out the direction of the agency. However, these two vital
elements seem to be currently missing from the agency, which
shows an ultra-conservative management process. This is
truly amazing for an organization that is so bold in its
conquest of space.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
1.0 INTRODUCTION-ASSUMPTIONS AND GOALS
I.i ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions and opinions are built into
the rest of this chapter and are stated here for completeness
and in aid of following the rationale of the arguments
presented.
The Years of 1987 and 1988 Will b__ee Years of Turmoil,
Uncertainty and Instability fo___rNSTS: It will take at least
two years for the program to settle down as a result of the
aftermath of the Challenger accident and the resultant
investigations.
NASA is Currently
the effort of NSTS is being spent supporting
to the various commissions investigating the
result of Challenger.
in a Response Mode o__[ Mana@ement: Much of
and responding
agency as a
Currently Ther_____ei___s N___o Integrated_ Coordinated Plan For
Transition: If such a plan exists then it has not been well
communicated throughout the agency. Certaintly there is no
participative system dedicated towards developing such a
plan.
There i__ssSome Degree of Confusion About the Strategic Goals
of the Shuttle Program: A recent survey of Dr. Mark Markly
of the University of Houston-Clear Lake brought this point
home when he found a significant population at JSC which did
not seem to understand the strategic goals of the agency.
The Demographics of
Manage an Operational Era:
the last annual report.
demographics chapter of
NASA are Currently in Poor Shoe to
This assumption is unchanged from
Further explanation lies in the
this report. Conversely, the
demographics are in good shape to begin the management of the
transition period.
There is No Real Pressure on NSTS to Transition to an
Operational Mode in the Near Future: In fact, Challenger may
have created just the reverse pressure. If any real resource
is committed to this problem it is yet to surface in a
visiable manner.
1.2 GOALS
In order for
goals are essential:
the NSTS to transition the following two
o NSTS MUST BEGIN INTEGRATED AND LONG RANGE PLANNING FOR
TRANSITION. THIS INCLUDES THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
COMMUNICATION OF STRATEGIC GOALS.
o NSTS MUST SEEK NEW METHODS OF
ACCOMPLISHINGTHE STRATEGIC GOALS
ERA.
DOING BUSINESS AND
FOR THE OPERATIONAL
These two goals are interrelated. Without a plan, a
smooth transition will not occur. Without communication of
the plan to the workforce, unified support of the plan is not
possible. Once strategic goals are established, then new
methods, in the sense of different from the old or usual
ones, must be found to accomplish these goals. One of the
recurring themes of this report is that the old methods will
have difficulty accomplishing operational goals.
1.3 INTRODUCTORYCOMMENTS
The rest of this chapter is devoted to specific
recommendations and their related reasons. While the shuttle
is on a stand down basis the pressure on management should be
reduced to the point where there is time to concentrate on
strategic questions. It is equally as important to lay a
good foundation for an operational era as it is to get back
to flying. Strategic considerations have a long lead time.
Now is the time to begin the transition process in earnest.
These recommendations are aimed at beginning the process.
It is a firm belief of this research team that NASA must
solve its own problems. The only value of an outside
influence such as this team is that of stimulating the
thought and problem solving process at NASA. It is in this
light that the recommendations are presented.
2.0 EVALUATE THE RISK MANAGEMENTSYSTEM
A task force needs to be formed to evaluate the risk
management system in light of Appendix VII F. The purpose of
this task force would be to determine if the risk management
system would have identified the problems found since the
stand down in a timely manner and whether the program would
have been able to react to such findings if the flight rate
was as predicted.
3.0 EDUCATENASA ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN R/D AND
OPERATIONS
Until this is done, many at NASA will believe in the
work harder, faster argument. Efforts need to be expended to
insure that all elements of the shuttle program understand
how their environment will be changed when the shuttle enters
the operational era. Without this understanding, it will be
impossible to insure a smooth transition ...... _ ....
4.0 DESIGN FOR PRODUCTION AND QUALITY
A new orbiter is being built. Programs and structures
are being changed. Now is a good time to emphasize that
quality should be built in from the bottom up. This issue
needs some leadership
level management.
Production issues such as
shortening of transportation lines need to be
in the form of committment from upper
standardization and the
addressed. In
addition, it is important to cross train to ensure that the
interface between design and production is smoothed.
Directions for operational viability need to be determined.
5.0 EVALUATEAND
YEAR
INITIATE VALID RECOMMENDATIONSFROM LAST
The recommendations from last year need to be evaluated
by upper level management. The valid ones of these need to
be initiated. These recommendations (see "An Investigation
of Transitional Management Problems for the NSTS at NASA,
annual report, 15 Jan 85-15 Jan 86, cont no. 9-bc4-19-4-1p)
are listed below. The original report should be read for an
in-depth discussion.
o Begin the planning.
o Begin to build the structure.
o Increase employee's awareness
and of transition.
o Begin to model the demographics.
o Start to build monitoring systems to track transition.
of operational concepts
6.0 EVALUATE AND INTITIATE OPERATIONAL STRATEGIES
A committee such as the recent Phillip's committee needs
to be appointed by the administrator to evaluate the
operational arm concept. Then operational strategic goals
need to be determined and communicated to the work force. If
an operational arm is the objective then plans to obtain that
objective must also be established and communicated. A
process to accomplish this action is included in last year's
recommendation to begin the planning.
